Dr Abdul Rashid -v- West Yorkshire Police

Bradford Combined Court Centre is the scene for the opening of a civil claim between Dr Abdul Rashid and West Yorkshire Police. It concerns the arrest and imprisonment of Dr Rashid in 2012 and alleged trespass on his home. The pre-action letter claiming damages, exemplary damages and special damages was sent to the police in October, 2015.

The arrest of Dr Rashid was, purportedly, in connection with Operation Thatcham, an investigation into fraudulent ‘cash for crash’ motor insurance claims. 48 offenders were eventually convicted in two separate trials in 2014.

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Dr Rashid, at the time of the arrest, operated a successful medico-legal practice examining and reporting on those injured in such incidents. He was, in all cases, instructed by either lawyers, or claims management companies, and his reports were for the use of the courts, as independent expert evidence, rather than for the benefit of personal injury claimants.

He was also a general practitioner, operating from two different surgeries, under the auspices of the Bradford Patient Care Trust.

The hearing, expected to last nine court sitting days, starting on Monday 9th September, 2019, will be presided over by Mr Recorder Nolan QC.

The claimaint is represented by Ian Pennock of counsel, instructed by solicitor, Simon Blakeley; the police are represented by Olivia Checa-Dover and Daniel Penman of counsel, instructed by solicitor, Alison Walker, Deputy Head of Legal Services at WYP.

A report on earlier case management and pre-trial hearings can be viewed here.

Monday 9th September, 2019

Proceedings opened at 10.45am.

A panel of eight jurors has been selected (the prescribed number in civil claims) with two reserves. They have been sent home until 10am on Tuesday. Mr Pennock is expected to begin his opening speech shortly after that time.

The court will hear evidence from five witnesses for the claimant and the police will be calling two officers to give evidence on their behalf.

The trial bundle presently extends to 12 densely packed lever arch files.

There are a number of ‘housekeeping’ matters for the judge and counsel to deal with after the lunch adjournment. These cannot be reported until the conclusion of the trial, unless permission is given by the judge.

Court rose at 3.30pm.

Tuesday 10th September, 2019

The judge is now in court and the jury filed in a little late at 10.15am

Following an oral application made by the police yesterday afternoon, the judge has discharged the jury and he will now hear the case alone. The application was grounded in Civil Procedure Rules (CPR 3.1(1)(m) and 3.3) which cover case management powers and section 66(3) of the County Court Act, 1994. The judge ruled that it would be ‘utterly inconvenient’ for a jury to sit and sift through what he described as ‘a shedload’ of documents, including a policy (investigation) log that extended to 200 pages.

There is no automatic right to a jury trial in a civil claim (in legal terms it is a ‘qualified right’) and the applicable legal test is whether it is ‘convenient’ for a jury to do so. Given the sheer volume of paper (4512 pages in total), and complexity of some of the issues to be tried, the judge found that it, plainly, was not convenient and made his Order accordingly.

With no jury in a fact-finding role, the shape of the trial alters and there will now be a reduced number of witnesses on the claimant’s side.

There is a short break whilst legal discussions take place. Detective Sergeant Mark Taylor, as he was at the time of the arrest, will give evidence first, followed by DC Andrew Christie (no relation to retired WYP inspector, Cedric Christie, who features elsewhere on this website). Mr Taylor is now a detective inspector based in Bradford. He will be mostly referred to in these reports as DI Taylor.

The judge returned to court at 11am with a warning against use of mobile phones as cameras or recording devices. He had received a report that there was such use in court yesterday afternoon. He reminded all present that this is regarded as a serious contempt of court.

DI Taylor is now being examined on his witness statement in the case by Miss Checa-Dover. The court has heard a chronology of events, and details of the nominals involved, in the prior investigation that led to the launch of Operation Thatcham, the ‘crash for cash’ investigation. Dr Rashid, the police say, was arrested as part of this wide ranging probe.

The focus of the prior investigation was mortgage fraud and led to the conviction of two brothers, Nadeem Khalid and Thazeem Khalid.

The court heard that the Huddersfield (or Kirklees) district, where DI Taylor was based with the Proceeds of Crime (POCA) team, was an insurance motor claim ‘hotspot’, according to data produced by both the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB). The MoJ is the statutory regulator for those involved in the running of claims management companies; the IFB is a not-for-profit organisation specifically focused on the detection and prevention of organised insurance fraud. Earlier, pre-trial hearings of this claim have heard that the MoJ and IFB were partners in the Thatcham investigation.

Two claims management companies were of particular interest to the police: Advanced Claims Ltd and Concept Accident Management Ltd. There was also an associated car hire company with shared directors, Advanced Car Hire Ltd. Nadeem Khalid and another local man, Sahir Mohammed were the principals involved in those companies, the police say. DI Taylor told the court that Op Thatcham was, initially, focusing on those associated with Nadeem. The police also say that the latter’s business activities also included a company registered as NK Business Consultants Ltd.

Court adjourns at 13.05 with DI Taylor part-heard. He has been taken through a chronology of events, based on policy log entries, that presently stands at the end of November, 2011. DI Taylor has invited the court to view the policy log as more of an investigation log than a record of decisions, rationales and records of actions taken. Detective Constable Mark Lunn was responsible for many of the entries to which the court has been taken. DC Lunn was the Officer in the Case in the prior investigation and had taken credit for it in press reports following its conclusion (read more here). He was ‘recommended’ to the Op Thatcham team, according to DI Taylor.

He told the court that DC Lunn was tasked with scoping Concept Accident Management, looking at lifestyle, houses, cars, and the ‘intel picture’. As a result, it was concluded by the police that Sahir Mohammed had a lifestyle well beyond the means that his association with Concept (and Advanced Claims) might confer that ‘he was involved in wholesale fraud’.

It has been heard in evidence that Dr Rashid first became a person of interest to Op Thatcham detectives, and recorded as such on the police log, in October, 2011, following the discovery of an appointments diary, relating to lists of Dr Rashid’s patients, in the car of another person under investigation, Fouad El-Habbal.

A young man of only 21 years of age (according to Companies House records he was born in May 1990), Mr El-Habbal had come to the attention of police, and the MoJ, by driving around in a Lamborghini motor car, worth £140,000, without any visible means to support the purchase, or lease, of such a vehicle. The court heard that it was registered to an address in Portsmouth.

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A scoping exercise into the business activities of Dr Rashid was launched by DC Lunn on 8th November, 2011. DI Taylor told the court that this followed a conversation with him. The judge sought clarification over other evidence concerning Dr Rashid, apart from the appointments diary. DI Taylor said that it was the only link at that stage. A civilian fraud investigator, Anthony Thornton, was tasked with background checks on Dr Rashid.

The court heard that, in the same month, evidence related to the claims management companies (CMC’s) was seized at a location in Huddersfield known as Stadium Storage. It ultimately formed part of the evidence in the criminal trials that were concluded in 2014. DI Taylor asserted that this material contained the ‘smoking gun’: Details of how car crash claimants were coached to make personal injury claims by the CMC’s.

The judge asked why the documents related to the search, and subsequent prosecution, were not disclosed in the trial bundle. Ms Checa-Dover replied that they had not been located after extensive searches by both the police and the CPS.

The examination of DI Taylor has now reached the point in the chronology where Dr Rashid was arrested on 7th March, 2012. By this time, the court has heard, four decision makers were involved: DS Taylor (as he was then), DI Andy White, DCI Paul Jeffrey and Crown Prosecution Service complex crime specialist, Julian Briggs. The decision to arrest was made the previous month, says DI Taylor. The first operational order for the arrest was drawn up by DC Lunn and was dated 28th February, 2012, there was a subsequent, amended version dated 7th March, the day of the arrest.

The court heard that DC Lunn was, shortly afterwards, found to be in breach of professional standards over activities unconnected to his police role that were, it is said, carried out on police premises using police computers. He was removed from Operation Thatcham by DCI Jeffrey and moved to a non-investigative role with Huddersfield Neighbourhood Police Team [in June 2012]. The court heard that he was placed on a monitoring scheme called an Unsatisfactory Performance Plan (UPP). At an earlier hearing of this claim, before HHJ Davey QC, counsel for the police had submitted that DC Lunn had received ‘management advice’ as the only recorded disciplinary sanction. It was not disclosed whether this related to use of police computers for a non-policing purpose, or as a result of a different complaint. Miss Checa-Dover said the documents relating to the sanction had not been found.

The judge in the present trial noted that Lunn left West Yorkshire Police a short time later. DI Taylor advanced the view that Lunn was unhappy in his new position and that was the reason for his departure from the police service. The court has heard previously that the claimant’s legal team was of the belief that he, later, went to work for the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), situated a short distance from police HQ in Wakefield. For their part, the police said they had been unable to trace him.

The examination of DI Taylor concluded at 3.40pm. Court rose shortly afterwards. A remarkable feature of the evidence heard today was the detective’s recollection of events that took place seven or eight years ago. For the most part he was clear, concise and consistent.

The cross-examination of the same witness will commence on Wednesday morning at 10am. Mr Pennock, counsel for the claimant, told the judge he anticipated being on his feet for most of the day.

Wednesday 11th September, 2019

Proceedings under way shortly after 10am, beginning with cross examination of Detective Inspector Mark Taylor. He was a sergeant based with the POCA team in Kirklees at the time of Dr Rashid’s arrest, as part of an investigation codenamed Operation Thatcham. He was the line manager of the Officer in the Case, DC Mark Lunn, presented by the claimant’s lawyers at pre-trial hearings as a ‘bad apple’. Both worked at Batley police station. [For clarity, DI Taylor’s position is that he was unaware of any activities of DC Lunn, prior to the end of May/beginning of June, 2012 that might support the claimant’s assertions of misconduct].

Ian Pennock is cross examining DI Taylor on behalf of the claimant. The thrust of his early questions is the extent of the role of DC Lunn in the both the initiation of Op Thatcham and its day-to-day running. DI Taylor has been presented by the police, in their written pleadings, and in oral submissions at pre-trial hearings, as the officer in charge of the investigation and the one best placed to present their witness evidence of the lawfulness of the arrest. DC Lunn was also the arresting officer in the actions central to this claim.

At the outset of his questioning, it was put to DI Taylor that DC Lunn was the ‘main man’ in Op Thatcham. He had led the investigation that resulted in the conviction of the Khalid brothers (read more here); he initiated Thatcham; was selected as officer in the case; and the only officer, from a team of six, who was working full time on the investigation; was allocated, as a detective constable, an office of his own. Reluctantly, DI Taylor agreed.

An email dated 26th March, 2012 from DC Lunn to Andrew Lockwood, a sergeant in Professional Standards, was shown to DI Taylor. In it, DC Lunn, when answering a public complaint of failing to return property, described himself as ‘Team Thatcham’. DI Taylor asserted that Lunn was not entitled to make such a claim. He was part of a team of six, that included DI Taylor (then sergeant) as his supervisor.

DI Taylor was taken to the policy log by Mr Pennock. It emerged during questioning that this document contravened a variety of policing protocols and practices (read Authorised Professional Practice here). For example: It was a free standing Word document with no police crest on it; it formed no part of any of the police’s recognised databases or systems; there was no records of decisions taken by the Senior Investigating Officer or rationales for such decisions; there was no restrictive marking on the document; no time or date stamp; it was not even marked ‘confidential’; there was no audit trail of entries or any amendments; no evidence of independent review or sign-off by a senior officer.

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Despite being put forward by the police as the man who could answer all questions pertaining to Operation Thatcham, and the civil claim filed by Dr Rashid, when asked by Mr Pennock, DI Taylor could not take the court to one single entry in that log that was authored by him. Almost all the entries on the policy log were made by DC Lunn.

DI Taylor could not explain, either, why there was a ‘big blank space’, in Mr Pennock’s words, in the policy log, where it appeared that at least one log entry had been erased. He could not say when the gap became apparent.

Eventually, DI Taylor was forced to concede, under questioning from Mr Pennock, that DC Lunn did, in fact, have day to day control of the Thatcham investigation. This is a sea change from the position advanced by the police at the pre-trial review in February, 2019.

DI Taylor also conceded that, as part of his wider policing duties and responsibilities, he had 12 other ‘live’ investigations, apart from Thatcham, and ‘one or two’ that were in the criminal court process.

Mr Pennock put to DI Taylor, in further questions, that his knowledge of Op Thatcham was not what the police purported it to be: The officer conceded that Thatcham was the biggest mass arrest fraud operation in West Yorkshire Police history: 38 arrests were made in Phase 1. In his evidence to the court yesterday, DI Taylor said there were around 10 arrests. Today, he told the court: ‘I got it wrong’.

As part of his supervisory role, the court heard that DI Taylor held regular weekly meetings with his team in order to review actions and progress. This included DC Lunn. A record was kept of these meetings, DI Taylor told the court, and a report sent ‘up the chain of command’, as Mr Pennock put it, as a form of briefing. When asked by Mr Pennock, as the officer presented to the court in charge of disclosure to the WYP Legal Services Department, in this claim, DI Taylor could not explain why those reports were not in any of the twelve volumes of the trial bundle. He did say, however, that, given the opportunity ‘he could find them’.

It was then put to DI Taylor that the decision to arrest Dr Rashid would be contained in at least one of those reports. He agreed that was the case. His recollection was that the decision would have been discussed with his line managers, DI Andy White and DCI Griffiths (the latter was DCI Jeffrey’s predecessor), and was not DC Lunn’s decision.

DI Taylor could not explain to the court why, even though it was what Mr Pennock termed ‘best practice’, the reasons for the arrest were not recorded in the policy log, or why there was no entry between 28th February, 2012 and 7th March. 2012. The first date mooted for the arrest and the actual date it occured. The reasons for the arrest, said Mr Pennock, appeared to be the appointments diary; the 10 minute interval between patient appointments and the charge of £470 plus VAT for the medico-legal consultations. These were set out in a post-arrest report prepared by DI Taylor, he continued. The detective agreed that it was his subordinate, DC Lunn, who had provided the investigation with the reasons.

Mr Pennock also put it to DI Taylor that when DC Lunn put together his reasons to ‘scope’ Dr Rashid’s business activities there was no mention of the appointments diary. He agreed that was also the case.

‘They did not raise suspicion did they?’ said Mr Pennock. ‘Difficult to assess’ was DI Taylor’s response.

Mr Pennock then questioned DI Taylor on the extent of the investigation into the far-reaching activities of the organised crime group, seemingly led by the Khalid brothers. DI Taylor agreed that, to the best of his recollection, during the investigations, no other doctor [apart from Dr Rashid] had been spoken to.

He was also asked if, even now, he fully understood motor claims and the legal proximity, or otherwise, of medical examiners to patients; the widespread use of questionnaires; the admin work done by claims management companies; block bookings. Following a discussion centering on questionnaires, and the examination of a sample included in the trial bundle, involving the judge and counsel for both parties, he answered ‘no’ to the rest of the question. Despite the questionnaire saying ‘Personal Injury Claims Questionnaire’ at the top, DI Taylor’s evidence was that it was not a medical questionnaire.

The court heard that the audio recordings of the patient examinations were seized, examined and investigated by the police. DI Taylor was asked if any analysis was done. The answer was, ‘yes’ to that, but ‘can’t recall’ if any discrepancies were identified. He also told the court that suspicions arising from the apparent high frequency of appointments, quality of reports and ten minute ‘slots’ were those of experts, not his own.

Mr Pennock then turned to those ‘experts’. The court heard that, pre-arrest, these appeared to be Doctors Tedd and Moffatt; mainly looking at Dr Rashid’s examination reports. Asked if these were experts that could be relied upon, DI Taylor told the court that he was ‘content that Dr Tedd was an expert’ and that Dr Tedd was ‘independent’.

Mr Pennock then took DI Taylor to the evidence in the form of an email from DC Lunn to DI Taylor in which it emerged that Dr Tedd was ‘a family friend’ of the Lunns.

The court rose at 11.35 for a 15 minute break.

Dr Tedd remained the focus of attention after the adjournment. DI Taylor could not explain why a reply to an email sent by him, seeking details of the doctor’s qualifications had not been disclosed in the trial bundle.

Mr Pennock asked if DI Taylor had made any enquiries regarding the doctor’s credibility, rationality, thought processes. ‘Not to my recollection’, was the answer. He also answered in the negative when asked about his [Dr Tedd’s] knowledge of medico-legal reports.

The court then heard that Dr Tedd had written to DI Taylor on 10th July, 2012 and offered the view that ‘10% of neck pain is caused by clapping of hands‘. He wrote again to the police in August in what DI Taylor said were ‘eccentric’ terms and in a manner, tone and content described by Mr Pennock ‘not commensurate with that of an expert’. A further exchange betwen Tedd and Taylor contained the doctor’s view that ‘whiplash doesn’t exist‘.

Mr Pennock put it to DI Taylor that Dr Tedd was dropped from the investigation ‘like a hot brick’ after that email exchange. DI Taylor responded: ‘I would not use those exact words’.

The subject of ‘missing’ police evidence was raised with DI Taylor, yet again, by Mr Pennock. This time it concerned materials seized in a raid on one of the rented units at Stadium Self Storage Ltd in Huddersfield and, eventually, used in the Operation Thatcham trials, at which over 40 fraud offenders were convicted in 2014. This comprised, said DI Taylor, of one box containing a large number of wallet files. Mr Pennock was under the impression there were more boxes. By this time, Mr Pennock said, a number of firms of solicitors were co-operating with the police in the Thatcham investigation. DI Taylor agreed that was the case.

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The judge observed that under ‘the six year rule’ the files should have been retained until 2020.

Mr Pennock said that Dr Rashid had been told during the pre-trial process that the files were ‘destroyed at the end of the statutory period’. DI Taylor told the court that the term ‘destroyed’ had come from him. His answer when questioned over non-production of that evidence to this court was ‘they were taken back to Batley police station’. He denied that any other WYP, or external, storage facility had been used. He could not tell the court when the files were destroyed, or by whom.

DI Taylor was then asked, once more, about missing disclosure. This time, Mr Pennock challenged him over the non-production of evidence that would ensure a fair trial and support the proposition that what Dr Rashid was doing, within his medico-legal practices, is not uncommon in the motor claims industry. DI Taylor had made this assertion to the CPS in a report he had sent to them in January, 2019. He said he had ‘no answer to that’. DI Taylor added: “Just because something is commonplace doesn’t mean it isn’t illegal.”

In that same report, the court heard that the police wanted to prosecute Dr Rashid to send ‘shockwaves’ throughout the insurance claims industry and get ‘other doctors to clean up their act’.

Court rose at 12.55pm for the lunch adjournment with DI Taylor’s evidence part-heard. At 2pm, Superintendent Richard Crinnion, acting Head of Professional Standards at West Yorkshire Police gave evidence.

The entirety of Mr Crinnion’s evidence was heard in camera and, as such, cannot be reported. It was submitted in open court that at least part of his evidence would cover Operation Waffleedge, an anti-corruption unit (ACU) investigation in which WYP has, at two pre-trial hearings, firstly submitted that this investigation was into DC Lunn then later said that he was not the target. Miss Checa-Dover told the court, at the pre-trial review, in February, 2019, that Waffleedge ‘was not an undercover operation’. Irrespective of that submission, it would be very surprising indeed if an ACU investigation carried out by any police force was not a covert operation.

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Supt Crinnion was in court for less than 10 minutes. After he had left the courtroom the cross-examination of DI Taylor resumed. Dr Clive Tedd was again the subject of Mr Pennock’s questions. The court heard that in a report dated 7.11.12, authored by the doctor, he stated: ‘I would not consider myself an expert in any medical field’.

Dr Tedd was one of two ‘expert doctors’ consulted by the police prior to the arrest of Dr Rashid. Mr Pennock asked DI Taylor, ‘where are the reports within the disclosure made by the police in this claim’. There was no answer. Miss Checa-Dover rose to inform the court that ‘the police don’t have these’. DI Taylor said ‘I would speculate that they (the reports) would have come via email to DC Lunn’.

Mr Pennock now returned to the activities of the police prior to the arrest of Dr Rashid. He put to DI Taylor that at 8.11.11 the police could not link the doctor to Advanced Claims UK Limited. ‘You had the appointments diary, but still no link’. DI Taylor agreed.

Attention then turned to the meeting, previously referred to in these proceedings, that took place on 19.1.12. It was between DI Taylor, Julian Briggs of the CPS (whom, the court heard, both met on an almost daily basis), DI White and DCI Griffiths. DI Taylor said he remembers this specific meeting. Mr Pennock asked: ‘Did anything stand out? Your memory is vague on other matters’. DI Taylor offered no explanation.

The issue of allegedly underdeclared earnings by Dr Rashid was touched upon by Mr Pennock. He asked DI Taylor if he knew how many reports the doctor had done in that financial year (2008/2009) and if that gave rise to suspicion. The detective did not know the answer.

DI Taylor was then asked if the investigation into his financial affairs revealed any criminal offences committed by Dr Rashid. He said, ‘to my knowledge, no’.

Mr Pennock advanced the view that the police focused on Dr Rashid because he was a high-profile doctor [in the motor claims industry] producing a high number of medico-legal documents: ‘They thought he looked ‘a bit dodgy’ because of the high volume of reports and what he charged [between £90 and £470]’.

At the conclusion of the day’s questioning, Mr Pennock put to DI Taylor the matter of payments by other doctors, solicitors, consultants to claims management companies. One of the companies mentioned was NK Business Consultants Ltd, whose name was raised briefly in evidence yesterday. His reply was: ‘During Thatcham I did not see any payment from any doctor, or agency, to a CMC’.

He was then taken to a document in the trial bundle, by Mr Pennock, who read out a significant list of payments made by such agencies.

The court has heard that the history of NK, according to the police, is that it is a successor company to Concept Claims, and before that, Advanced Claims (as far as is known, the original company).. Both, seemingly, controlled by at least one of the Khalid brothers. The police believed it had been set up to circumvent restraining orders on other bank accounts controlled by the directors.

Court rose at 3.40pm. The cross-examination of DI Taylor will resume at 10am on Thursday morning.

Thursday 12th September, 2019

The trial resumed at 10.15am in Court 7. Counsel for the parties went into closed session in the judge’s chambers and returned to court at 10.45am. Unfortunately, due to illness of one of the members of the legal teams, court has been adjourned for the day.

The judge asked the parties to be in court for 9.30am on Friday.

Friday 13th September, 2019

Cross-examination of Detective Inspector Mark Taylor resumed at 9.40 am. Counsel for Dr Rashid, Ian Pennock, opened by asking DI Taylor questions relating to ‘Frank’ which was the nickname of Fouad El-Habbal, previously identified in these proceedings as a young businessman living beyond his means, according to the police, and driving an expensive Lamborghini motor car.

It was established that the account ‘Frank’ was using to pursue his business as a claims manager, NK Business Consultants Ltd, had been ‘missed’ in the round of restraining orders applied to other bank accounts in the suspected frauds being investigated by the Operation Thatcham detectives.

DI Taylor told the court that the effect of these restraining orders was to monitor [as opposed to freezing] the bank accounts. The court heard that ‘Frank’ was ultimately convicted of perverting the course of justice by way of movement of funds from restrained accounts to the NK account.

It was also heard that no other person was prosecuted in relation to offences connected to that same bank account. ‘Frank”s actions occured after the arrest of Dr Rashid and were not, in any way, connected to him. It has emerged that ‘Frank’ was not convicted of any other offence connected to Operation Thatcham

Mr Pennock then returned to the Op Thatcham policy log that has featured centrally in the trial. The policy log ‘stops at 11.2.12, where’s the rest’ he asked. DI Taylor said he didn’t know. The judge, Mr Recorder Nolan QC then directed the police to check on this point. Olivia Checa-Dover, counsel for West Yorkshire Police, said there was a seperate policy log for Dr Rashid but that she would refer the matter back to her instructing solicitors for further enquiries to be made.

The court heard that there appears to be a gap between the two policy logs. At the pre-trial hearing HHJ Davey QC had ruled that all materials relating to policy logs should be disclosed by the police to the claimant.

In answer to the point, an ancient police adage, made by Mr Pennock, ‘if it’s not recorded, it didn’t happen’, it emerged that DI Taylor’s decisions were recorded in his Work Book (sometimes referred to, at the time, as a Blue Book) not on the policy log. His book that covers the period relevant to the issues in this case cannot be located. A further search is to be undertaken at the direction of the judge.

Miss Checa-Dover told the court that the police had found ‘a huge amount of materials’ in this case. The fact the Work Book appears not to be there could be attributed to a number of possible reasons: incompetence, policy, human error. ‘We are where we are’.

The judge asked that an officer be designated to look into the circumstances of how the Work Book came to be missing and what procedures were followed. ‘We need to know what has happened’, he said.

The evidence of DI Taylor is that he believes his Work Book may have been part of the unused materials in the Op Tahtcham trials which concluded in 2014. [If that is so, one might reasonably ask why the MG6(c) Unused Schedule for those trials has not been disclosed to the Claimant’s legal team].

He also told the court that force policy is that tWork Books are retained for 5 years.

Questioning then moved on to the warrants obtained for the search of Dr Rashid’s home and two offices: One annexed to the surgery and another at the medico-legal practice he ran separately. The notes that would have been attached to the warrant applications, at the time they were submitted to Dewsbury Magistrates’ Court, have not been disclosed to Dr Rashid’s legal team. Under questioning, DI Taylor conceded that these should still be retained on WYP servers. Asked by Mr Pennock if he had looked there for them, DI Taylor said he hadn’t.

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A search is also to be conducted for these items by the police at the request of the judge. As Mr Pennock put it to DI Taylor, these would give ‘reasonable grounds for the suspicion of offences’ that led to Dr Rashid’s arrest and good contemporaneous evidence of those grounds. DI Taylor agreed.

The judge asked DI Taylor how much detail would be attached to the warrant application. ‘Quite lengthy, which is usual for complex fraud’.

DI Taylor also said there were ‘numerous’ officers that attended Dr Rashid’s home at approx 6.15am on Wednesday 7th March, 2012 to execute the warrant. Mr Pennock had put it to him that there were 16 police officers present.

The court has heard evidence, in the form of read emails, that, within a few hours of arresting Dr Rashid, DC Lunn had made contact with the General Medical Council (GMC) with what he described as ‘our [the police’s] findings’. Before any questions had been put to the doctor in interview. Lunn said he was taken into custody over ‘large scale fraud, money laundering, connections with organised crime group’.

Asked if Dr Rashid was ever suspected of money laundering, DI Taylor answered: ‘Not by me’.

Mr Pennock then asked DI Taylor if he was aware that doctors are paid, whether or not personal injury (PI) claimants are found to be injured in a road traffic accident (RTA); DI Taylor said he knew that. Doctors are paid whether or not the claim succeeds: DI Taylor didn’t know that.

He also told Mr Pennock that he didn’t satisfy himself as to how the RTA/PI system worked, prior to the arrest of Dr Rashid. It emerged that the doctors DI Taylor relied on as experts, pre-arrest, hadn’t explained this system to him, either.

‘Did you ever investigate any solicitors, they must have been part of the same [alleged] fraud’ asked Mr Pennock. DI Taylor said ‘no’.

Mr Pennock: ‘No solicitors suspected [of conspiracy to defraud]’ DI Taylor: ‘No’.

When asked by Mr Pennock if the fact solicitors agreed fees with doctors, for between £90 and £470 [per examination], should not cause concern, DI Taylor said ‘no’.

Questions then turned to the custody record and the question of the necessity of the arrest of Dr Rashid. The judge interjected and reminded counsel that the applicable test in law is ‘Wednesbury reasonable‘.

The question of why the arresting officer, DC Lunn, was not giving evidence in this trial was put to DI Taylor. He replied that ‘he was not party to that [decision]’. When asked if he could find him, DI Taylor said: ‘I’m a police officer, I can find anybody‘.

Miss Checa-Dover had told the court at the pre-trial review in February, 2019 that ‘Mark Lunn couldn’t be traced’ by West Yorkshire Police.

The court then heard evidence, in the form of extracts read from police internal emails, that whilst working as a police officer, mainly investigating Dr Rashid, DC Lunn was holding himself out as a private investigator. He was using the name ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd‘. DI Taylor agreed, to the best of his recollection, that this company was not registered at Companies House.

Mr Pennock said that Lunn had been offered £183,000 funding to set up his company. He was corrected by the judge who said that ‘Lunn had asked for £183,000, and was not offered it by the insurance company‘.

Taken to an email from Sergeant Andrew Lockwood of the Professional Standards Department, to DCI Jeffrey, that said ‘he (Lunn) had got the funding’, DI Taylor said he didn’t know of this. He told the judge that the first he knew of Lunn’s private enterprise was when a POCA team colleague, DC John Barratt, told him about some of Lunn’s telephone conversations that he had overheard. He was very upset, the court heard. This happened towards the end of May, or the beginning of June, 2012.

Opus Law, a firm of Bradford solicitors, had made a formal complaint against DC Lunn on 14th May, 2012 regarding the private investigator concerns. This eventually found its way to DI Taylor on 7th June, 2012 when he was copied into an email sent by Sgt Lockwood to DC Lunn seeking an explanation of the matters raised against Lunn by Opus.

Court rose at 12.35pm and resumed at 1.30pm

The court heard that DC Andrew Christie, from whom more will be heard next week, was tasked with producing a disclosure report to GMC. DI Taylor signed off this report. When asked why the force’s specialist disclosure unit was not deployed, DI Taylor said that he had consulted with them, and with Andrew Keeling, his main point of contact at the GMC.

Mr Pennock then took DI Taylor to the dynamics of the investigation, and the shifting ground as it progressed. He asked when it became apparent that Dr Rashid was to be separated from Operation Thatcham; payments to Dr Rashid were no longer a cause for concern; and there was no issue with Dr Rashid’s tax affairs. The detective answered to the effect, on all three issues, that he couldn’t assist with a date.

DI Taylor was asked again about the Advanced Claims UK Ltd evidence seized from Stadium Storage. Mr Pennock put to him that, if his evidence was that there was only one box, why had Advanced rented a storage unit for just that? DI Taylor had no explanation.

Court rose at 2.45pm shortly after the conclusion of the cross examination of DI Taylor.

Monday 16th September, 2019

Proceedings resumed at 10.05am this morning with the examination and cross examination of Detective Constable Andrew Christie. His evidence concerned an investigation he had carried out which led to a large amount of disclosures, and 40 pages of submissions, to the General Medical Council (GMC) concerning Dr Rashid and the allegations being put to him at that time by the police. DC Christie had joined the POCA unit as part of D/Sgt (as he was then) Mark Taylor’s team in March 2012 and started working, more or less straight away, on this probe. The court heard two days of evidence from Mr Taylor (now an inspector) last week.

DC Christie was asked to clarify 4 points, by counsel for West Yorkshire Police, Miss Olivia-Checa Dover: The restraining orders obtained on the bank accounts of Concept Claims UK Ltd operated by ‘Frank’, the nickname of Fouad El-Habbal; the personal injury claimants (referred to also as ‘patients’) examined by Dr Rashid, with the focus being on ‘genuine’ accidents; How this informed what was disclosed to GMC; lastly, an analysis produced by DC Christie that looked at formulaic reporting of the patient examinations.

He told the court that the restraining orders against Frank’s accounts were obtained in October, 2011; ‘genuine patients’ were identified as: not being known to police; the accident was recorded on police systems; and there were no links between the patients and Concept. He was instructed to prepare the report to GMC by senior officers, who relied on medical experts, Dr Colin Holburn and Dr Watson, to assist their decision-making. They principally advised on level of physical contact between doctor and patient when assessing injuries, and ‘good medical practice’; the analysis referred to had formed part of a MG3 document submitted by the police to the CPS [an MG3 is a short overview of the reasons why the police consider there is sufficient evidence to charge a suspect] and it considered the use of identical phrases, and other standardisation, across a number of reports made by Dr Rashid.

The court also heard that as a result of analysis of CCTV, at locations where block bookings of patients were made, the average time for examination by Dr Rashid was calculated by DC Christie to have been between 7 and 8 minutes. Only two went over 10 minutes, and the longest was 16 minutes.

Mr Pennock then began his cross examination by asking if production orders were obtained for solicitors’ files where they were involved in instructing Dr Rashid to carry out examinations.  DC Christie agreed that was the case.

The court heard that none of the contents of these files, including the letters of instruction and personal injury claim questionnaires, were disclosed to the ‘expert’ doctors involved in advising the police. Instead, they were asked to rely on witness statements taken from patients identified from CCTV and the dictaphone recordings that Dr Rashid made of every examination, together with the report of those examinations compiled by him. All except one of the 12 witness statements was taken, face to face, by DC Christie.

DC Christie said he had read the solicitors’ files but couldn’t recall seeing any letters of authority in which patients confirmed they had read Dr Rashid’s report and signed the letter to confirm its accuracy. Those letters were not disclosed to the police experts. DC Christie said he couldn’t see their relevance.

The detective also said some patients said in their witness statements, they didn’t recall seeing their medical reports, or signing them.

The matter of personal injury questionnaires sent to patients, in advance of examination by a doctor, was then ventilated. Mr Pennock put it to DC Christie that these were important in terms of reducing the time needed to examine a patient, DC Christie’s evidence was they gave some information, were more of a general claim form than a medical questionnaire, and that at least one patient who gave evidence for the police investigation recalled seeing one.

Mr Pennock made the point that examinations that only took 4 minutes may have been of a patient with relatively minor injuries who had already made a full recovery. He also said in questioning that the police relied almost entirely on statements taken from witnesses, years later, but didn’t send any contemporaneous documents to the GMC. DC Christie agreed with the latter but said he couldn’t recall whether the patient who was seen for 4 minutes had recovered, or not.

DC Christie said he couldn’t recall seeing a letter, sent by the GMC to West Yorkshire Police, informing them that they had refused to put these matters raised by him, and the patients in their witness statements, to their Fitness to Practice Panel.

DC Christie’s witness box evidence concluded at 11.25am

Dr Rashid entered the witness box at 11.50am and was still part-heard at 1.15pm when court adjourned. His counsel, Ian Pennock asked just the one question and sought to adopt the rest of the doctor’s evidence from his witness statement: Dr Rashid was asked to confirm in what way, and by whom, he would be asked to conduct examinations of personal injury claimants. He explained that instructions would come from solicitors or medical reporting companies.

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The judge asked him to confirm if separate staff were deployed in his medico-legal practice. The doctor told him that, when he started out, he used his general practice staff, who worked overtime. Once established, he had a separate office and separate staff.

Miss Checa-Dover’s questioning this morning focused on text messages received in 2010 and 2011 by Dr Rashid from persons with whom he had a professional, or more familiar, connection.  She explored the duty of the doctor [or any other doctor in the same position], to the court and as an expert medical witness, upon receiving such messages and the actions he took as a result.

A number of those messages were from Jamil Dad, with whom Dr Rashid had a burgeoning professional relationship. Mr Dad was also involved in promoting Dr Rashid’s medico-legal credentials and was paid for that work. They would meet to exchange cheques for the various services each carried out for the other.

The court heard several times that the text messages sent to Dr Rashid had been included, by the police, in the trial bundle, but the replies from him were not.

After a discussion involving both counsel, the judge asked that the police provide a final explanation as to why they were not seized from the doctor’s computer. The incoming messages had been downloaded from a backup of the doctor’s mobile phone which rested on the hard drive of his computer.

The court was also told that the police did not seek to prove that any examinations carried out by Dr Rashid were part of fraudulent claims.

The afternoon’s questioning of Dr Rashid, by Miss Checa-Dover, focused on those text messages. The point she advanced repeatedly was that same one made earlier in the day, Dr Rashid had breached his duty to the court, as an expert witness, by not reporting potential conflicts of interest. Those conflicts arose mainly through contact with members of the families of claims managers, Nadeem Khalid, ‘Frank’, and instructing solicitor Jamil Dad.

Dr Rashid explained that he maintained his professional independence at all times, his prognoses and reports were always open to external scrutiny, and, to the best of his recollection, would have discussed any conflicts with solicitors.

He also said he couldn’t be sure that he knew that those patients were connected to Khalid, Frank and Dad at the time of the examination. The court was of told of ‘a traumatic ten years’ suffered by Dr Rashid which had affected his recall of events

Miss Checa-Dover referred Dr Rashid to practice rules which state: ‘…only continue as expert if there is no conflict of interest’. The doctor conceded that he had not discussed these matters with the courts concerned, or the other parties in the injury claim.

She also put it to the doctor that some solicitors involved in discussions regarding potential conflict of interest would, themselves, have been part of that conflict. It was a ‘red flag’ issue, she said. The judge also pointed out that Mr Dad and Mr McIllaney were ‘not independent of the conflict’.

The court also heard that Khalid and ‘Frank’ had presented themselves to Dr Rashid as personal injury claimants. This was a few months after a meeting had taken place at Akbars restaurant in Bradford, between the three of them; Jamil Dad; and a solicitor from Wakefield, Damian McAlinney, in order to explore how they could further their respective businesses in the personal injury claims field.

A commercial agreement was reached whereby Dr Rashid was to be the doctor of choice of Advanced Claims UK Ltd (ACL) and, in return, he would pay ACL £50 per patient referral. Dr Rashid said that other doctors made payments to claim management companies in the same way. [DI Taylor said in his evidence that it was ‘common practice’ in the motor claims business].

Miss Checa-Dover put to Dr Rashid that he was asked to pay off the debt of a previous doctor to ACL. He said he didn’t recall being asked by Mr Dad to do so and no such payment was made. His recollection of that matter came from police interviews.

Dr Rashid was questioned about an examination where the injury claim patient claimed the accident was a side-on impact, but the injuries claimed were consistent with front to back displacement. He said he couldn’t recall the specifics of that examination but would rely largely on the account of the person being assessed.

The court had heard earlier from DC Christie on this topic. The mechanism of the accident was set out in the personal injury questionnaire, filled in by the claimant before the appointment with the doctor.

The judge asked Dr Rashid if he recalled any adverse reports he had made after examining an injury claims patient. The doctor said he recalled one in particular because it had caused a ‘falling-out’.

Miss Checa-Dover then questioned Dr Rashid on the layout of his report form. She was told that it was developed from a Ministry of Justice template issued in 2010. The doctor also confirmed that his administrative staff typed out the reports from his audio recordings and inserted an electronic signature. He then checked them before they were sent out. The court heard that his proof reading of reports had come under scrutiny by the General Medical Council and found to be satisfactory.

Dr Rashid was asked about his reaction to finding out that Nadeem Khalid, with whom he was conducting a significant amount of injury claims business, had been convicted of fraud in March 2011. He said he was told that Khalid had been prosecuted over mortgage fraud and would have been alarmed at discovering that Khalid was a convicted fraudster.

He tole the court that he had subsequently discussed the matter with Jamil Dad ‘to make sure our work was above reproach’.

The court heard that Dr Rashid had provided Khalid with a reference before the trial and that payments were made to ACL and Concept [the claims management companies] after the conviction of Khalid.

Court rose at 3.50pm

Tuesday 17th September, 2019

The cross examination of Dr Rashid continues. Miss Checa-Dover, counsel for West Yorkshire Police, is asking questions. She carries over the theme from yesterday relating to the conviction of ‘Noddy’ (Nadeem Khalid) in March 2011 and now his arrest, in prison, in October, 2011 as part of Operation Thatcham. He was arrested along with ‘Juggy’ (Sahir Mohammed) and ‘Frank’.

‘Was this another big red flag?’, she asked. Dr Rashid told the court that, although it was a big concern for him, the claims management companies remained regulated by the MoJ post arrest. The court heard that he had been informed of the arrests by Mr McIllaney, but he did not know the reason why.

Counsel then asked the doctor if he considered the option of terminating his working with Concept Claims following arrest. His reply was that his instructions for expert reports came from solicitors, not the claims management company.

The court heard that Dr Rashid had a conversation with Mr McIllaney in which they discussed ensuring that the arrest of the three suspects did not impact adversely on their respective practices.

Asked about contact with Frank the day after his arrest, the doctor said that he had called to find out more details. He went on to tell the court that ‘police have been through my medico legal practice, and all my reports, with a fine toothcomb. At the end of that, my integrity remained intact and there was no finding of my involvement with any fraudulent activities’.

Miss Checa-Dover turned her attention to payments being made to Concept/ACL (the CMC’s) after the arrest of the principals: ‘You were still sending money after their bank accounts were frozen’.

Dr Rashid said that it was industry practice to pay CMC’s promptly and ‘everything I sent is noted and accounted for’. The judge observed that Dr Rashid had been provided with another bank account, at Barclays, into which to make payment. This was the bank account of NK Business Consultants Ltd referred to earlier in the proceedings.

He was then asked by Miss Checa-Dover if he could recall Gill, a solicitor with a firm by the name of JCA Solicitors, telling him they had decided not to work with Concept from 11th November, 2011, one month after the arrest. Dr Rashid told the court that he believed Gill was a marketing manager with JCA, not a solictor, but he couldn’t remember that exchange with her.

It was then put to Dr Rashid, by counsel, that ‘he was in on it with Concept and needed another solicitor’. He said that at any one time he was working with between 30 and 60 solicitors.

Miss Checa-Dover then turned to the matter of the medico-legal reports. By asking a number of sequential questions she sought to establish that Dr Rashid didn’t have time to carry out all that was required for his expert report within a 10 minute time slot:

Patient’s details; Mechanism of accident; Seatbelt; Movement within vehicle at impact; Oral account of symptoms from patient; Time off work; Impact on social life; Medication; Psychological symptoms; Physical examination.

She also put to the doctor that as many as 53 patients had been block-booked on one occasion, when the appointments window was open from 12 noon until 8.10pm, and she took him to statements of two patients who said they had been ‘rushed’. 40 in a day was a more usual number, she said.

Dr Rashid told the court that all these matters had been reviewed, by experts, within a two year investigation at the General Medical Council and no issues found. He also said that he couldn’t understand why these matters were being ventilated again.

An very short audio file was played to the court of a dictaphone recording made by Dr Rashid. Miss Checa-Dover questioned him over speaking into the dictaphone whilst the patient was also talking about his injury. The doctor said that the patient had checked the post-examination report and signed it off.

The issue of whether the proof reading of his draft reports, typed up by his administration team, either took place at all or was rushed was put to Dr Rashid by counsel. One former employee had told the police, post arrest, that the doctor ‘had got sloppy’. As heard earlier, Dr Rashid told the court that the reports were proof read and that the GMC had found in their investigation that this aspect of his work was satisfactory.

Another former employee and personal friend, had made a statement saying that Dr Rashid had told her that “he would be a millionaire in 5 years”. The doctor said she had a good memory but he didn’t remember saying that.

Miss Checa-Dover then pursued the matter of a mistaken entry on Dr Rashid’s CV. She put it to him that ‘he had lied’. Again, in his answer, he said that this was a matter already considered by the GMC. He admitted that he had got it wrong. The Court heard later, in re-examination of the doctor by his counsel, Ian Pennock, that he had included membership of Expert Witness Institute (EWI) on his CV. He was, actually, a member of Expert Witness online. That entry did not appear on his CV. An application form had been filled out for EWI in 2006 but, Dr Rashid said, it, apparently, had not been posted.

Miss Checa-Dover’s cross-examination ended at 12.40. She did not appear to ask Dr Rashid one question pertaining to the events leading up to his arrest; any warrants produced by the police; whether he was cautioned; the events on the day of the arrest; his subsequent detention at at least three different police stations; or the deployment of an estimated 16 police officers at 6.15am on the morning of the arrest at his home, where he was with his wife and young children.

Mr Pennock then re-examined Dr Rashid. It emerged in evidence that after the search at the medico-legal offices ‘the police left thousands of files open and scattered all over the floor’; the phone and laptop that was seized from Dr Rashid was returned in 2014 and, when he tried to access his phone backup on the hard drive of his computer, he found the police had deleted it. This meant that all records of his text messages had been purged. The court has heard a number of times that the police have only exhibited, and questioned Dr Rashid, on text messages sent to him. His replies were not in the bundle.

Dr Rashid was then asked about appointments slots at his GP surgery (as opposed to the medico-legal examinations). He told the court that they were arranged at 10 minute intervals for face to face visits and 5 minute intervals for telephone consultations. He agreed with Mr Pennock that he would see 40 patients a day.

The judge then read witness statements, filed and served as apart of the Claimant’s case, from: Zakiyah Begum; Waseem Ahmed: Dr James McBride and Lawrence Horan.

Mr Pennock told the court that these statements are unchallenged by the Defendant, as is the witness statement of Dr Rashid which the judge said he had already read. The cross-examination of the doctor appeared to concern only matters raised in the police investigation, post-arrest.

The court will hear Final Submissions from both Claimant and Defendant on Wednesday. Thursday is a reading day for the judge. He expects to hand down judgment on Friday morning.

Key tests for determining whether the arrest of Dr Rashid was lawful are: (i) Did the arresting officer, Detective Constable Mark Lunn, reasonably suspect the doctor was guilty of the offence for which he was arrested (conspiracy to defraud); and (ii) Did DC Lunn have reasonable grounds to believe that the arrest was necessary.

Wednesday 16th September, 2019

Judge in court at 10am but, after a short discussion with counsel, he rose for 45 minutes to allow each to read a copy of the other’s submissions they are putting orally to the court today. Mr Recorder Nolan QC said that ‘the days of trial by ambush are long gone’.

Miss Ceca Dover has made her final submissions to the court on behalf of West Yorkshire Police. In summary, they set out to:

(i) Justify the arrest of Dr Rashid based on reasonable suspicion.

(ii) Justify the necessity of an arrest (as opposed to, for example, a voluntary interview).

Points (i) and (ii) are referred to as the Primary Liability issues

(iii) Provide an alternative scenario whereby if DC Lunn did not have the required suspicion of guilt, or belief in the necessity of the arrest, whether Dr Rashid would have been lawfully arrested anywayIf so, no harm was caused by the unlawful arrest meaning substantial damages will not be awarded. This was described in court as the Lumba/Parker test. [The Parker case is better known in the stage name of the former television celebrity, Michael Barrymore, who was unlawfully arrested by Essex Police in 2001. By an odd dint of circumstance, the solicitor representing Mr Parker all the way to the Court of Appeal, was Damian McIllaney, referred to a number of times elsewhere in the present proceedings]. For the legally curious, the Parker judgment can be read in full here. The Lumba case, which went all the way to the Supreme Court, and concerns the various legal tests for damages awards, can be read in full here.

Miss Checa-Dover submits that DI Taylor was present when the Claimant was arrested. He shared the reasonable suspicion in Dr Rashid’s guilt and is entitled to rely on what he has been told, including by his fellow officers, in order to form his own suspicion.

(iv) Provide a further alternative, in the event the arrest was found to be unlawful, by way of the ex turpi causa principle. That would require a finding by the judge that Dr Rashid’s conduct in preparation of medico-legal reports and/or his involvement with others, facilitating motor accident injury claims, was so culpable, negligent or reckless as to extinguish his claim. [In legal terms it engages ‘moral turpitude’.

Miss Checa-Dover submits that the duty owed by doctors conducting medico-legal work is onerous and of significant public importance. Where the motive becomes to get more reports out and make as much money as possible, to the expense of proper adherence to the duties owed, a serious risk to the proper administration of justice arises.

In reply, Mr Pennock, for Dr Rashid, said that to make such a finding the judge would have to ‘go behind’ the findings of the General Medical Council who cleared the doctor of the matters raised in Miss Checa-Dover’s submissions. He suggested that the judge ‘exercises caution’.

Mr Pennock, on behalf of Dr Rashid, completed his submissions shortly before 4pm. In some tense and, at times, intemperate exchanges between the bench and counsel the principal points advanced were:

(i) The burden of proof is on the Defendant to prove they had objectively assessed, reasonable grounds to suspect Dr Rashid of conspiring with Advanced Claims to defraud insurance companies with fraudulent claims for personal injury.

(ii) Dr Rashid had never reported in his medico-legal role on any fraudulent claim or even a suspected fraudulent claim. Requests for the police to produce any evidence of such claims had been ignored.

(iii) Detective Constable Mark Lunn was the designated Officer in the Case and, also, the arresting officer. At the time of the arrest, DC Lunn was holding himself out as a private detective to the insurance industry and he had received some, or all, of a payment of £183,000 from an insurance company, according to an email in the trial bundle from Andrew Lockwoood, a detective sergeant in Professional Standards, to DCI Paul Jeffrey.

(iv) There is no evidence of any credible investigation being carried out, by the police, into the payment of that money to DC Lunn and where it went (as opposed to a lesser investigation into DC Lunn holding himself out as a private detective). Similarly, there is no credible explanation of why an insurance company would want to give a serving police officer such [a large sum of] money when the insurance industry have set up the Insurance Fraud Bureau (frequently referred to earlier in these proceedings) working alongside the police as an open and transparent co-operation between them.

(v) In the circumstances, Mr Pennock submits that the bogus company run by DC Lunn, a company which did not actually exist in Companies House records, was, arguably, invented as a vehicle for an inducement for Lunn to arrest Dr Rashid. If the payment ‘to set up his business’ was discovered he could attempt to claim it was an ‘investment’ in his company by the insurers. [Lunn had attempted to set up the business from offices in Marsden, close to his home, but the insurance company said they wanted it to be based in Leeds, the regional economic centre].

(vi) The court, and the wider public, would expect DC Lunn to give evidence on oath to justify the arrest of Dr Rashid and explain the alleged receipt of a substantial sum of money from an insurance company, and running a substantial private investigation business, whilst a serving police officer. He could readily have been summoned to court, by the police, as their main witness. But, on the police version of events, that should not be needed, in any event, because he left the police service of his own accord without any duress being placed upon him.

(vii) Surprisingly, and very unusually, submits Mr Pennock, the Defendant is not calling DC Lunn to give evidence the court would normally expect to hear in such circumstances. There has been no explanation for his remarkable absence, other than ‘the police cannot trace him’.

(viii) In the circumstances, Mr Pennock invited the court to draw an adverse inference [against the police] from DC Lunn’s very notable absence.

(ix) The ‘reasonable grounds’ upon which the police suspected Dr Rashid of committing an offence have changed at least five times. First version is their original defence; second version their amended defence; third version within DI Taylor’s witness statement; fourth version given in his oral evidence (appointments lists kept by Advanced Claims of the appointments they made on behalf of Dr Rashid, the payment of £825 into the account of NK Consultants and the adequacy of his reports); fifth version found in the document now produced by the police, at the request of this court, to identify the reasonable grounds they rely upon, with reference to matters known pre-arrest.

(x) The court heard that it should expect the reasonable grounds for suspecting Dr Rashid in the alleged fraud conspiracy, for which he was arrested, to be recorded by the police (as was accepted by DI Taylor in his oral evidence). That would be the best evidence. The court should expect the decision to arrest Dr Rashid and the reasons for it to be recorded in;

DI Taylors day book; the Operation Thatcham policy log; the Application to the magistrates’ court for the search warrant; in the policy log set-up for Dr Rashid [as opposed to the Thatcham policy log].

The police have not disclosed any of those records.

(xi) The police obtained a Production Order for Dr Rashid’s mobile phone airtime provider to produce all call and text data from his phone, yet only disclose the police’s version of text messages, without any replies to those texts made by the doctor. After the police had Dr Rashid’s laptop and phone he can no longer access any of his mobile phone data.

(xii) Mr Pennock submits that it is hard to avoid a very strong suspicion that the police documentation has been ‘sanitised’ to remove anything harmful to them and helpful to Dr Rashid. A culture of failing to disclose evidence helpful to any opponent is corroborated by the alleged failure of officers to inform the criminal defence teams in the Operation Thatcham fraud case. The police should have known that DC Lunn’s activities would seriously compromise such a prosecution, if not lead to a stay [as an abuse of process]. A decision was taken by those same officers to keep DC Lunn’s activities secret until after the Operation Thatcham prosecutions were finalised two years later. In order words, convict the fraudsters and stay silent about Lunn.

(xiii) He further submits that the whole presentation of the police case smacks of hiding contemporaneous reasons given by DC Lunn for the arrest of Dr Rashid and the scrabbling around ex post facto for whatever justification they could find for the arrest.

At the end of Mr Pennock’s submissions there was an animated discussion between the bench and both counsel regarding undisclosed materials. The upshot is that the judge, who described it as ‘a grumble’ by Dr Rashid’d legal team, directed that such issues be dealt with overnight, by the two parties to this civil claim, and to report back to him if there was any outstanding issues following completion of that process.

Those present at the two previous hearings of this claim, heard before a different judge in December, 2018 (a case management hearing) and February, 2019 (pre-trial review), would place the repeated complaints over disclosure by Dr Rashid’s lawyers, and the numerous troubling explanations by the police, as rather higher than ‘a grumble’. A contemporaneous report of the second of those two hearings – sent to the police press office at the time – can be read here.

There is also an obvious tension in the police’s choice of disclosure officer, Detective Inspector Mark Taylor, who gave evidence as their main witness.

Similar tensions appear in the submissions of Miss Checa-Dover, presumably on instructions from the police, across the pre-trial hearings referred to above. Most notably, she claimed yesterday that it was never said, by her, to HHJ Davey QC that ‘the police could not locate Mark Lunn’. Regrettably, the transcript of that hearing will tell a different story. As does the contemporaneous report of those proceedings, to which the weblink is provided above, that has stood unchallenged by West Yorkshire Police, and Miss Checa-Dover, for over 6 months.

She also told the court, on that day, that the actions of DC Lunn ‘were at all times lawful and proportionate’ (see excerpt from that article below).

The various versions, again, presumably, on instructions from the police, of the disciplinary action taken, or, indeed, not taken against Lunn can, most charitably, be characterised as a muddle. As are the various explanations of what Operation Waffleedge is, or is not, about. A matter presently exercising the Information Commissioner. The police position, before her, is that they can neither confirm nor deny it exists.

Although Thursday 19th September, 2019 is a designated reading day, the judge said that the court would be open and he would make himself available to attempt to resolve, with counsel, any unfinalised issues over disclosure.

Disclosure failings by the police has been a very high profile news topic over the past year. From the press seats, at least, it is utterly extraordinary that disclosure is still being sought, on the ninth day of a trial, in a civil claim first intimated to the police in October, 2015.

Public confidence in both the police, and the civil justice system, is ill-served by such a debacle.

Friday 20th September, 2019

The police and Dr Rashid were told yesterday afternoon that judgment would not be handed down first thing this morning. Instead, there will be a hearing of the unresolved disclosure matters first.

This morning’s hearing was listed by the court for three hours.

Handing down of judgment commenced at 11am.

The court was told earlier this week that Olivia Checa-Dover is not in Court 7 this morning.  She is elsewhere in the building on another matter. The judge excused her, and Daniel Penman (Miss Checa-Dover’s junior throughout this final hearing) will represent the police at today’s hearing.

Detective Inspector Mark Taylor and Detective Constable Andrew Christie are in court this morning. They gave evidence earlier in the trial.

Mr Recorder Nolan QC completed the oral delivery of his judgment at 11.50. He dismissed the claim of Dr Rashid, finding that the arrest of the doctor, by Detective Constable Mark Lunn (as he was then), was based on reasonable suspicion, and as part of ‘an emerging picture’ of evidence that may have linked him to others who were running fraudulent claims management companies. He found that it was ‘a team decision’ to arrest Dr Rashid, not that of DC Lunn.

Dr Rashid was never charged with any offence. He was on bail for 15 months.

It was also found, by the judge, that if the arrest by DC Lunn had been ruled unlawful then, on the Parker principle referred to in Wednesday’s report, Dr Rashid would have been arrested anyway.

Dr Rashid is contemplating an appeal against the judgment. It appears to contains a significant number of factual errors. A full analysis will be posted over the weekend.

There are also grave concerns about the manner in which this trial has been conducted. A matter also exercising the author of this piece. At one point, when a National Union of Journalists press card was produced to the judge for inspection he said: “They give those out to anybody“.

 

Reporting restriction

The judge ruled, orally, that none of the patients examined by Dr Rashid, and named in court proceedings, can be identified in the reporting of this case. The exceptions being ‘Noddy’ (Nadeem Khalid), convicted of fraud and money laundering in 2011 and, again, for conspiracy to defraud in 2014, and ‘Frank’ (Fouad El-Habbal), convicted of perverting the course of justice in 2014.

Note

Fouad El-Habbab is also reported elsewhere by the name of ‘El Habbab Fouad’.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page last updated at 2200hrs on Monday 7th October, 2019

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Photo credit: Telegraph & Argus

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

Catalogue of policing scandals that shame the two-faced Mayor of Manchester

On 6th August 2018, two retired Manchester police officers, Peter Jackson and Maggie Oliver, and one serving officer, Paul Bailey, met with the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham and the Deputy Mayor, Beverley Hughes. Also present in the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) HQ were Deputy Director of Policing, Clare Monaghan and policy adviser, Kevin Lee.

The purpose of the meeting was for the police officers, past and present, to provide extensive disclosures of alleged wrongdoing by the senior leadership team of Greater Manchester Police. Most of those disclosures either directly concerned the chief constable, Ian Hopkins, or could be tracked back to him via vicarious liability or his role as a very much hands-on, directing mind.

When that meeting was eventually brought, after thirteen months of prevarication by the Mayor, he told the whistleblowers that he ‘only had an hour’. He was asked by Peter Jackson, in that moment, if he could quote the Mayor’s position as: ‘You only had an hour to discuss the rape and abuse of kids, the deaths of police officers, the deaths of members of the public, a corrupt police command team etc…’. The response of Andy Burnham was: “No, no no, this is just the first meeting, the first of many”.

But Jackson had formed the distinct view that all Burnham wanted to do, at that time, was to escape the room, escape the meeting, escape the challenges of the three whistleblowers. He really didn’t want to hear what they were saying and, of course, there has been no further meetings between Mayoral team and the whistleblowers, no further discussions. Not an email, a phone call. Nothing.

Beverley Hughes, a long term political crony of Burnham, was upbraided during the meeting, and afterwards, over face-pulling, negative body language and generally dismissive attitude. Kevin Lee played on his phone virtually throughout. Abuse victims and bereaved families will be horrified to hear of such grotesque conduct by those charged with safeguarding them and their loved ones. For his part, Burnham never once challenged their behaviour. Which is a measure of how weak he is behind the public-facing bravado.

Another is the fact that it took Burnham almost nine months before he finally responded to the very serious issues raised in that meeting. Despite, during that time, repeated email requests from the whistleblowers asking what action was being taken over the large amount of information passed over and the numerous ancillary issues raised in the arbitrarily allocated time of one hour.

Peter Jackson has this opening message to the Mayor: “It is clear that you have no desire to properly investigate the whistleblower complaints about GMP’s chief constable, and other senior officers, and no desire to hold him to account for the many scandals and failings that we have brought to your attention. These either directly relate to him, or have occurred in Greater Manchester Police on his ‘watch’.

“How can you defend your actions when myself, Maggie, Paul [and Scott Winters] are all such credible witnesses? We have over 100 years of exemplary police service in GMP between us. We have unrivalled insight into what goes on in GMP, gained from our first hand experiences, from our extensive networks of friends, colleagues and acquaintances built up over all those years. We have information sources that go to every corner and every level of the organisation, yet you are very keen to discount and ignore what we say.

“Maggie [Oliver] is one of the country’s best known whistleblowers; the driving force behind the BBC’s real-life drama series ‘Three Girls‘ and BBC documentary ‘The Betrayed Girls‘. Referred to as emotionally unstable by Sir Peter Fahy when she was a serving officer trying to expose the ‘grooming gangs’ scandal, her character besmirched by his colleagues and, yet, despite that smearing, which continues to present day, she is now a nationally respected voice on child sexual exploitation. Along with Sarah Champion MP and abuse survivors’ advocate, Sammy Woodhouse, she is, arguably, one of the most influential persons in the UK in putting the scandal of Pakistani grooming gangs firmly on the political agenda.

“Paul, a highly experienced serious crime career detective and now in his 30th year of service, was for many years the Chair of GMP’s Black and Asian Police Association (BAPA) and is, again, a nationally respected figure in that role.

“I completed 31 years’ service in GMP, was a senior officer and Head of GMP’s Major Incident Team.

“We are not alone; we are aware of many others who have complained to you about what is going on in GMP. We, personally, have provided you with extensive information and evidence about factual events and yet you treat us with utter disdain. Why is that? Is it that you and the Deputy Mayor are too close to Ian Hopkins?

“I count at least 21 different issues, or what I would describe as 21 scandals, that you catalogue within your response letter. All factual incidents that relate to serious failings and serious misconduct. All that have occurred under the watch of the present chief constable.

“The [alleged] lies, the deceit, the cover ups. the endemic senior officer misconduct, the fact that assistant chief constable after assistant chief constable [Steven Heywood, Rebekah Sutcliffe, Terry Sweeney] has left the force in disgrace, should surely raise serious questions about the present state of Greater Manchester Police, the leadership of the chief constable and the infected culture that cascades down from the top of the force through to the federated ranks. Another, Garry Shewan, did a ‘moonlight flit’ when the sky fell in on the catastrophic Integrated Operational Policing System (iOPS) technology project. Now set to be one of the biggest policing scandals in recent times after featuring as lead story on ITV Granada Reports (view 7 minute clip here).

“Please be assured that myself, Maggie and Paul, assisted by other whistleblowers and former and serving officers, will continue to hold you, Beverley Hughes and Clare Monaghan to account for dereliction in your duties, in failing to hold the chief constable to account”.

Devastating though it is, the statement of Peter Jackson, as one might expect of a renowned murder detective, is carefully and fully documented. The Mayor’s office, by contrast, is becoming notorious for its haphazard record-keeping and absence from its sparsely-populated website of specified information that should be published under the applicable elected policing body regulations. The office is a shambles at every level visible to either the public, or through the keener eye of an investigative journalist.

This is the genuinely shocking catalogue of scandals that were highlighted by the whistleblowers, and contemptuously dismissed by Andy Burnham, in his much delayed response dated 18th April, 2019. The citizens of Greater Manchester, who fund their regional police force, and the wider public with even a passing interest in the safety and security of those close to them, can now judge whether the train and tram-obsessed Burnham is discharging one of his primary functions as Mayor: To hold the chief constable of the region’s police force to account – effectively, efficiently and with the necessary level of rigour.

1. Operation Poppy – an IPCC (now IOPC) investigation into Peter Jackson’s whistle blower disclosures.

(i) Operation Nixon

A senior GMP officer, Dominic Scally, allowed a dangerous violent paedophile to take a child into a house, and remain there for over two hours, whilst under police surveillance, and stopped his officers from safeguarding the child. Officers under Scally’s command were outraged. GMP PSB, directed by senior leaders, took no disciplinary action against him.

At the conclusion of the IPCC investigation, Peter Jackson met with Sarah Green, the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, as she was then. He saw her face glow red with embarrassment when he asked searching, but perfectly fair, questions over the outcome she had signed off. He asked, “Would it have been gross misconduct if it had been your son? Would it have been gross misconduct if the paedophile had killed the child whilst police watched?”.  Jackson reports that she couldn’t wait to get out of the room and end the meeting. In much the way that Andy Burnham closed down the whistleblower meeting at GMCA.

(ii) Dale Cregan and the deaths of PC’s Fiona Bone and Nicola Hughes

That same officer, Dominic Scally, who had little, if any, homicide investigation experience, and in full knowledge of his failings on Op Nixon, was placed by GMP Command in charge of the Mark Short murder (Dale Cregan case). Jackson, a very experienced and efficient murder detective, warned at the time that such actions were placing the public and officers at risk. Whilst Scally was leading that investigation, Short’s father and two police officers were murdered. Jackson highlighted the numerous failings in that investigation. He now asks: “Does that not require review, or judicial inquiry, especially given the utterly damning Grainger public inquiry report? Especially, given that two young, female police officers lost their lives? Very arguably, preventable deaths?”

(iii) North West Counter Terrorism Unit

Scally was promoted to Head of Intelligence in the North West Counter Terrorism Unit and in February and March 2017, Jackson raised concerns with Chief Constable Hopkins via emails, about his ability and others in Command of the NWCTU to keep the people of Manchester safe. Within two months Manchester Arena was suicide bombed. A coincidence? Did Jackson have a crystal ball? Was Salman Ramadan Abedi a GMP covert human intelligence source (CHIS) or registered informant, as some informed sources suggest?

ACC Rebekah Sutcliffe and ACC Steve Heywood were the two consecutive Heads of the NWCTU, and both left GMP in shame amidst nationally-known scandal. ACC Heywood the subject of humiliating criticism over Grainger, astonishingly avoided prosecution and yet to face a much-delayed gross misconduct hearing. GMP has primacy for the NWCTU. The problems and scandals that have infested GMP Command have consequently led to dysfunctional leadership in the NWCTU and at what cost? Bearing in mind what the Mayor now knows about his antecedents, the issue of whether Dominic Scally was an appropriate appointment to head up the NWCTU intelligence function is a matter of high public concern. Particularly, given what has followed.

Everything about Operation Nixon, the Cregan investigation and subsequent NWCTU promotions was flawed and, yet, since the Mayor/whistlebower meeting in August, 2018, Scally has, incredibly, been promoted again. He now heads up the NWCTU under the overall command of his long-term ally and supporter, Russ Jackson, a senior officer who had not attained the substantive rank of ACC at the time of his own promotion, and who has failed at the Senior Police National Assessment Centre twice, where necessary competencies are Serving the Public. • Leading Strategic Change. • Leading the Workforce. • Managing Performance. • Professionalism. • Decision Making. • Working with Others. In which of these is Russ Jackson (no relation to Peter) deficient according to PNAC? Can public confidence be maintained in these circumstances, given the legacy issues from the previous NWCTU leadership?

(iv) Shipman body parts scandal

Senior police officers secretly disposed of body parts without consulting the victim’s families in the face of strong objections of the Force Coronial Officer at the time. His protestations were ignored. He was present at a meeting when questions were raised about how they might deal with future requests under the Freedom of Information Act, which could reveal what they had done.  The same Coronial Officer witnessed Simon Barraclough, recent recipient of the Queens Police Medal, suggest that all documentation be burned to stop people finding out what had happened.

“Another shocking example of GMP operating in an unethical, unprofessional and unlawful way; a secretive manner, covering up their actions. Their motives? To avoid negative publicity, reputational damage and, most importantly, avoid damage to their own careers”, says Peter Jackson.

(v) Unauthorised bugging of police premises and Operation Oakland armed robbery incident.

A senior officer at the rank of temporary superintendent, Julian Snowball, bought covert recording equipment via the internet, then (unlawfully) repeatedly entered the office of his Divisional Commander in Wigan, C/Supt Shaun Donnellan, and the office of another senior leadership team member, DCI Howard Millington, and inserted covert surveillance equipment, subsequently and secretly recording months of private conversations.

This behaviour clearly constituted gross misconduct. The ‘spy’ was, however, a crony of ACC Terry Sweeney. Snowball had admitted to Peter Jackson that he was ‘one of Terry’s boys’, treated very favourably as a result and kept his job in the police. The disciplinary investigation was irregular. The outcome was only a written warning, followed by a posting to a detective position he coveted, close to his home.

T/Supt Snowball had almost no front line detective experience, yet was placed as the most senior detective at Stockport. He subsequently headed up a policing operation, codenamed Oakland, where he allowed violent armed robbers to commit an attack on licensed premises that were under police surveillance at the time, and where he stopped his officers intervening to ‘protect the victims’. Snowball also unlawfully changed details on a warrant after it had been granted. This officer was allowed to take a career break without facing disciplinary action, until the whistleblowing disclosures were made to the IPCC.

As rehearsed earlier, Jackson met with the IPCC Deputy Chair Sarah Green at the conclusion of the Poppy investigations. On this particular topic he asked her, “Would it have been gross misconduct if the armed robbers had killed someone in the pub whilst the police watched?”

“As with the Op Nixon questions, I saw her face colour bright red. She didn’t answer the question”.

The IPCC returned the bugging incident disclosures to GMP and, Jackson asserts, didn’t complete their gross misconduct investigation.

In his April, 2018 letter dismissing the disclosures of the whistleblowers, Mayor Burnham relies on the thoroughness of the IPCC investigation to give GMP a clean bill of health regarding the bugging and armed robbery incidents. Yet appears to have forgotten that he was a ferocious critic of the same IPCC over their Orgreave investigation, carried out in much the same timeframe (read more here). Burnham also overlooks the fact that Jackson was the whistleblower, a very experienced and highly regarded murder detective, and is a first hand witness.

Conversely and perversely, the IPCC deployed inexperienced and unimpressive officers with no recognised detective credentials (PIP1 or PIP2). As one might expect, Peter Jackson takes this unvarnished view: “As an organisation, they do not know how to secure evidence, or how to investigate senior police officers impartially. They act with deference to them. The IPCC’s Senior Investigating Officer was Dan Budge, taking over from a deputy position whilst the original SIO was on sick leave. He was a very inexperienced investigator who had to admit to me he had never prepared a criminal case file, or even been to court. Many colleagues reported back to me about being interviewed by very young, new to the IPCC, investigators. One witness, a very experienced DCI, told me he actually had to show the IPCC investigator how to take a witness statement.

There is in existence, of course, as now revealed in a front page article in The Times newspaper, a tape recording of Chief Constable Ian Hopkins, at a meeting with other senior GMP officers, saying he thought the IPCC were ‘abysmal and incapable of conducting a thorough investigation’ yet ironically both Burnham and Hopkins now rely heavily, and frequently, on ‘the IPCC have conducted a thorough investigation’ to defend themselves and the failings of other members of the GMP Command Team.

Irrespective of the well catalogued and wider inadequacies of the IPCC (now IOPC), the incidents they investigated still happened. Reflecting badly, and bringing shame and substantial reputational damage onto both Greater Manchester Police, the Mayor’s office and the wider police service.

2. The questionable purchase of ACC Heywood’s house by the Police and Crime Commissioner.

The background to this complaint is the purchase of Steven Heywood’s house on the perceived threat that a small-time criminal, who went on to murder two police officers, was going harm him. The whistle blowers assert, with confidence, that the alleged threat to ACC Heywood’s house was, at its highest, temporary; it only came to light after Cregan was in prison on remand. He was held as a Category A prisoner. When spoken to in prison by psychiatrists, and other specialists, Cregan said he had gone to Bury Police Station to look for ACC Heywood, and to shoot him as he was angry about the harassment and treatment of his family. He had seen Heywood on the news as the figurehead of the investigation. ACC Heywood however had no connection to that station and Cregan soon realised it was a pointless plan. As he had no idea how to find him, he decided ‘just to kill any cops’ instead. That led to the murders of Nicola Hughes and Fiona Bone, following which he handed himself in.

The threat to Heywood had been momentary. It was not a real or present danger at the time of the house sale. The supposed threat was hidden from the purchasers of the house who were, understandably, outraged when they discovered the truth. The expenditure hidden in subsequent police accounts.

The ‘briefing’ relied on by Andy Burnham to exonerate the GMP Command Team, and ex-PCC Tony Lloyd, was provided by those with a clearly vested interest. The actions surrounding the Heywood house purchase would not stand up to the slightest external scrutiny and have not been properly investigated. The superintendent in charge of GMP Covert Policing told the Command Team at the time that, ethically and professionally, they couldn’t do what they were doing with the house sale and purchase. Burnham’s willingness to accept, at face value, anything told, or provided to him, by GMP Command highlights his lack of desire to investigate matters, robustly, independently and thoroughly, to establish the truth and properly hold CC Hopkins to account.

3. Incident involving ACC Rebekah Sutcliffe at the Senior Women in Policing 2016 Conference – ‘Titgate’ or ‘Boobgate’

ACC Sutcliffe was drunk at the event, and bullied, harangued a junior officer over a lengthy period – and then publicly exposed one of her breasts. That is well rehearsed in the public domain. But the extent of her drunkenness, perhaps, less so; she was very highly intoxicated.

It was a national event to highlight and promote the work of senior female officers in policing. Sutcliffe’s actions brought huge negative publicity, discredited the event and brought shame on herself and GMP.

Chief Constable Hopkins was present on the night and saw the increasingly drunken behaviour of his Command Team colleague. He failed to take charge of the incident and, instead, left early, leaving a junior officer to attempt to deal with Sutcliffe.  His failure to take control of the incident, and deal with the matter himself, could be argued as a lack of moral courage and necessary leadership. What cannot be argued against is that his inaction subsequently led to what was very widely reported as the ‘Titgate’ or ‘Boobgate’ incident in the media.

This was in the early hours of Sunday morning, she reported for duty that morning at Police HQ as duty Gold and, of course, Head of NWCTU. She cannot, conceivably, have been fit for duty. Hopkins must have known this by the state she was in. Yet, he did nothing.

Hopkins was, subsequently, made aware of what happened after he left the event – and was going to do nothing at all about the incident. No sanction against Sutcliffe, not even ‘words of advice’ for conduct that, on any independent view, was gross misconduct. He, eventually, had to take action when details of the incident was revealed on several social media platforms, one week later, and picked up from there by alert newspaper reporters.

ACC Sutcliffe should have been dismissed for gross misconduct. The fact that she wasn’t appears to be connected to an investigation carried out on behalf of Hopkins, by Durham Constabulary, that did not, seemingly, go where the evidence should have taken them. Other incidents, at least one where excess alcohol, and abuse of her rank, was a feature at another high profile event, and Sutcliffe had discredited the force. There was no finding by Durham that Hopkins was largely responsible for the escalation of the incident at the women’s policing event, after the point when he should have ordered Sutcliffe off the hotel premises, ensured her access to alcohol was cut off, and denied her access to police premises until she was sober. A point not lost on the Chair of the subsequent disciplinary hearing, Rachael Cernow QC.

After the disciplinary hearing, Hopkins said Sutcliffe was undeployable in GMP and she was subsequently placed into a senior position at Oldham council on secondment, funded by GMP, later taking the job full time on a salary in excess of £120,000. More than she was paid as a police officer.

This ‘rewarding’ of an ACC for gross misconduct is something not lost on the rank and file, and it is why the GMP Command Team are held in such contempt by many of the officers they lead.

The investigation report following the Durham investigation into Sutcliffe has never been published, despite the massive public interest in the matter.

4. Child Sexual Explotation, Operations Augusta and Span, Pakistani Grooming Gangs.

Now one of the most respected commentators and authors on child sexual exploitation, former GMP detective, Maggie Oliver, very recently heard from the Burnham CSE inquiry for the first time in well over a year. She has little confidence in either the Mayor, those involved in it, or the process itself.

She says, with justifiable force: “I spent several hours talking to the Burnham Review team in 2017, and made it crystal clear to them that as the only senior officer still in post who had failed CSE victims in 2004/5, when he was head of GMP Child Protection Unit, I considered that the buck stopped with Steve Heywood – and he should be held accountable.

“Unsurprisingly the Review team chose not to to speak to him about the disclosures I had made and allowed him to retire unchallenged, over a year later. This is a complete disgrace.

Maggie concludes: “Judgement as to what their findings will be is reserved, as I haven’t yet been given sight of the full Review and no date has been given for publication”

The last ‘deadline’ for publication of the Review, emanating from the Mayor’s office, was ‘end of March, 2019’. At the present rate of progress, Spring 2020 looks a reasonable guess. An agonising, and unnecessary wait for victims, witnesses and campaigners.

In Peter Jackson’s disclosures to the IPCC, he alleged that [Name redacted], GMP’s Force Review Officer at the time, had re-written, or was a party to the re-writing of a critical report that reviewed GMP Command’s approach to CSE in Rochdale. It is alleged that process involved nine separate revisions, after the original authors refused to amend their report. The Review Officer’s brief from senior officers was to cover up the criticisms and initial findings, which had reported that GMP had prioritised volume crime over the rape and abuse of children. It has emerged that at least one other senior female officer, [Name redacted] was involved with what might best be termed as historical revisionism.

As Maggie Oliver explains, ACC Heywood was again involved in another dreadful scandal. Interviewed on TV, he denied there was a cultural issue at play in the grooming gangs phenomon.

Jackson has offered to provide, in confidence, details of witnesses to this grotesque ‘cover up’ who can assist the Burnham CSE inquiry. But is still waiting to hear from the Mayor, or the inquiry team, so that the necessary protections can be put in place and arrangements made for an Available Best Evidence (ABE) interview.

5. Inappropriate relationship between ACC and junior officer.

ACC [Redacted] was the senior officer involved in the inappropriate relationship. The other officer involved was Temporary DI [Redacted]. Her husband, [Redacted] was at that time a temporary DCI. He had just failed his promotion assessment in GMP to substantive chief inspector. He kept his own counsel, didn’t create a fuss and then succeeded in gaining a double promotion to Cheshire Police, jumping two ranks to become a detective superintendent. Thus enabling a departure from the Force and avoiding embarrassment all round in the workplace. Ms [Redacted] was promoted to inspector during the currency of her relationship with ACC [Redacted].

The relationship was known to a large number of rank and file GMP officers and, again, contributes to their very negative view of the Command Team. The Mayor was invited to make a short phone call to CC Hopkins to confirm the facts, ask why this situation was tolerated and to enquire into the merits of the promotions, as opposed to their personal, or political, expedience. It appears that, from his written response to the whistleblowers, Andy Burnham has opted not to do so.

6. Complaints referred back to GMP by IPCC rather than be subjected to external scrutiny.

Following earlier whistleblower disclosures to the IPCC (now IOPC), there were several incidents referred back to GMP for investigation, including the cronyism, nepotism and promotion scandals, the Cregan investigation and a Major Incident Team being called out to deal with the domestic incident involving Supt [Name Redacted] (see para 10 below).

Andy Burnham in his assessment of more recent whistleblower disclosures makes no reference to GMP or what actions may, or may not, have taken on these matters. Peter Jackson asserts that Burnham’s willingness ‘to be satisfied’ that matters have been concluded, without any independent investigation or scrutiny, simply highlights his lack of desire to lift the stones and scrutinise the many misconduct, leadership failings and properly hold the chief constable to account.

7. The Metropolitan Police Peer Review of GMP PSB

It is, by now, well rehearsed that Ian Hopkins misled his officers, and the public, by purporting to have commissioned an in-depth investigation into GMP’s Professional Standards Branch by the Metropolitan Police Service. This was in response to numerous complaints and repeated negative media stories about GMP PSB. The so called six-week review consisted of a visit to the Force by four Met officers and was completed within 24 hours.  The senior officer in that group described his role as a ‘critical friend’ of GMP. None of the issues raised about the alleged PSB corruption were investigated or even lightly addressed. Or even discussed in the pre-planning for the visit. The Met involvement was nothing more than a ‘tick in the box’ exercise that Hopkins could point to and say, ‘Well, the Met have been in and scrutinised PSB. They found nothing wrong’.

Journalist Neil Wilby has investigated this scandal via a number of FOI requests and reported extensively on it. Read more here.

Post peer-review, the scandals surrounding GMP PSB and its closely associated Legal Services Department continue, Peter Jackson claims he is a victim, as does DC Paul Bailey, retired Inspector Scott Winters and a host of others. Jackson describes GMP PSB as “the Command Team’s Praetorian Guard, there to protect senior officer reputations, limit reputational damage to the force, cover up and shut down damaging complaints and pursue, vendetta-style, those who seek to challenge and expose failings within the force”.

8. Operation Holly

Holly was a five year investigation into money laundering, and a serious organised crime group which included one of Manchester’s most infamous criminals, the now deceased Paul Massey. ‘Mr Salford’, as Massey was known, was murdered by a hitman from a rival gang. A strong evidential case had been built up during that period. Numerous reports, and specific allegations, of senior GMP officer corruption were also received by detectives during the investigation. The money laundering against the serious criminals was, subsequently, dropped and no charges were brought. All the detectives involved on the case were outraged by the senior management decision to abandon the investigation and prosecution.

The total costs of the investigation are estimated at £10 million. Peter Jackson knows all the officers on the case. It is common knowledge amongst those officers that the case was dropped because the prosecuting counsel had informed GMP Command Team that the case could not proceed unless all the corruption allegations were fully investigated. GMP Command chose to drop the case, rather than investigate the allegations against its own officers. This, by necessity, would have involved another force or the National Crime Agency.

The Times newspaper has reported on this matter, extensively, and called for an independent inquiry into GMP. (Read more here). Despite very serious corruption allegations being received against senior police officers, the Mayor and his Deputy allowed GMP to investigate itself which rode against the Police Reform Act and Statutory Guidance (and natural justice). The investigation was only requested by Burnham and Hughes after Jackson had raised the issue and The Times had reported on the case.

Jackson concludes: “You (Burnham) repeatedly rely on briefings by the chief constable, and investigations into itself by GMP, to give the force a clean bill of health. Such actions clearly lack integrity or transparency and are, quite frankly, shameful”.

9. Incident during DC Paul Bailey Employment Tribunal proceedings involving alleged malpractice by a GMP lawyer

Peter Jackson was contacted by a witness who asserted that a GMP solicitor [Name redacted] sought to have the Senior Investigating Officer in Operation Holly make a false statement about Detective Constable Paul Bailey in support of GMP’s defence at an Employment Tribunal Hearing brought by the serious crimes detective.

DC Bailey was present when the whistleblowers met the Mayoral entourage in August, 2018. In the months that followed the meeting, not one single member of  Burnham’s team, or the Mayor himself, made any further contact, sought to conduct any further enquiries or launched an investigation into this matter. This is not an isolated incident. says Jackson: “Several others have raised similar issues with you (Burnham) concerning alleged criminal conduct, or alleged gross misconduct, involving GMP PSB and/or Legal Services”.

In Burnham’s response letter, eight months after the only meeting with the whistleblowers, he says he will take appropriate action if the name of the witness is supplied. He offers no protection for the witness, or explanation as to how his/her anonymity would be preserved, fails to disclose whether a severity assessment has been conducted, does not reveal how the matter would be investigated and, particularly, if this would be another police force, statutory body, or member of the Bar or judiciary, rather than GMP, leading it.

The actions, or rather inaction, of Burnham and weak, defensive response to the entirety of the Jackson whistleblower disclosures, and those of others, have engendered genuine mistrust. The perceived closeness of his relationship with the chief constable, and lack of desire to thoroughly investigate the Force does nothing to undermine that proposition. The whistleblowers say, perfectly reasonably, that they need concrete assurances before putting their witness at risk of reprisals from the GMP Command Team.

10. Major Incident Team attending domestic dispute between Superintendent and wife

A Major Incident Team was deployed to deal with a domestic incident involving Superintendent [Name Redacted] and his wife. The domestic argument arose around the allegedly prolific extra-marital sexual activity of the senior officer, involved threats from his wife to go to the media, a scratch on Mr [Name redacted]’s finger, the arrest of his wife for common assault and the search of her home address. The MIT Team was deployed at the request of senior officers. Peter Jackson has spoken to the elite officers who were turned out on the night and, as a result, has extensive knowledge of the incident.

Jackson says: “Why wasn’t this incident dealt with by neighbourhood police? Why was a murder team turned out? How could a search of premises be justified? Who authorised the arrest of the wife? Which senior officers were involved? I know; the ones who run as a thread throughout my disclosures. It is an abuse of powers and authority. A grotesque misuse of police resources”.

“This incident provides yet another window into the broken and rotten cultures at play in GMP. The secrecy, cover ups, lies. The cronyism, the cliques, the misconduct. the wrongdoing. The two-tier system of response from the Professional Standards Branch: Those well connected are treated favourably, wrongdoing overlooked, their actions minimised, examples include Rob Potts, Dominic Scally, Julian Snowball, [Officer involved in DV incident – Name Redacted]. Whereas those not in cliques, not well connected, or who have invoked the wrath of Command are dealt with disproportionately. Examples include John Buttress, Mo Razaq, Rick Pendlebury (both high profile with mass media coverage), Paul Bailey, Scott Winters, Clara Williams, Maria Donaldson, Lee Bruckshaw and myself”.

“Chief Constable Ian Hopkins is well aware of all these matters and I also provided this same information to the IPCC. They returned it to GMP to investigate themselves.

“What has happened since? Nothing”.

11. GMP Professional Standards Branch (PSB) – Group think, toxic, defensive culture.

Over the past few years, there has been many negative news stories and TV broadcasts featuring the troubled and widely derogated PSB. Alleged witch-hunts against such as Chief Inspector John Buttress, Inspector Mo Razaq, Sergeant Rick Pendlebury, Chief Inspector Clara Williams, Chief Superintendent Lee Bruckshaw, Chief Inspector Maria Donaldson, Detective Inspector Andy Aston, Detective Constable Paul Bailey, Inspector Scott Winters, Inspector Laura Escott, Superintendent Jane Little and, of course, Peter Jackson, to name but a few, have also sapped morale within the force and public confidence in those running it.

For example, the grotesquely disproportionate response, expenditure and resources deployed over the John Buttress case, on any independent view, was an outrage. Especially when other misadventures, many much more serious, are deliberately minimised, or dispensed with, by the same PSB. It spawned a BBC Inside Out programme, produced by Neil Morrow and presented by the late and much lamented Dianne Oxberry, and Judith Moritz, that embarassed and enraged the Command Team (view programme here), as did a similarly explosive BBC File on 4 broadcast, extraordinarily titled “Bent Cops”.

Similarly, the resources and seemingly bottomless public funds deployed against Rick Pendlebury was another outrage. Operation Ratio spawned numerous employment tribunals all of which GMP lost. against the investigators and investigated. Jackson asks with considerable and justifiable force; “How much has it cost in legal fees defending the claims and in damages paid out? How much did the Op Ratio investigation cost? This case is a scandal. All for a £25 shoplifting incident. How many hundreds of thousands or millions of pounds has Op Ratio cost? As clear an example of a vexatious, obsessive, oppressive response, from within a police force, as you would find. Accompanied, of course, by reckless spending of huge sums of public money”.

Concerns over Paul Bailey’s case is referenced above at para 10, and recent disclosures by Scott Winters, to the IOPC, are alarming. With PSB officers, aided and abetted by senior officers and legal services, prepared to falsify and/or delete records in order to advance their case in tribunal proceedings, or subsequently seek to defend those actions when later challenged. Yet another case that warrants an urgent independent criminal investigation.

12. Victimisation of Peter Jackson as a police whistleblower

Peter Jackson has this to say about his own experiences:

“I suffered victimisation, was investigated by PSB and secretly referred to the IOPC for my involvement in detecting the perpetrator who assaulted, and nearly killed, my son in Manchester city centre. Did my actions warrant disciplinary investigation, and referral to the IPCC (now IOPC), simply because I expressed my disappointment at having to find evidence myself to identify the serial violent criminal, following a neglectful police investigation.

“Complaints about my treatment following my son’s assault were whitewashed by GMP PSB.

“The adverse referral to the IPCC was uncovered inadvertently, via a data subject access request surrounding my whistleblowing, This contrasts sharply with many other much more serious misconduct, or criminality, that is not referred to the watchdog. Even when there is a mandatory requirement to do so.

“What I allege to be subsequent victimisation and constructive dismissal, at the hands of Russ Jackson, Rebekah Sutcliffe, Ian Pilling and Ian Hopkins, is now the subject of Employment Tribunal proceedings against GMP. The listing of the hearing of the claim has now been delayed until April 2020, almost three years after it was lodged. GMP Command having employed their usual obstructive, underhand and delaying tactics, for the past two years, using the public purse as a bottomless pit.

“And what of the serious consequences for the high-profile Operation Leopard investigation which I had been leading at the time? The negative impact my treatment, and departure from the investigation, had on bringing the leaders of two of Manchester’s most dangerous and violent organised crime groups to justice?

“I had made a major breakthrough, as reported in the media (read more here), arresting the leader of the notorious Salford A Team, equipped with a loaded firearm, and stopping him killing the leader of the rival Anti A Team. Both major targets for GMP. The case against Stephen Britton, who was caught red handed, was dropped after my premature departure from the force.

13. Morale and staff survey

Peter Jackson was ‘tipped off’, by one of his many reliable sources within the force, about a visit to the Mayor’s office by Ian Hopkins, and a Professor from Durham University, with the results of a GMP staff survey the chief constable had commissioned. The survey was weighted towards new recruits, excited at joining the police and with few, if any, negative experiences of ‘the job’ in their early months of service. It gave Hopkins and the Command Team the results they wanted. An improving picture of morale.

“It doesn’t reflect the true landscape and the contempt in which the Command Team are held by many rank and file officers”, says Jackson. “A picture those longer in service have gleaned from seeing repeated senior officer misconduct and misapplication of resources”.

“For example, ACC Sutcliffe exposed for ‘Titgate’, keeping her job despite being found guilty of gross misconduct, then being rewarded with a better paid job at Oldham Council.

“ACC Heywood ‘retiring’ after being exposed lying, and altering his policy book post-incident, in the Grainger public inquiry. The subject of damning criticism by Judge Teague in his recently released Inquiry report. Heywood went on sick leave the day after he gave evidence at the Inquiry, and never returned to work, costing the taxpayer a six figure sum.

“He was portfolio holder of NWCTU. The force has refused to say who was in charge in Heywood’s absence, at home drawing full salary, when the Manchester Arena was bombed two months later

“ACC Sweeney also receiving damning criticism. having left the Force in shame after the Shipman revelations

“Experienced officers, longer in service, being fully aware of the many integrity questions around the PSB, all the adverse findings at ETs, all the operational failings, are sickened by these scandals. By contrast, new recruits are wide eyed learning the job. They are almost completely unaware of any of the scandals. The survey that Hopkins, and now Andy Burnham, relies upon does not reflect an accurate picture and would not stand the slightest scrutiny.

“Another glaring example of how easily Burnham is hoodwinked by the very officer he is charged with holding to account” Jackson concludes, and not without justification. The Mayor looks, increasingly, as though he is as easily schooled as a fourth form pupil taking lessons from the headmaster. When the roles should, actually, be in reverse. Burnham appears to have forgotten that he has the power to hire and fire chief constables, not constantly suck up to the sub-standard one presently deployed in the Greater Manchester region.

14. Local Policing Review

This new policing model saw the introduction of a different shift pattern; changes to the  neighbourhood team model; the dismantling of the well-established, effective and efficient main office CID [Criminal Investigation Department] function; detectives working with PCSOs; frontline patrol officers reduced to a small number of response officers.

Yet, Andy Burnham claims, in his April, 2019 response to the whistleblowers’ meeting, that he has no knowledge of the Local Policing Review issues and needs evidence of its alleged failings. This recent article in his local newspaper might give the hapless Mayor some clues (read more here)? The headline is a give away: “Has Greater Manchester gone soft on crime?”. The reporter centres on how criminals are ‘laughing’ at the police and victims of crime virtually abandoned, even those with compelling evidence, often gathered themselves in the absence of any investigative support from GMP.

The response of the force within that article, by Superintendent Andy Sidebotham, is by way of an obvious untruth about the availabilty, delivery of evidence in a specific case concerning a £10,000 caravan theft. Filmed in its entirety by the victim’s own CCTV and published on the newspaper’s own website just four days after the incident. Weeks later, Sidebotham claims that none of the three emails sent to the force by the victim, and bearing the CCTV file, had been received and, presumably, no-one in GMP’s Salford Division reads the Manchester Evening News.

Peter Jackson expresses his incredulity over Burnham’s response to the LPR crisis: “Surely as Mayor, and surely your Deputy, statutorily charged with setting the policing plan and budget, are fully aware of the Local Policing Review? A model that has been an unmitigated disaster and I simply cannot believe you have not been briefed on its failings by the chief constable in your regular meetings”.

He continues: “Over the years I saw lots of unnecessary changes brought to GMP, with many millions of pounds wasted on vanity projects by senior officers trying to advance their careers. However, none more so than CC Hopkins signing off the LPR model.

“In the whistleblowers meeting with the Mayor, I described the changes to CID as tantamount to corporate vandalism and seriously undermining the investigative capabilities of the police force. And at what financial cost? How many millions to implement all the changes?

Jackson concludes with another broadside: “The result – a system that doesn’t work and after years of trying to force a failing model to succeed we now have acceptance of reality and Operation Ergo is seeing the return to the policing model we essentially had in the 1980’s”.

15. CC Ian Hopkins ‘lies’ in response to The Times paedophile story.

Following what can only be described as an attempted ‘brushing under the carpet’ of this incident by Deputy Mayor Beverley Hughes, Peter Jackson’s appeal was upheld by the IOPC after assessing her so-called ‘investigation’. As a result, Andy Burnham elected, on advice from the same IOPC, to have the matter ‘independently investigated’. The Mayor, or his advisers, chose to hand it to Durham Constabulary.

This proved to be a controversial choice and has spawned three other articles on this website. Peter Jackson says: “As you know I expressed a vote of no confidence in the Durham Senior Investigating Officer, Darren Ellis, at an early stage, but Burnham allowed him to continue, even though the SIO behaved in a totally unprofessional, defensive, biased, aggressive and belligerent manner”.

“The same SIO harshly exposed in the media over his dealings with the Loughinisland controversy (read more here).

“It, therefore, came as no surprise that the Durham investigation report was a whitewash, reeking of confirmation bias, cherry-picked evidence and a conclusion of ‘no case to answer’ for CC Hopkins. Ellis refused to interview the witnesses I identified and ignored the welter of evidence that demonstrated that CC Hopkins and ACC Russ Jackson, who was involved in drafting the statement, must have known what they said was not true.

“I did, however, note that the report also contained evidence of CC Hopkins having been advised by former PCC Tony Lloyd regarding a previous incident of apparently ‘not intentionally lying’. Repeated ‘accidental’ lying or not telling the truth to the media is certainly not a quality one would want of a Chief Constable, is it?”

16. The Grainger Inquiry

Anthony Grainger was shot by a GMP officer (anonymised ever since as Q9) whilst sat in a stationary car in Culceth, Cheshire in 2012. There were many appalling failings by the police before, during and after the killing.

Through the tenacious, relentless efforts of his partner, Gail Hadfield Grainger, and his mother, Marina Schofield, a public inquiry eventually sat in Liverpool Crown Court in 2017 to hear those circumstances and take evidence from those involved

His Honour Judge Thomas Teague QC’s damning report, published over two years later, can be read in full here.

It is a crushing condemnation of Greater Manchester Police by the Inquiry Chair. Particularly, its leadership and its specialist firearms unit. The report attracted close attention from almost every mainstream media outlet. There is little point rehearsing the catalogue of deceit and operational failures again.

In this instance Peter Jackson simply says, “As far as the whistleblower meeting with the Mayor goes it is a case of ‘res ipsa loquitur’, although if Andy Burnham wants me to point out some of the more damning comments about senior GMP officers from the Inquiry report, which I foretold during our meeting, I would be happy to assist”.

17. iOPS scandal

Presciently, the early failures and alleged cost over-runs of GMP’s were raised in the whistleblower meeting in August, 2018. One year later, almost to the day, it was the lead story on the ITV’s Granada Reports daily news broadast and a full blown scandal has developed.

Once again, Peter Jackson has strong words to say to Mayor Burnham: “I note in your response to our meeting, and my disclosures and complaints about IOPS, you seem to imply all is in order and you even take some ownership of this project, as you say ‘expenditure is monitored very closely and spend agreed… now by me or the Deputy Mayor with advice on the investment provided independent of GMP.’

“I also note in the first MEN article on the subject (read article in full here) it says there has been a ‘glitch’ and cites ‘GMP chiefs’ as saying the system is progressing well.

“The reference to ‘chiefs’ rather than ‘chief’ is interesting, as if it had been in the singular CC Hopkins would be caught in a lie again. Costs are cited at £27 million, but as you know the true figure of the project with implementation costs has to be, in reality, well in excess of an estimate first broadcast over three years ago. What’s more, I have ample evidence from many other police whistleblowers that the system is not ‘progressing well’. It has been a complete and utter disaster.

Jackson continues his attack on the Mayor: “Are you alarmed Mr Burnham? Is that enough of a scandal for you to take action? Live feedback from officers is pouring in. The Police Federation say there is a serious risk to officers and the public.

“Are you concerned about Intelligence System failures? Everyone should know of the dangers of that from the murders of PC’s Fiona Bone and Nicola Hughes committed by Dale Cregan. Most recently, the intelligence failures that were exposed at the Grainger Inquiry. Also, it is well known that GMP officers went to the wrong house and killed the ‘wrong’ Jordon (Jordan) Begley.

“And what of the many other ‘glitches’? Are you waiting for a blue light call to a non-existent job to end in tragedy before you take action?

Conclusion

Peter Jackson’s conclusion on the response to his own disclosures, and those of other whistleblowers, can be summarised thus:

“Margaret Oliver, Paul Bailey and myself are three voices that represent the views and concerns of many other ex-, retired and serving officers.  After the meeting last August, we were, more or less, blanked for eight months by Mayor Andy Burnham, his Deputy, and Clare Monaghan. All three failed to positively engage with us and repeatedly resist taking serious, determined action to investigate our disclosures and complaints. All we have faced is delays, prevarication and been treated as a nuisance. The unacceptable behaviour of such as Beverley Hughes and Kevin Lee in that meeting foretold what came later.

“I would, respectfully, remind you, Mr Burnham, of some of your comments in your House of Commons speech on Hillsborough (read in full here).

  • This is a time for transparency, not secrecy

Let me turn to collusion between police and the media. The malicious briefings given in the immediate aftermath were devastatingly efficient. They created a false version of events which lingered until yesterday.

  • At many inquests today, there is often a mismatch between the legal representation of public bodies and those of the bereaved.Why should the authorities be able to spend public money like water to protect themselves while families have no such help?
  • This cover-up went right to the top.
  • This police force [South Yorkshire Police] hasn’t learned and hasn’t changed.
  • Mr Speaker, let me be clear – I don’t blame the ordinary police officers, the men and women who did their best on the day and who today are out keeping our streets safe. But I do blame their leadership and culture, which seems rotten to the core.
  • One of the lessons of Hillsborough is that there must be no arbitrary time limits on justice and accountability.
  • This is a time for transparency, not secrecy—time for the people of South Yorkshire to know the full truth about their police force.

“I agree, completely, with all the sentiments you expressed. They all apply to GMP today. Yes, it is time for the people of Greater Manchester to know the full truth about their police force.

“It is time that they also knew that their Mayor failed to take action, failed to hold the Chief Constable to account.

He signs off with a very powerful message to the Mayor: “Your failure to tackle the scandal that is Greater Manchester Police is a serious neglect of your public duties and ultimately should, if justice is served, mean that you lose your position as Mayor next May. This great city, and the wider region, deserve much better than you can provide. I, and many others associated with the police, will be actively campaigning against you both on the streets, at hustings, public meetings and on social media”.

Which means that Andy Burnham was right after all about the whistleblower meeting being the first of many. But, perhaps, not in the way he might have envisaged.

Earlier today, (12th August, 2019), senior reporter Jennifer Williams broke the mould of the Manchester Evening News exempting the Mayor and his Deputy from any critisism over failings of their regional police force. In a short, but sharply pointed, piece she sets out clearly and concisely just where she considers the democratic deficit to lie: Squarely at the feet of Andy Burnham and Beverley Hughes (read in full here).

This Neil Wilby piece,  a mammoth 8,200 words epic, might go some way to fleshing out the MEN and Jennifer’s argument.

Other scandals outside the scope of the police whistleblower disclosures

There are a series of other scandals that were not part of the Bailey, Jackson, Oliver (and Winter) disclosures to the Mayor of Greater Manchester. Associated articles have either appeared, or due to appear in the near future. It is a depressingly long list, and reveals a police force so badly run that it, in all conscience, should be placed in special measures by the Home Office and the chief constable served with a Section 38 notice.

As for the Mayor and his Deputy, they should fall on their sword and announce that neither will stand in the local regional elections next May:

(i) Industrial scale breaches of Freedom of Information Act and Data Protection Act.

(ii) Mabs Hussain promotion to Assistant Chief Constable (read here).

(iii) Spying on and reporting disabled protesters to Department of Work and Pensions (read here).

(iv) Chief constable’s behaviour in and outside the courtroom at the Grainger Inquiry

(v) Destruction of weapons, assets following death of Ian Terry. Undertaking signed off by present chief constable, Ian Hopkins. Destruction didn’t take place until at least 2017.

(vi) Death following police contact of Jordon Begley.

 

Page last updated: Wednesday 22nd August, 2019 at 1705 hours

Photo Credit: Getty Images/PA/Huffington Post

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

Right of reply: If you are mentioned in this article and disagree with it, please let me have your comments. Provided your response is not defamatory it will be added to the article.

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

Another Durham debacle as chief constable snubs Manchester Mayor

Much has already been written about the Operation Mackan fiasco, over which the now-retired chief constable of Durham Constabulary, Michael Barton was Gold Commander (read more here).

The central theme has been the sub-optimal, one-eyed investigation carried out by his Silver Commander, civilian investigator Darren Ellis, into complaints raised against the chief constable of Greater Manchester Police, Ian Hopkins. It is alleged that, not for the first time, he responded dishonestly to press criticism.

Durham were asked to investigate by the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, on his behalf, after a grotesquely failed ‘investigation’ carried out by his deputy, Beverley Hughes.

An appeal by the complainant, to the police watchdog, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, against the outcome, signed off by Hughes, unsurprisingly succeeded. The so-called investigation amounted to nothing more than a single phone call to Hopkins, of which there was no note or record.

The complainant is Peter Jackson, a retired superintendent and now a nationally known police whistle blower, having been the source for a large number of regional and national newspaper stories, over the past two years, plus a regular round of TV appearances. Most recently on ITV Granada Reports where he broke a massive scandal concerning information technology failures at GMP from which, the Police Federation say, lives of police officers and members of the public are at risk.

It was also Jackson who was the source for The Times article at the heart of the complaints.

The Durham investigation outcome, accompanied by a 66 page report, littered with errors, is now also subject to appeal to the IOPC. Its receipt was ackowledged on 2nd August, 2019 and the Casework Manager, who gave his address as the Sale office of the police watchdog, anticipated being in a position to complete his assessment ‘within 15 working days, subject to any senior manager or lawyer input’.

‘Casework Manager’ is a very junior role in the IOPC, often held by inexperienced recruits, with little or no experience in police matters and no investigative experience or qualifications. The watchdog do themselves yet another disservice by not having this appeal, against a highly controversial investigation, analysed and assessed under the direct control of one of their Regional Directors.

It is hard to envisage the handling of a complaint, outside the realm of a death following police contact, that continues to drain confidence in the police complaints system as much as this Jackson, Hopkins, Burnham farrago.

In April 2019, Peter Jackson made a multi-faceted complaint to the Mayor’s office, via his Deputy Director for Policing, Clare Monaghan, regarding the conduct of Darren Ellis. It concerned both his questionable performance and competencies as a detective, and a series of alleged ethical breaches that included disrespect, discourtesy, neglect of duty, partiality and discreditable conduct. Jackson is well placed to assess the merits of a police investigation, particularly how it is framed and progressed, as he was Manchester’s leading murder detective before he retired. He had investigated serious crime for most of his 31-year police career.

The following month Andy Burnham wrote to the Durham chief constable, passing on the Jackson complaints against Ellis to him, as the appropriate authority, to make a decision whether to record them under the Police Reform Act, 2002. Bizarrely, Burnham did not support the whistle blower’s request for the removal of Ellis from the investigation. A decision likely to prove very costly; both in terms of public funds and further damage to his already failing reputation as an elected representative capable of holding a police force to account.

Jackson wrote to Barton, just before he retired in June, to enquire about the status of his complaints. His email was ignored. The Operation Mackan outcome was sent to Burnham a few days later. Jackson describes it as one of the worst he has ever seen, with, he says, a large catalogue of basic investigative errors and a highly partial approach virtually throughout. His appeal to the IOPC reflects those points.

Questions about the recording of the Jackson complaints, raised via the Durham press office in the course of researching this article, also drew a blank. Although separate enquiries to the Professional Standards Department did reveal that Ellis is still employed by the force. The clear inference at this point is that they have not been recorded. Strongly backed up by the fact that there has been no contact at all from Durham PSD to the complainant since the Burnham letter to Barton.

In the light of that information, Peter Jackson wrote to Barton’s successor as chief constable, Jo Farrell, to again enquire whether the complaints have been recorded. He has not even received an acknowledgement.

Even allowing for the apparent absence of ethical and professional standards in Durham Constabulary, cascading down from the top of the force, it is very poor conduct by Ms Farrell towards a retired police officer with an exemplary record across 31 years of service. This echoes dealings I had with her during her stint as deputy to Barton. Her portfolio responsibilities at that time included PSD. Our contact concerned an attempt to establish the directing mind in the response to a freedom of information request in which Durham gratuitously libelled me (read more here)

Members of the public, some with very serious issues indeed, have come forward to complain of the same disdainful culture within Durham. Typified in every way, it must be said, by Darren Ellis, as well as others across the ranks of this “grubby little police force”.

Alarming though it is, the protection of Ellis by Barton, and now, it seems, Farrell, does not just extend to the Jackson complaints. He is also under complaint over the most appalling conduct towards two Irish journalists, Barry McCaffrey and Trevor Birney in an operation codenamed Yurta that resulted in the two reporters being arrested and their properties searched over a TV documentary they filmed, and produced, about the infamous Loughinisland massacre. Barton, described by his own Durham colleagues as “a nutter”, resolutely defended Ellis in a televised broadcast from the Policing Board of Northern Ireland and continued to do so through other media, up to the day of his retirement.

The next step for Jackson is to appeal the non-recording of his complaints by Durham to the IOPC. Very determined that they will be appropriately and proportionately investigated, however long that takes, he is, of course, acutely aware that such an investigation, or local resolution, is unlikely to happen within the Durham force: Chief constables, past and present, are already implicated in a ‘cover-up’ and Darren Ellis, it seems, is still able to exert considerable influence within the very department that would deal with the complaints against him.

Peter Jackson’s merry-go-round predicament is another perfect example of why the police complaints system, and the statutory framework governing it, is in such urgent need of radical overhaul; a re-structure that should find no place for police officers, and forces, investigating themselves.

The seriously flawed IOPC should also be confined to the dustbin of history, alongside its three disgraced incarnations, the Police Complaints Board (1977-1985), the Police Complaints Authority (1985-2004) and the Independent Police Complaints Commission (2004 – 2018). Each one worse than its predecessor, which is, arguably, something only the UK Home Office could achieve.

Page last updated: Monday 12th August, 2019 at 0715 hours

 

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

Right of reply: If you are mentioned in this article and disagree with it, please let me have your comments. Provided your response is not defamatory it will be added to the article.

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

Second investigation into ‘lying’ chief constable flounders

Retired murder detective, Peter Jackson, the country’s best known police whistle blower, has written to the Mayor of Greater Manchester’s office to point out that his complaints against the region’s chief constable, Ian Hopkins, are, once again, not being investigated properly.

Under the applicable statutory framework, the Mayor is, ultimately, the Appropriate Authority who deals with such complaints. After a calamitous first investigation, in which his Deputy, ‘Bev’ Hughes attempted to dispose of the complaints by a hopelessly misconceived local resolution process, and misled the complainant by claiming she was conducting an ‘investigation’, Durham Constabulary was asked to assess and manage the probe into the misconduct allegations (read more here).

The ‘investigation’ by Mrs Hughes subsequently turned out to be no more than a phone call to Mr Hopkins. Not one scrap of paper was produced by her after the Independent Office for Police Conduct (more widely recognised under its previous guise of the IPCC) directed the hapless Deputy Mayor to disclose all documents relating to the process. Mr Jackson’s complaint against her ‘local resolution’ findings was, unsurprsingly, upheld by the police ‘watchdog’.

Bev Hughes had falsely claimed that she had conducted a three month investigation and Peter Jackson was, understandably, disconcerted when the truth emerged. She has faced no disciplinary process or sanction, arising from that disgraceful farrago.

Greater Manchester Combined Authority, which hosts the Mayor’s administrative functions first contacted Durham on 5th December, 2018. Three weeks later, after a flurry of communication between GMCA’s Deputy Director of Policing, Clare Monaghan, and a Durham civilian investigator, Darren Ellis, the small county police force took on the job of tackling serious misconduct allegations against the chief constable of the country’s fourth largest metropolitan force.

It looked a mis-match from the outset, and so it has proved. Not helped, it seems, by the unexpected announcement of the retirement of the Durham chief constable, Michael Barton. He is the Gold Commander of the Hopkins investigation, even though he appears to spend an extraordinary amount of his time ‘out of force’.

There are serious and well-grounded questions presently being asked surrounding the reasons given for that retirement, and its proximity to accepting the investigation into Chief Constable Hopkins. Mr Barton was less than half way through a contact extension agreed in 2016, which would keep him at the Durham helm until February 2021 (read more here).

Mr Jackson says he has lost confidence, both in Mr Ellis and the Durham investigation. He cites the following principal reasons:

– Witnesses that were identified in his evidential statements have contacted him to complain about the conduct of Ellis towards them.

– Those witnesses, a serving and a retired police officer, Paul Bailey and Scott Winters respectively, plus journalist Neil Wilby, have no confidence in Mr Ellis and, particulary, his ability to conduct a correctly framed, robust, proportionate investigation.

 – He is not reassured that Mr Ellis is adopting an appropriately thorough and independent investigation of his complaint. He fears another ‘whitewash’, along the lines of the previous feeble attempt to dispose of the complaints by the Deputy Mayor.

 – Ellis has been accused variously, of being sarcastic, patronising, confrontational, aggressive, insulting, deceitful, evasive, inept, unethical and unprofessional. Seeking, from the outset it seems, to break off contact with all parties on the complainant’s side.

 – Providing a straight answer to a straight question also appears to be beyond Durham’s finest.

Mrs Monaghan was provided with relevant e-mail correspondence to evidence this serious and quite astonishing catalogue of allegations. She has acknowledged the communication from Mr Jackson and is set to discuss the matter with the Mayor, Andy Burnham in the near future.

Clare Monaghan 2
Gretaer Manchester’s Deputy Director for Policing, Clare Monaghan.

Those Ellis emails, highlighted by Peter Jackson, include one to Neil Wilby, where, amongst other smearing, misdirected remarks, he references visiting the toilets at a friend’s house. Mr Ellis cites quotations he read on the walls of both the upstairs and downstairs facilities, referring to him as a fool. Ellis might well be correct in his assertion, but to use a police email address and IT systems, is unethical and unprofessional, at best. Not least, as the journalist is a deponent in the investigation of which the Durham detective is seized, at the behest of the complainant, and has extensive and detailed witness evidence relevant to what is asserted by Peter Jackson.

At the initial meeting between investigator and complainant, Mr Ellis gave the impression that he understood the seriousness of the matters in issue, and would conduct a thorough investigation. More crucially, he agreed to ‘go where the evidence takes him’, adding it into Mr Jackson’s first witness statement and asserting that such a crucial caveat would form part of the investigation’s Terms of Reference, agreed with GMCA.

As a former head of GMP’s elite Murder Investigation Team (MIT), Mr Jackson is much more aware than most, including Mr Ellis, that it is a well recognised, and sound, approach to examine evidence arising out of similar conduct in other incidents when conducting any investigation.

To Mr Jackson’s obvious dismay, Mr Ellis is said to be conducting the investigation ‘with his fingers in his ears’ whilst acting in an antagonistic manner towards highly informed and experienced witnesses. Conversely, and perversely, there appears to be excessive contact between Ellis and Mrs Monaghan. More alarmingly, Durham Constabulary appear to be willing to break the law to conceal the extent of it (read more here). 

Mr Jackson was recently contacted by a well informed local journalist, based in Manchester, who has reinforced the complainant’s view that the outcome of the present investigation is going to be another ‘whitewash’. Firmly held views, emanating from highly placed sources within both GMP and GMCA, are that the complaint is ‘trivial’ and ‘the investigation is going nowhere’. 

In an article, published on Wednesday 3rd April, 2019 in the Manchester Evening News, that has the look and feel of the under-fire Mr Hopkins calling in a favour from his friends at the local newspaper, the prospect of a ‘whitewash’ increases.  ‘Chief constable vows to clear his name’ screams the headline. The oxymoron, ‘I did not deliberately lie‘ is the theme of an article almost entirely absent of journalistic rigour. 

Mr Jackson has made it clear, in his evidence to both the Durham team and Mrs Monaghan, that the conduct of the chief constable in response to The Times article at the heart of the present complaints, was not a ‘one off’. It forms part of a much wider pattern of alleged behaviour that includes deceit, lies, ‘cover up’ and misleading of the public. 

For his part, Mr Ellis has repeatedly refused to inform the complainant of the outcome of his severity assessment. Although Ellis asserts that a Regulation 15 notice has been served on Ian Hopkins, he refuses to say whether the allegations amount to misconduct, or gross misconduct. Adding to the opaqueness, GMCA have refused requests by the BBC to confirm whether the regulation notice has been issued. GMP referred such enquiries to GMCA. The latter has been approached by Neil Wilby, via a freedom of information request, for a copy of the notice.

The terms of reference have been disclosed publicly and they appear to be a diluted version of what Mr Jackson was told to expect. There is no mention of the recording of the disreputable conduct that is alleged by Jackson, and the ‘go where the evidence takes us’ is missing. Mr Ellis has refused to explain these disparities and has cut off contact with the complainant, accusing him of leaking information to journalists.

In the light of the alleged misconduct of Darren Ellis, together with the highly conflicted position of the Deputy Mayor and GMCA, flowing from the disgraceful first attempt at the investigation of the Jackson complaints, a firm request has been made for a referral of these matters to the IPCC (now IOPC) for an independent investigation, by them, as a matter of urgency.

Page last updated on Monday 8th April. 2019 at 1725hrs

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

Right of reply: If you are mentioned in this article and disagree with it, please let me have your comments. Provided your response is not defamatory it will be added to the article.

Picture credit:  Manchester Evening News

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

Staring into the abyss

As an eight year old lad, I was hit by a car whilst crossing the main road near the tied colliery cottage in Whitwood, Castleford that was my family home at that time (number fifteen, the house with the unkempt gable in the picture).

The injuries were not life threatening, but I was detained in hospital for five days. I retain little, or no, memory of what was, most fortunately, a glancing blow impact.

When consciousness returned the next day, a policeman from the now defunct West Riding Constabulary was soon at my bedside, along with my parents. They were, of course, anxious to hear an account of what had happened. I told them about my errand to the newsagents, almost opposite the landmark Rising Sun public house, coming out of the shop, looking both ways before attempting to cross, seeing a car coming from my left, nothing from my right. Judging that I could beat the car, as a notably fast runner, I sped across the road.

It wasn’t possible to say whether the car, later identified as a Wolseley sedan used in a post office robbery in neighbouring Normanton, had hit me with its offside or nearside wing. It, very obviously, hadn’t struck me head on. The driver may have stopped, briefly, to ascertain my condition, but he didn’t remain at the scene and was never caught.

All I could usefully report was that it appeared grey in colour with a large chrome radiator grille and bumpers. My elder, much loved, and now sorely missed, sister found me in the road, nearer the centre than the far kerb. It was Jacqueline that had despatched me to the shop with the usual inducement of a penny for sweets. By the time she was at the scene, other cars had stopped and an ambulance, called for from the nearby pub, was on its way.

After the police officer left, my father robustly challenged my account and suggested I had been reading the evening newspaper, the purpose of my errand, or had my nose in my bag of Sports Mixtures, and not looked before crossing the A655.

It was my fault – according to my father – and I’ve never forgotten the words he said, thereafter: “If you tell one lie, you will end up telling five or six more to cover up the first one”. They are quoted by me, often, to this day.

To a young lad lying in hospital, with broken bones and crushed pride, when, in reality, he should have been on a mortuary slab, the accusation was deeply wounding. The pain is still felt over 50 years later. More excruciating because there was no apology from my father when, a couple of weeks later, our local bobby told my parents about the escaping villains in a stolen vehicle. Which appeared to support my account, in part, at the very least.

I had told the truth, and had been caught out by the speed of the car, but that flawed, and summary, parental guilty verdict was etched in the front of my mind. As was the fact, that I learned over the years, my father very rarely explained or apologised for anything, up to the day he died in 2014. But, in that regard, he was no different to most other men hewn from coal mining stock in the many surrounding pit villages.

Latterly, I’ve been drawn into another ‘car-crash’ investigation, this time in North Manchester, the site of the region’s police headquarters, rather than a quiet West Riding backwater, just off the M62. There has also been a second incident in Central London, at New Scotland Yard, as the country’s largest police force has failed to apply the brakes and prevent a slow-motion collision with a pedestrian, plodding investigative journalist unnaturally driven to uncover the truth.

Again, allegations of lying, lack of explanation or apology are the central themes. Its aftermath has already spawned three articles on this website.

Mystery of the missing peer review

Your cheque is in the post

Peering into the gloom

Greater Manchester Police (GMP) is a force that has attracted a lot of adverse media attention over the past few years and, in particular, its seeming ability not to come clean about its shortcomings, explain them, learn lessons, apologise and move on. Instead, it has a senior leadership team that is perenially mired in deceit and ‘cover-up’.

The present chief constable, Ian Hopkins, having joined GMP in 2008 as one of Sir Peter Fahy’s assistant chiefs, promoted to deputy in 2011, then taking over the top job, unopposed, in 2015, has been at the scene of much of the controversy.

This latest, and still expanding, investigation into alleged GMP impropriety started with a notion that the force was, once again, hiding the truth over internal failures. But, taken at its face, appeared relatively innocuous at the outset, compared to those by other newspaper, radio and TV journalists covering, for example, death or industrial scale rape and trafficking of children.

On any view, it is a quite extraordinary tale and GMP has now dragged the Metropolitan Police Service under the bus with them. It began, in November, 2015, with an entire front page of a newspaper taken up with a photograph of a newly invested chief constable, accompanying a hard-hitting story of a repeatedly called for, long-overdue corruption inquiry.

The once-mighty Met was, it was said, to spend six weeks in Manchester investigating GMP’s much-criticised internal affairs department, otherwise known as the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU). A root and branch process that would settle the ‘corruption’ argument one way or the other. Hopkins vigourously denies any wrongdoing of his police force and, by implication, himself.

Of some concern at the time, but not, apparently, to the newspaper’s reporter or editor, the Met invasion was designated to be a process known within policing as a ‘peer review’. A long way short of a misconduct or criminal investigation, by another police force, that many deemed essential.

The CCU, a secretive, undercover investigative unit, forms one limb of GMP’s Professional Standards Branch (PSB). Another is the PSBi, known as the Professional Standards Investigation Unit, which, ostensibly, deals with overt resolution of public complaints. A third is the Force Vetting Unit, and, lastly, Legal Services.

The role, and importance, of the latter is often misunderstood by the public, as the primary function of the PSBi is to prevent, at source, civil claims being successfully mounted by complainants. That applies to the professional standards departments of every police force in the country. If they came clean to the public, and properly explained the dynamics, it would save so much time and frustration to those wronged by the police.

An unseen, and too often unseemly, activity of the CCU is to target officers who become a problem to the reputation of the force by speaking out against wrongdoing by other officers. They are subject to intensive and, often, seriously intrusive scrutiny in order to discredit and ultimately drive them out of the police service.

Ex-Superintendent John Buttress is the highest profile example of this tactic as the CCU were, for example, permitted, without sanction, to seriously tamper with witness evidence and criminally hack the phone of his partner as part of a grotesque, highly-publicised witch-hunt. By contrast, Assistant Chief Constable Steve Heywood was allowed to retire after the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to prosecute him on the most compelling evidence. The working hypothesis is that the CCU attack dogs were not unleashed on Heywood to dig up other dirt, just in case the CPS ‘bottled it’ over his lying in oral evidence to a public inquiry, and forging a document disclosed to it.

The Met’s peer review team did not look at the Buttress file. Nor is their any suggestion in their final written report that any of the other controversial files were examined, either.

The three previous ‘peer review’ articles covered the genesis, execution and aftermath of the Met’s visit to Manchester, in forensic detail. A fifth article will follow this one, demonstrating that GMP’s professional standards function, post peer review, is as deplorable as ever.

The focus of this fourth article is the huge gap between expectation and delivery: What the local newspaper projected as a robust, thorough, warts and all investigation and the pale imitation, talking-shop that actually took place at Manchester police HQ.

After the third article, a highly critical take down of what can only be described as an inter-force ‘whitewash’, a statement from the GMP chief constable was sought, via his press office, in order to explain the difference. This is the lengthy response, attributed to a force spokesperson.

“In late 2015 a programme of work to transform Greater Manchester Police’s Professional Standards Branch was put in place. As part of this work a range of activities were undertaken including a full, in depth independent review, a peer review and oversight from an external group.

“The Peer Review by the Metropolitan Police originally planned for 6 weeks in late 2015 had been delayed due to operational matters. This was rescheduled to May 2016 by which time substantial work was already underway as part of the independent review. The peer review therefore was focused as an assessment of the progress that had been made and changes which were planned. This was reduced from the initial scope to two days as this was sufficient for its revised purpose – to support the independent review and transformational change programme which had started in Nov 2015. The Peer report was provided to GMP in December 2016.

“The external reference group was established in Feb 2016 with an independent chairperson. Representatives on the group included a wide range of individuals with expertise and views about the work around professional standards. They continued to provide support and advice until June 2017.

“The programme of work has led to changes being made to the way professional standards operates in GMP and we are continuing to review and develop this work. Since then there have been reviews by HMICFRS (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Service) and the IOPC (Independent Office for Police Conduct) who have raised no issues of significant concern.”

There was no comment, as specifically requested, from the normally voluble chief constable.

A request for clarification of a press statement that, plainly and unexpectedly, introduced a tranche of what appears to be significant new information, regarding the alleged review of GMP’s PSB was, however, plainly necessary. There is no open source material available to support any of the assertions made by the press office about independent and external scrutiny, other than the Met’s peer review. A search of the two police watchdog websites was not immediately fruitful, either.

The second press request was thus formulated:

“There is no wish to be a burden to a busy press office but this is a matter directly affecting public confidence, not only in GMP, but in the wider police service.

Independent review: Who carried it out, when did it start and end, was there a closing report (the latter would be subject of an FOIA request, of course)?

External reference group: Please provide details of name of the group, and its constituent members, and, also, direct me to any publications made either by GMP, or the group, before, during or after the review. This is necessary to establish their credentials for carrying out the work. Only the Chair would be named in the article, unless the other Members raised no objection to being named, or their names are already in the public domain.

HMICFRS and IPCC (IOPC): Can you please direct me to the ‘watchdog’ reports referenced in your press statement?

“These require scrutiny, and further comment from them, as my own extensive experience of PSB (which is the subject of the next in the series of peer review articles) leaves me in no doubt, whatsoever, that the department is still quite shockingly run, with little or no discernible commitment to the requisite ethical or professional standards. A matter I have articulated, at some length, to DCC Pilling, over a lengthy period, including the email dated 24th March, 2018 which is attached as a pdf.”

 

The press office replied as follows:

“We have nothing further to add to the statement and report you have received on this. If you wish to seek further information then please put in an FOI request.

“With regards to where the reports are, you will need to speak to those respective organisations if you want to find/access their reports.”

This, from a police force that jumps on any ‘open and transparent’ bandwagon that rolls past. Even by press office standards, and GMP are one of the better ones it must be said, it is a woeful abdication of ethical and professional responsibilty.

Quite apart from which, it could safely be argued, the information sought, via the press office, should be part of a police force’s publication scheme on their own website, or that of the elected policing body that provides oversight. That is the effect of guidance given to public authorities by the Information Commissioner, a statutory regulator.

In any event, the questions, as framed, should have posed no difficulties at all if there is nothing to hide: Who undertook the reviews, when did they start and finish, where are the reports?

The irony is, also, completely lost on the press office that the peer review, and the transformational change programme within which it was embedded, was designed to improve the experience of those engaging directly with the force, and stakeholders who had lost confidence in GMP as a result of swathes of adverse publicity connected to corruption allegations.

A sub-optimal response, as this one can safely be characterised, is simply an open invitation to a journalist for the delivery of more stinging criticism. Kicking off with the wasting of substantial amounts of not only my time, but those dealing with freedom of information (FOI) requests within GMP, HMICFRS, IOPC, College of Policing, National Police Chiefs Council and the Greater Manchester Mayor’s office. All avoidable, with a minimal amount of effort from a GMP press officer and one GMP PSB administration assistant, or low ranking detective.

What follows, by way of further investigation, is a piece by piece dismantling of the GMP press office statement, with, almost inevitably, more deceit and double-speak exposed. It will be re-assembled after the disclosures from the various FOI requests are received, around the end of January, 2019. A delay which appears to be the only motivation for GMP providing a statement of such obviously poor quality.

The starting point has to be the introduction, by the press office, or the directing mind behind their statement, into the peer review ambit, of the “independent review” and the “external reference group”. In a five month, fairly intensive, journalistic investigation of the peer review, this is the first heard of this additional form of scrutiny.

I was alert to the possibility that they could be one and the same, but the press office would have made that clear, surely? So, this analysis proceeds taking the force spokesperson’s words at their ordinary meaning.

Returning to the genesis of this saga, there was no mention by Chief Constable Hopkins of anything other than a peer review on the now infamous Manchester Evening News front page. The Metropolitan Police were put up as the solution to the problem, and no-one else. It also begs the question that if GMP have the country’s largest, and much the most important, police force giving an organisational problem the ‘once over’ during a six-week review, why would anyone else be needed?

In an article published by the MEN in September, 2016, it was noted that the peer review by the Met had taken place, but attributes no source and, most certainly, does not mention either of the other two reviews. The working hypothesis being that the local newspaper was also blissfully unaware of their existence:

“The peer review by the Metropolitan Police was carried out at the request of Chief Constable Ian Hopkins, in a bid to draw a line under the [corruption] allegations which stretch back at least two years and which it vigorously denies.

“A separate investigation has been carried out by Kent Police into 17 allegations of corruption made by sacked former chief inspector John Buttress.”

The thrust of the MEN article was that a member of GMP’s counter-corruption team was under investigation for alleged fraud. The CCU officer, believed to be of managerial rank, is one of several being investigated after the force received information from a whistleblower concerning the alleged inappropriate disposal of £100,000 worth of vehicles.

* Since this article was first published on 18th December, 2018 information has come to light that the CCU officer, an inspector (whose name is known), was cleared of any wrongdoing. He was formerly a covert officer in GMP CID and the alleged fraud concerned members of his team selling vehicles previously used in undercover operations at below book value. *

The next stop in the search for the peer review truth was a trawl of the Manchester Mayor’s website. He, and his Deputy, are the de facto police commissioner for the region, with a statutory remit to appoint, dismiss and provide oversight of the chief constable. It did shed some light, but does not assist either Mr Hopkins, or his press office. Quite the opposite, in fact.

This is an extract from the Deputy Mayor’s Independent Ethics Committee meeting on 28th January, 2016 tucked away under Any Other Business:

“Ian Hopkins gave the Committee a brief update with regards to the general review of the Professional Standards Branch in GMP, and in relation to individual cases. Reports in relation to this are expected within the next few months.”

No questions relating to the ‘general review’ were raised by any Ethics Committee Member and, it appears, no advance notice of the Manchester Evening News article, loudly trumpeting the Metropolitan Police peer review, was given to the Committee by Mr Hopkins, at their previous meeting on 15th November, 2015. Even though it occupied the whole of the front page of that newspaper just four days later.

Neither the words ‘independent review’ or ‘external reference group’ were mentioned to the committee on either occasion. On that basis, the Ethics Committee, led by the Bishop of Manchester, Right Reverend David Walker is dismissed as having partaken in any meaningful ‘independent’, or ‘external’, review of GMP’s PSB or CCU. The Bishop has previously served as a human rights panel member at the College of Policing. Which would make for an interesting brainwashing competition.

The Ethics Committee was the brainchild of the previous Police and Crime Commissioner, Tony Lloyd, who instituted it in early 2015. In a letter to HMICFRS talking head, Zoe Billingham, Lloyd signalled that a process of reform in GMP was already under way, with particular focus on both PSB and CCU (read in full here). This, of course, differs from the press statement wherein it states the process began in November 2015.

In the months after the Met’s peer review was said to be delivered to GMP, there were two meetings of the Ethics Committee. Attended, respectively, by Deputy Chief Constable Ian Pilling and Ian Hopkins. The minutes of those meetings reveal that there is no mention of the peer review, or any other review of PSB.

After elimination of the Ethics Committee as a reviewing body for PSB transformation, the College of Policing and HMICFRC websites were the next locations searched for open source data connected to the various alleged reviews of GMP’s PSB and CCU. It was a short process. There is none. Freedom of information requests have, subsequently, been submitted to both.

Chief Superintendent Annette Anderson, who played a key liaison role with the Met, before and during the peer review, served for two years with HMIC, prior to its change of name, after they took over inspections of fire and rescue services. During her time with the inspectorate, a report was published that bears the title ‘Police Integrity and Corruption – Greater Manchester Police’ and is dated November 2014 (read here). It is a largely unimpressive piece of work, given the most serious of subject matter, that appears to be lacking in the necessary investigative rigour.

My own experience of dealing with HMIC, on disclosure and press issues, is memorable only for that organisation’s underwhelming mediocrity, led by a man with a chronic over-estimation of his own ability and judgement. Sir Thomas Winsor’s characterisation of the disgraced David Crompton, a former senior officer with GMP, and later chief constable of South Yorkshire Police (SYP), as ‘an exceptional police officer’, in civil proceedings fought out in the Royal Courts of Justice, defied comprehension. I sat in the press seats, a few feet away from both, quite simply agog.

HMICFRS has, also, fairly recently formed an External Reference Group to advise on policing protests (read here). Incredibly, its panel includes another disgraced ex-SYP chief, Meredydd Hughes, who gave, arguably, the worst evidence ever, to a Parliamentary Select Committee, when questioned over his knowledge of industrial scale rape and trafficking of children, over the entirety of his period in charge of that disgraced force (view video here). Hughes is also on the list of discredited ex-GMP senior officers, having served there as an assistant chief constable from 1999 until 2002.

The suspicion is now raised over the efficacy of such groups, if this is a sample of the selection of its constituents. It may well explain why the GMP press office were reluctant to reveal more details of their own?

A FOI request has also been submitted to the IOPC, seeking details of their alleged involvement in the subject reviews. Whilst not attributable to the IPCC (as they were then known) an undated, 22 page document did surface. It appears to have been produced internally by un-named officers in GMP’s professional standards team for the consumption of the police commissioner at the time, Tony Lloyd (read here). It is largely statistical, but in one interesting paragraph it reveals the appointment in 2014, by Lloyd, of a Greater Manchester Complaints Ombudsman, retired judge William Morris, to work alongside Lloyd’s deputy, Jim Battle, dip sampling PSB files. It appears that files were inspected, and reviewed, on this basis once, but there is no trace of further activity, records or minutes, via open source. Battle continued to sit on the Ethics Committee until recently.

Absent of substantive responses to the FOI requests, the preliminary view is that the ‘independendent review’ and ‘external oversight group’ activities, relied upon by the GMP press office, amount to much the same as the fabled Emperor’s New Clothes.

Attention is now turned to the other anomalies in the GMP statement:

Firstly, it is claimed that the peer review report was delivered by the Met to GMP on 22nd December, 2016. But the document is clearly dated on its front cover, 7th January, 2017.

Secondly, it is claimed that the peer review was delayed by ‘operational matters’. The reality is that, the terms of reference, a two page document, was not drafted by DCC Pilling until the end of March, 2016. The Met responded extraordinarily quickly after that. GMP had previously claimed, in writing, that the terms were drafted by the Met, not by Pilling. They have not responded to a request for an explanation of that anomaly.

Thirdly, the GMP claim that the work of the Met’s peer review team could be reduced from six weeks to two days, on the basis of the other claimed reviews, simply has no evidence base and appears fanciful, at best: The Met’s peer review report and appendices, within its 42 pages, make no mention at all of the work, or findings, of any other reviewer, or how their own task was related, or joined, to them.

Fourthly, as alluded to earlier in this piece, an informed insight into the inner workings of GMP’s PSB, post peer review, is that it is still in a desperate state. Not assisted in any way by its two principals, Anderson and Pilling, lacking the necessary grasp of the applicable statutory framework. Or, failing to adhere to it, if they do. Also, deploying a hopelessly incompetent Complaints Manager, Mike Thornton, whose very presence blights the whole department.

Thornton, unbelievably, is a delegate of the chief constable in a role known as Appropriate Authority. Which more than anything, informs on the importance, or lack of, that GMP attaches to ethics, professionalism and the effective, efficient resolution, or disposal, of public complaints.

Following the email sent to DCC Pilling in March, 2018 – a blistering, fully evidenced condemnation of the PSB under his leadership – and sent to the press office to assist their reply, I wrote again to Pilling, in early November, 2017, following the exposure of subsequent calamities. He was invited to reflect on the wisdom of having the key role of complaints manager filled by an officer plainly unsuited to the role. His reply, which, I believe, was drafted by Thornton, was both vacuous and peurile, and, as is usual in my dealings with him, fails to address the core issue.

Any implication of improvement in PSB following the various reviews, as alluded to in the press statement, is simply untrue. A matter put to them, with some force, in my follow up questions. To which, of course, they declined to answer, at all. On any independent view, a continuation of the organisational lack of truthfulness which has characterised this investigation from the very outset.

My father’s body was cremated in April, 2014 after a short, poignant, private service. When the coffin was touched in a last farewell, I wanted to believe he may have gone to a better place. The last few years of a life that lasted almost 86 years were blighted by the most terrible dementia, having previously survived bowel cancer, first diagnosed in 1980-81. At that time, he was given only 6 months to live, but he was a proud Yorkshireman, with the love of a wife, Vera, utterly devoted to him for all their adult lives, to cling to. He survived 33 more years, although his propensity for evidence-free, snap judgements did, thankfully, diminish over the years. It is also true to say that my own indulgence of them increased, correspondingly, with advancing maturity.

Alan Wilby may look down on his son, or up, who knows, and say to himself: ‘Might have been a bit hard on the lad, but he certainly learned the difference between right and wrong, truth and lies’.

My promise to the old man is that I will get to the bottom of this peer review farrago, and change for the better, for the taxpaying public in Manchester, will be brought about, one way or another.

As a footnote, my dear mother, who passed away in January, 2018, did not approve of anything that was critical of the police. Including my own investigative journalism. She had this unswerving, old-fashioned faith in their efficiency, effectiveness, fairness and honesty. As so many of her generation did. The liars and deceivers in the present day police service should deeply reflect upon where all that went wrong.

 

Page last updated on Sunday 23rd December, 2018 at 0720hrs

Picture credit: Roy Hampson and Shirley Schofield

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

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© Neil Wilby 2015-2018. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

 

 

 

The Inn of Last Resort

The oft-maligned police complaints system is well overdue for a complete overhaul. Much has been written on the topic, including by me. Particularly on the topic of the ludicrous and superfluous Code of Ethics propagated by the College of Policing (Read more here).

One of the noisiest champions of reform is Julia Mulligan, the newly re-elected Police and Crime Commissioner for North Yorkshire (pictured below). When we first met in August 2014, the topic dominated our conversation.

PCC-Julia-Mulligan-3

My viewpoint, as an experienced police complaints advocate, is that reform is urgently required to change the focus from findings of misconduct, under a complex labyrinth of legislation, to one of ‘did the incident complained of occur’ and the police providing a swift and appropriate remedy.

In many of the cases in which I become involved a simple apology, at the outset, would have sufficed. The most famous of those was the case of well-known Wakefield businessman Anthony Ramsden, assaulted by PSU officers at Elland Road football stadium. Anthony went to the now-defunct Holbeck police station the following day, seeking only an apology, and was told by a senior officer: ‘You are wasting your time. This f*****g complaint is going nowhere’. Five woeful and hugely expensive police investigations, five IPCC appeals (four of which were upheld) and a judicial review application occupied the ensuing four years. Some of the findings of Deputy High Court Judge, Stephen Morris QC, are now regularly used authorities by the legal profession in civil cases involving the IPCC or police forces (Read full judgment here).

But the police preoccupation with not attaching blame to individual or groups of officers, or protecting the force’s reputation (perceived or otherwise), very often gets in the way of that. Lies and cover-up become embedded in the DNA of police forces. More crucially, gilt edged opportunities to enhance the public standing of the police – by dealing with complaints quickly, courteously and efficiently – are lost.

This statement broadly represents Julia’s position: ‘As it stands the police complaints system is broken.  It is bureaucratic, complex, slow and lacks independence. This can have profound consequences on individuals who may be in very difficult circumstances. Police officers, too, can wait months for complaints to be resolved, very often with a cloud hanging over their heads’.

But the truth of the matter is that her own office, based in a leafy Harrogate street, and the force’s Professional Standards Department are two of the worst offenders in abusing the police complaints system – and I have recent and damning evidence to prove that.

I have met Julia Mulligan twice over the past two years and find her likeable, charming and engaging. She is a Yorkshire hill farm girl made good, and no-one could doubt her commitment, and capacity for hard work, in her Commissioner role.

I also have boundless admiration for the caring and compassionate way in which she champions the cause of victims of crime and those with mental health issues in North Yorkshire. Victims of crime (and occasionally the mentally challenged) is the core focus of my work, too. But at the other end of the scale by opposing the police (and often the CPS) over miscarriages of justice. The most high profile of which is, of course, the soon to be heard appeal against the conviction of ex-PC Danny Major, following an outside police force investigation that I was instrumental in securing (read more on Operation Lamp here).

Our differences of opinion, usually expressed in cordial terms, concern how I view the discharging of Julia’s statutory function of holding the chief constable to account. She believes in the ‘partnership’ principle. I maintain that the chief constable ‘takes the mickey’ and keeps her in the dark on key issues, when it suits him.

For the past sixteen months my focus, as an investigative journalist, has been on police misconduct – and potential misfeasance – in the ranks of the North Yorkshire force. My attention was drawn away from the more familiar ground of West Yorkshire Police, and their across-the-Pennine neighbours in Greater Manchester, by a civil harassment claim mounted by NYP against two fellow journalists.

It has certainly been an eye opener, as my investigations into two NYP Operations, styled Rome and Hyson has uncovered a tangled web of lies, deceit and a grotesque misuse of public funds on the grand scale. Hyson is the codename given by NYP to the civil court action. Rome is the failed criminal investigation that preceded it.

I have written a number of forensic pieces on the topic which dig deep into the mire into which NYP have sunk over Rome and Hyson. Two of the most damning in the series can be read in full here and here.

North Yorkshire Police are, understandably, highly displeased at having their dirty washing aired in public in this way and, as a consequence, my work as a journalist is now obstructed at every turn – and I am smeared by senior officers whenever the opportunity arises. The police, more used to controlling a tame local and regional media, are simply not used to ‘push back’ from independent operators who refuse to be intimidated. I include fellow journalist and justice campaigner, Nigel Ward, in that group.

Nigel, incidentally, was the also the author of an informative North Yorkshire Enquirer ‘In My View’ piece on Julia Mulligan and the broken police complaints system. (Read in full here).

Formal misconduct complaints have been lodged, by both Nigel and myself, against a number of senior North Yorkshire officers as a result of their unethical and unprofessional conduct towards the two of us. These include outrageous, and entirely untrue, accusations by chief officers that we have conspired together to commit criminal offences and contempt of court. The formal complaint documents lodged by me can be viewed here. Nigel’s are in a similar vein.

Desperate not to have to refer the complaints to the IPCC, or face the prospect of an outside police force proportionately investigating the complaints and the wider shambles of Operations Rome and Hyson, the police and the PCC’s office have visited the Inn of Last Resort: Label the complaints as ‘vexatious’, ‘oppressive’ and an ‘abuse of the complaints system’. The outcome delivered by Simon Dennis, acting Chief Executive for PCC Julia Mulligan can be read in full here. A similar outcome was provided by DI Steve Fincham on behalf of the force.

In publishing documents this way, the public can decide for themselves the respective merits of the complaints, decisions not to record them and the appeals to the IPCC. Neither Nigel Ward, nor I, have anything to hide and it will be interesting to gauge the response of the police and PCC’s office to more dirty washing held up for public examination.

Most justice campaigners are familiar with the term ‘vexatious’ as at one time or another they, or complaints they have been made, will have been labelled as such. It is what public servants are trained to do. Particularly if they are Common Purpose graduates and they have run out of excuses as to why they will not deal with the complainant (or complaints) within the appropriate legislative or regulatory framework. The most spectacular example of this is Sir Dan Crompton labelling bereaved Hillsborough campaigners as ‘vindictive, vexatious and cruel’. Read my 2013 piece on this topic here.

Deeply disgusting and disgraceful though the unrepentant Crompton’s remarks were, they should be taken in the context that every day someone, somewhere, will be smeared by a public official as a ‘vexatious’ or ‘persistent’ complainant. Irrespective of the merits of their case. Inferring mental health issues is another favoured smear tactic.

This, sadly, is the society we live in today and it is only through the dignity and tenacity of the Hillsborough families and survivors that the landscape will now change – and those same smearing public officials brought more readily and efficiently to book.

Simon Dennis

Returning to the Ward and Wilby complaints, the police and PCC’s office were again not expecting a ‘push back’ from the two journalists, but robust appeals which make both Mr Dennis (pictured above), formerly Force Solicitor for North Yorkshire Police, and DI Fincham look foolish, grounded in their apparent lack of knowledge of applicable law, regulations and guidance have now been drafted and submitted to the IPCC.

My appeal to the IPCC against Mr Dennis’ decision not to record the complaints against Chief Constable Dave Jones can be read here.

The discovery that the two officers principally responsible for dealing with complaints for the force and the PCC’s office appear to be entirely unsuited to their respective roles might come as a shock to some. It shouldn’t to Julia Mulligan, as I’ve made my views publicly known to her via social media, and by way of two detailed letters.

My viewpoint is grounded in a number of other outcomes that not only disclose a prejudicial, discriminatory and harassing approach towards me at all times but, more alarmingly, show clearly that DI Fincham, in particular, doesn’t seemingly have much of a clue about what he is doing in the Professional Standards Department (PSD). Neither, it seems does T/Superintendent Maria Taylor who heads up NYP PSD – and appears to be out of her depth.

Or, alternatively, Fincham does – but is prepared to operate outside of regulations and guidelines to advance his career. A classic case in point was a serious complaint made against NYP’s Chief Financial Officer, Jane Palmer, that DI Fincham commandeered and then tried to dismiss as a local resolution matter, along with a half-hearted apology to me. The IPCC have now agreed with me that his actions were wholly inappropriate.

The latest attempt by Mr Dennis to dodge the recording of fully particularised, well evidenced complaints against NYP’s acting Force Solicitor, Jane Wintermeyer, includes the interesting proposition that an officer who is based at police HQ, has a collar number (3840), a NYP email address and, as far as I am able to discern, spends the entirety of her working days on NYP matters, does not fall under Police Regulations or the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics.

Mrs Wintermeyer is captured, in actual fact, by S12 (a) of the Police Reform Act, 2002. A fact of which Mr Dennis should have been aware as he was, himself, NYP Force Solicitor between 2004 and 2012. A period during which a number of scandals emerged concerning senior officers that led to NYP being described by a local MP as a “laughing stock”.

The ‘Mrs Wintermeyer doesn’t work for the police‘ argument was then supplemented with some other starkly threadbare reasoning concerning my reporting of the Operation Hyson fiasco, and other litigation that has not yet commenced. Mr Dennis contended, quite wrongly, that they could possibly be interpreted as grounds not to record and investigate what are very serious complaints.

Most telling of all was that this latest Simon Dennis correspondence was sent minus a URN (complaint reference). Which strongly suggests that this is another case where the decision not to record was made first, followed by a search for whatever reasons can be found to try to justify such a finding.

The fact that Mr Dennis did not disclose in the latest round of correspondence that he has direct oversight of Mrs Wintermeyer’s Force Solicitor role does not assist his own credibility, either.

The ‘vexatious’ argument was, of course, still a last resort option for Mr Dennis if all other reasoning failed. However, the deadline passed on 9th June, 2016 without him making any recording decision on the Wintermeyer complaint. This placed him outside the legislative framework, yet again.

It has also emerged, in correspondence with the IPCC’s lawyers, that Simon Dennis had no delegated power to be dealing with the complaint. Regulation 2 of IPCC (Complaints and Misconduct) (Contractors) Regulations 2015 (Contractor Regulations) requires the chief officer of the police force to do so.

So, yet another non-recording appeal has been submitted to the IPCC, wasting even more time and public money. It is certain to be upheld, much to the growing embarassment of both Mr Dennis and his employer, Julia Mulligan, who has described her Chief Executive’s efforts as ‘appropriate, professional and diligent’ in dealing with the complaints in issue.

Make no mistake: Those are words that will come back to haunt the PCC and her right hand man.

Both Nigel Ward and I have made separate, and well grounded, representations to the IPCC to have DI Fincham, a former Leeds Drug Squad officer, removed from his PSD post. Confidence in the police complaints system cannot be retained whilst he has a role in it.

If the IPCC uphold the appeals against the various outcomes delivered by Mr Dennis – plus the no decision farrago – then it is, also, hard to see how his position can remain tenable. The ‘doesn’t work for NYP’ shenanigans over the Wintermeyer complaints do not assist his prospects of a lengthy tenure, either.

Representations have also been made to the IPCC about the role of Mr Dennis in dealing with complaints. He has already admitted to the police watchdog that he has adopted an Appropriate Authority role in the Wintermeyer complaints for which he has no delegated powers.

Right of reply was offered to both Mr Dennis and DI Fincham when this article was first published on 22nd May, 2016. No comment has been forthcoming from either.

Mrs Mulligan was also approached for comment on 15th June, 2016 concerning her confidence in the ability of both her substantive and acting Chief Executive to operate within the appropriate legislative framework in dealing with complaints. None has been forthcoming, to date.

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Page last updated: Friday 17th June, 2016 at 1841hrs

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