Chickens come home to roost

On 3rd February, 2019, during a pre-trial hearing held in Bradford Combined Court Centre, a barrister, Olivia Checa-Dover, made several quite remarkable submissions to the judge, His Honour Neil Davey QC.

One of those was to the effect that West Yorkshire Police had, incredibly, instructed her to say they did not know where to locate one of their former officers.

More experienced, right-minded counsel might have told the instructing solicitor, Alison Walker, Deputy Head of Legal Services at WYP, not to place her in such a compromising position.

At the final hearing of a controversial, high profile civil claim, seven months later, Miss Checa-Dover denied making such a submission. The transcript of those earlier proceedings will tell a different story, as does the contemporaneous reporting of them, that has stood unchallenged by WYP, and their legal team, since its publication (read in full here).

The man in question, Mark Lunn (pictured above), was the lead investigator, and the only officer working full time, on a police operation codenamed Thatcham: The largest fraud investigation in WYP history, and one that ultimately led to the arrests of 91 men, and convictions for 45 of them, over ‘crash for cash’ insurance claims.

He was the arresting officer of a number of those men. One of which was a Bradford doctor, Abdul Rashid, who ran two general practice surgeries and a private medico-legal practice in the city.

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Dr Abdul Rashid, arrested by Mark Lunn in March 2012

On 7th March, 2012, Lunn turned up at the doctor’s home with fifteen other officers at 6.15am. His wife and three children were asleep when the knock was made.

Dr Rashid was not, subsequently, charged with any offence and he had issued a civil claim against WYP on the grounds that his arrest and detention by the police was unlawful. As such, Lunn was at the very centre of those legal proceedings and the police were doing all they could to justify not producing him as a witness.

The reason the police say they ‘couldn’t locate’ Lunn is because he had, by a catalogue of dishonest actions, tainted Operation Thatcham and placed the entire investigation in jeopardy. If this was revealed by way of cross-examination of Mark Lunn, in open court, the public and the press would come to know that the 45 ‘crash for cash’ convictions are, very arguably, unsafe.

Appropriate disclosure of Lunn’s misdemeanours would have also greatly aided Dr Rashid’s claim for unlawful arrest.

It has only very recently been discovered, by a painstaking journalistic investigation (read more here), that by November, 2012, the police knew about the extent, and effect, of Lunn’s wrongdoing and its devastating impact on Thatcham. They chose to conceal that disclosure from the Crown Prosecution Service, and the suspects’ criminal defence lawyers, and thus began a sustained and far reaching WYP ‘cover-up’ that is now well into its seventh year.

The first stage of that audacious cover-up was to conceal Lunn’s wrongdoing from all except a small group of officers who had been involved in the internal misconduct investigations.

The second stage was not to prosecute him for what appears, arguably, to be at least one criminal matter (a second offence of computer misuse and associated data, licence breaches) and to apply no disciplinary sanctions at the end of that process, so that the misconduct investigation would attract no undue attention amongst the rest of the police force (at that time, misconduct findings against officers were published on police notice boards every Monday). A prosecution of Lunn would have also blown the cover-up.

The third stage was to keep Lunn under the WYP cloak, and out of harm’s way, until Operation Thatcham suspects were charged and the prosecutions of the ‘crash for cash’ perpetrators and beneficiaries were in chain. He is regarded as a loose cannon and his record both in the police and, subsequently, bears that out.

The fourth stage was to allow him, in August 2013, to resign from West Yorkshire Police with little, or no, adverse disciplinary record that would be a barrier to future employment. A reasonable hypothesis is that a deal had been cut with Lunn on this basis: Salary paid, and pension preserved, for at least another year; no adverse notes on his Human Resources (HR) file (the court heard during the civil trial that Lunn’s HR file had been ‘weeded’ and that disciplinary records had gone missing).

There is no other reason that WYP could justify overlooking a catalogue of serious misconduct issues, compounded by the fact that there is incontrovertible evidence that he repeatedly lied to two senior officers when confronted by some of them.

Mark Lunn’s lying did not stop when he left West Yorkshire Police. Before he had even left the force his name had already appeared, according to Companies House, on the list of Directors of a firm called Quo Vadis Investigation Services Ltd (QV). His biography on the company website was a fiction and he was forced to resign from QV after less than 3 months service. Lunn’s ‘success’ on Operation Thatcham was, apparently, the leverage for the appointment and the main feature of the bio, which included the claim he had been a detective for 20 years. The truth was he had been a CID officer for less than 5 years before forcibly removed from Thatcham, almost 2 years before the trial at which the men were convicted.

By 2014, Lunn was again attempting again to trade on Thatcham in a private venture. This time the vehicle was to be ‘Pennine Investigations‘. But a company of that name has never been registered and a Google search draws a blank.

In January, 2015 Mark Lunn started work at the Wakefield office of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). But, true to form, that is not what it says on his LinkedIn biography. Enigmatically, he is recorded as working for the Home Office as ‘an investigator’ and is still listed as working there.

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Justice campaigners protest outside Pioneer House, Woolpacks Yard, Wakefield. The IPCC’s regional base in the North East.

This, on any view, was an extraordinary turn of events: An ex-police officer who has a string of misconduct investigations against his name turns up at the policing body charged with maintaining public confidence in the police complaints system. The IPCC purported to do that by oversight of the investigation of complaints made by members of the public against police officers. It is hard to imagine someone less suited to such a role as Mark Lunn.

These are just some of his misdemeanours that have been uncovered so far: He was subject to a large number of misconduct investigations whilst a serving police officer, including what appears to be a major covert operation codenamed Waffleedge; another covert operation codenamed Wademere; seriously compromised WYP’s largest ever fraud investigation; has twice been found to have misused police computers and software (many police officers are sacked after a first offence); tried to obtain £183,000 from a major motor insurance company using a bogus company as an investment vehicle whilst a serving police officer; discussed details of a sensitive police operation with unconnected third parties; is an obsessive and persistent liar; a fantasist who invents competencies and past vocational experience on his CV’s and biographies: and has confessed, in police interview, to having a very bad memory.

Lunn’s complaints record includes allegations of unlawful arrest (four); assault (four); neglect of duty (three); incivility (two); oppressive conduct and harassment of a female; and false imprisonment.

It is also more likely than not he was part of the conspiracy, along with a number of other police and civilian officers, to conceal his wrongdoing from the Operation Thatcham suspects. The driving force for that conspiracy appears to be the present Head of WYP’s Homicide and Major Enquiry Team (HMET), Chief Superintendent Nick Wallen. He was a detective inspector in the force’s notorious Professional Standards Department at the time.

It is anticipated that, when the full story eventually emerges, the list of Lunn’s misdemeanours may well be longer. Two former high ranking WYP colleagues describe him as “thick as a brick” and, not uncontroversially, lacking in the necessary integrity and intelligence to have ever been selected as a detective. Their actual words were much more direct and colourful.

Examination of documents authored by Lunn, and some of his emails, appear to bear that out. He is also given to inaccuracies, wild exaggeration and disparaging remarks about members of the public, and in one case a criminal defence solicitor, where and whenever it suited.

So the BIG questions are, how did Mark Lunn wangle a job with the IPCC in the first place, and why did he want to conceal that appointment from his LinkedIn connections, first and foremost, and anyone else amongst the wider public, curious enough to know what the miscreant officer was up to?

A subsidiary question is why did he leave the IPCC (now IOPC) fairly recently with, apparently, no other permanent employment to go to? Lunn is currently self-employed as a jobbing builder and free range egg vendor in rural Huddersfield, where he lives. Connexions Property Maintenance, ‘a family run business owned by Mark Lunn’, trades on the fact that he is a former police officer.

In what appears to be a regular ploy, Lunn sought external funding for Golcar Free Range Eggs. He raised £50 out of a crowdfunding target of £3,000. Rather less than the £183,000 he was sought from 1st Central Motor Insurance to fund his private investigation business in 2012.

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A further question is why did the police tell a circuit judge that they couldn’t locate him when he was working at the IPCC, amongst other former police officers, less than 300 yards from WYP headquarters in Wakefield?

Press enquiries have been made of the Independent Office for Police Conduct, the successor organisation to the IPCC. Contact has also been made with Derrick Campbell, the IPCC Commissioner who controlled the Wakefield office at the material time.

The Home Office and West Yorkshire Police have also been approached for comment. The latter has been asked why a circuit judge was also told by Miss Checa-Dover that Mark Lunn was not the man leading the Operation Thatcham, before he was forcibly removed. Evidence heard, and documents exhibited at the final hearing of the civil claim last month plainly showed that he was (read more here).

The Police Federation press office has also been contacted. The present Chairman of their West Yorkshire branch, Brian Booth, is a friend of Mark Lunn. Mr Booth has been contacted previously but has not replied.

Enquiries have also been made of West Yorkshire Trading Standards regarding Connexions Property Maintenance. The Trading Standards mission is to aim to ensure that the people of West Yorkshire are well informed and empowered consumers who have the confidence to interact with businesses safely and securely. Mark Lunn’s history of misrepresentation and his naked attempt to solicit business by purporting to be an honest, ethical, professional police office is concerning to say the least.

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A series of questions has been put to Mark Lunn. He has also been offered right of reply.

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Page last updated at 1620hrs on Thursday 3rd October, 2019

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

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Photo credit: Telegraph & Argus

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

The Smoking Gun

Earlier this week, an exclusive article revealed to an unsuspecting public the known misdemeanours of a ‘bad apple’ West Yorkshire Police detective (read in full here).

It is an important story because the reckless and, at times, dishonest actions of former Huddersfield based detective constable, Mark Lunn, may have placed the convictions of 45 men at risk.

Lengthy and forensic, the piece was almost entirely grounded in police emails and reports, together with notes from nine days of court reporting from the hearing of a high profile, high value civil claim in Bradford (read more here).

But, within the most explosive and damning piece of evidence, it has emerged that Lunn is only a bit part player: On 28th November, 2012, at the conclusion of an internal inquiry into his wrongdoing, Detective Inspector Nick Wallen, as he was then, wrote to a number of WYP colleagues in these terms:

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Chief Superintendent Nick Wallen (centre) receiving an award recently at the Police Superintendents’ Association

“Subject: DC 3602 Mark Lunn

“Ladies/Gents. Our investigation. is now concluded, there is no need for me to re-iterate what is in this report.

“My own view is that Kirklees SMT and PSD were right to remove DC Lunn from the investigation [Operation Thatcham] and to investigate respectively (sic). There is no doubt that had this issue been raised, in the first instance, at Crown Court, that the case would have been seriously compromised and may have lead (sic) to the prosecution being withdrawn.

“Mark will have undoubtedly learnt lessons from this, and his removal from CID duties to his current post [Huddersfield South Neighbourhood Police Team] may be the most suitable sanction for him.

“So, I thank everyone for their efforts regarding this matter, PSD will contact DCI Jeffrey regarding any other sanction for Mark that might be considered appropriate.

“Regards, Nick W”

The internal inquiry was one of a number of investigations carried out into Lunn’s misconduct. Another followed a complaint raised by Opus Law, a leading firm of Bradford solicitors, on 14thMay, 2012. Opus were not made aware of the internal investigation, or its outcome. It is understood, from a lawyer formerly employed by Opus, that their complaint was not concluded before Lunn left the force in August, 2013.

The most senior of the recipients of the Wallen email, Detective Chief Inspector Paul Jeffrey (as he was then), retired in July 2017 at the rank of superintendent and was central to the previous article about Lunn.

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Paul Jeffrey – who retired from West Yorkshire Police in 2017

Jeffrey hails from a family of police officers (read more here) and had first been made aware of the concerns over Lunn’s conduct, and the Opus Law letter, at a meeting on 8thJune, 2012. He instructed the local Professional Standards Department officers to carry out a scoping exercise. He was not aware that a covert police operation, codenamed Waffleedge, was already investigating Mark Lunn.

Nick Wallen is now a chief superintendent and Head of WYP’s Homicide and Major Enquiry Team: A remarkable rise for an officer whose career is littered with controversial investigations and faux pas. Not least the murder of Leeds schoolteacher, Ann Maguire, about which her widowed husband, Don, has repeatedly and justifiably complained and the ‘Bradford 4’ acid attack murder in which clear, and unchallenged, findings of evidence tampering forms part of the miscarriage of justice case of Andrew Feather Jnr, who was found on that evidence to be the secondary getaway driver. Mr Feather’s case presently rests with the Criminal Case Review Commission. He and his family has received widespread and positive publicity from a large number of regional and national newspaper articles, plus broadcast packages from the BBC and Sky.

The author of this piece has spent many hundreds of hours, collectively, on both cases. In the Maguire case there is a bizarre restriction on access to documents that were used in the inquest touching on Ann’s death, that Don has scrupulously observed, much to the frustration of both of us. Those include such as the investigation policy book (or log).

In the Feather case, unrestricted access was given to all the materials disclosed to the family, and the fruits of the remarkable post-conviction sleuthing of Andrew Feather Senior, which drew warm praise from no less than the bench at the Court of Appeal.

To be clear, there is no direct evidence that links Nick Wallen to any wrongdoing, but he was the senior investigating officer (SIO) in both cases and, as such should have signed off every action and decision in the policy book. If, indeed, actions that led to grotesque incompetence, or wrongdoing, were ever recorded there, about which there has to be considerable doubt, given the force’s very long and troubled history where policy logs and similar procedural or evidential requirements are concerned.

It can, however, safely be said that, in both cases, the timings relating to the murders, and the movements of those at or near the scene, now meticulously plotted and at variance to the police version, give rise to suspicion about the integrity of the rest of the investigation. Only a robust, thorough, independent enquiry, by another police force or policing body, can begin to allay those doubts.

The internal investigation into Mark Lunn, and the Wallen email at its conclusion, is concerning, to say the least. Taken at its face, it appears that a conscious decision was made not to disclose material, either to the Crown Prosecution Service or the criminal defence teams of the defendants, in a trial in which Lunn was centrally involved. As he was ‘officer in the case’ in only two investigations, Operation Thatcham and the one that preceded it, the field is very narrow.

The Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act, 1996 is explicit about what should be disclosed in criminal trials and failure to meet those statutory obligations could amount to an offence of perverting the course of justice. Or a conspiracy of the same, as this decision to deliberately conceal disclosure appears to involve at least five officers, including Paul Jeffrey.

West Yorkshire Police has said, in writing, that it is not investigating the matters exposed in the first Lunn article and, in those circumstances, a copy of the Wallen email was sent to Gerry Wareham, Chief Prosecutor for the Yorkshire and Humber Region, with a request that the matter be further examined by him and then referred to an appropriate policing body for a more complete investigation.

Mr Wareham, who features elsewhere on this website in a seriously troubling case (read more here), responded promptly and to the effect that he had no locus to investigate any offences that may be disclosed within the Wallen email. He has written to West Yorkshire Police, effectively passing the buck back to them, knowing they have no intention of progressing a matter that would cause the force huge reputational damage.

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CPS lawyer Gerry Wareham pictured outside Bradford Combined Court Centre

Mr Wareham expressed no alarm, or even mild concern over what had been disclosed to him which, put shortly, was that the police had duped the CPS in high profile trials, leading to the conviction of 45 men, that now appear, on their face, to be unsafe.

He also appears to be unaware of the Attorney General’s robust, zero-tolerance stance on this very issue (read more here).

As expected, following the publication of the first Lunn article other material has emerged: A former Kent, Essex and Metropolitan Police officer, Darren Jones, says that the account of their interaction, given by Lunn in police interview, is false. They did meet in London on one occasion, but ‘Operation Thatcham was never discussed’ says Jones.

It has also been revealed that, in 2014, Lunn renewed contact with Mr Jones.  He told him that he was still looking to start up his own fraud investigation company. This time the trading style was set to be Pennine Investigations. There is no such company registered at Companies House.

Materials relating to the now defunct Quo Vadis Investigation Services Ltd (QV) have also been disclosed. They show that Mark Lunn was listed as ‘Operations Director’ and made several outlandish claims in his biography on the company website. Not least that he had ‘over 20 years of experience as a CID officer with West Yorkshire Police’. In truth, he only served as a police officer for 19 years, and less than 5 of those were as a detective.

Companies House records show that Lunn became registered was a Director of QV on 31st July, 2013. He didn’t leave West Yorkshire Police until the following month. By October of that same year he had resigned, following a letter sent to QV, by Opus Law, pointing out why he had been removed from Operation Thatcham and the falsehoods on his biography.

A fraud investigator who made fraudulent claims about his own credentials was more than the other directors could countenance.

A consultant to QV, Peter Taylor joined and left on the same days as Mark Lunn, so there appears to have been a link between the two and Lunn was, very likely, leveraging the ‘success’ of Operation Thatcham to make these connections and secure positions that appeared well above his station. Taylor, rather immodestly, describes himself as ‘a highly regarded Counter Fraud professional with over 25 years experience’. He currently runs a company called Peter Taylor Consultants Ltd. Mr Taylor has been invited to prove further insight into his apparent association with the disgraced Mark Lunn.

In 2015, according to Lunn’s LinkedIn page, he joined the Home Office as an investigator. At the civil trial in Bradford the court heard that the belief of the claimant’s legal team was that he was working for the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) at their Wakefield office. On that same CV, Lunn lists ‘well versed in police misconduct procedures’ as one of his self-stated competencies. That appears to support that hypothesis.

There is an unexplained gap 16 month gap in his LinkedIn CV, from when Lunn left WYP until he joined the Home Office. There is no mention of the ill-starred association with QV Fraud Investigation Services or Pennine Investigations. He is still listed as working at the Home Office up to the present time, but also now runs a jobbing builder business and sells free range eggs in the village where he lives. A man of many parts.

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The press office of the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) was approached on 20th September, 2019 to confirm, or otherwise, whether Mark Lunn had worked for their predecessor organisation, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) and, if so, how would public concerns over such an appointment be addressed. No response has been received from the ‘police watchdog’. Adverse inference can, of course, be drawn from that silence from an organisation that lists openness and transparency as two of its core values.

John James, a Leeds solicitor, has not responded to the email sent to him seeking an account of his interaction with Lunn. It was claimed, in police interview, by Lunn, that James was a ‘prospective co-director’ of a bogus company ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’. It was also claimed in that interview that the two had met during police investigations upon which Lunn was engaged.

The Chairman of the perpetually noisy West Yorkshire Police Federation, Brian Booth, also failed to respond to the enquiries made of him and his association with Mark Lunn.

The Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB) promised answers to these questions put to them concerning their involvement in Operation Thatcham: 1. A short statement from Insurance Fraud Bureau, covering the police decision to, effectively, conceal the serious misdemeanours of the lead investigator in Operation Thatcham from the CPS, and the defendants’ legal teams, would be helpful. 2. It would also assist, also, to know if WYP received any funding from IFB for Operation Thatcham.

After an inexplicable delay, they provided this statement which ducked both issues: ‘IFB’s role is to provide evidence of insurance fraud to UK police forces and to assist forces with their investigations into this criminal activity. In these circumstances, the relevant police force takes the lead with IFB providing information in an administrative role’.

A series of questions was put to the press office of 1st Century Motor Insurance in connection with the business plans for ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’ that Lunn had compiled on police computers. After a series of meetings with two of their Directors at their Sussex HQ, he was asking the insurance company to make an investment of £183,000 in the bogus company. Police documents appear to show that at least some of that money was paid to Lunn. Clarification over the questions put to 1st Century was sought by their press officer and, following receipt, answers to at least some of the questions are promised in the near future.

In response to a freedom of information request that asked if West Yorkshire Police had undertaken a risk assessment, or a process whereby the they would have confirmed the authenticity and legal standing of the IFB, WYP said: ‘We hold no information. The Insurance Fraud Bureau has been contacted for basic information about the car insurance industry. They are not funding any aspect of the enquiry, it was a police-initiated operation. No risk assessment has been undertaken’. 

Of greater concern is that the police gave what appear to be false answers to other questions in that same request. Firstly, about the transfer of officers from other duties to run Operation Thatcham: They say there were none, Mark Lunn was certainly one as he was transferred from Huddersfield CID to the Proceeds of Crime Team at Batley Police Station to run Thatcham. Secondly, when asked whether any complaints had been received as a result of this investigation, they said there were none. In reality, there appears to be, from documentary evidence, at least three against Lunn, one of which it is known was from Opus Law.

The West Yorkshire Police press office has not repsonded to questions put to them about Mark Lunn and Operation Thatcham. Or provided a statement, as requested.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the obfuscation and false trail left by the police and the stonewalling by their perenially disgraced ‘watchdog’ and the ultra-defensive CPS, enquiries from this quarter are continuing, The next ports of call are the Police Superintendents’ Association, the Home Office, the Attorney General and the Justice Parliamentary Select Committee to test whether any amongst them has the resolve to tackle this disgraceful situation.

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Page last updated at 1130hrs on Saturday 28th September, 2019

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

Right of reply: If you are mentioned in this article and disagree with it, please let me have your comments. Provided your response is not defamatory it will be added to the article.

Photo credit: Telegraph & Argus

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Did ‘bad apple’ taint the Thatcham barrel?

In March 2008, an investigation began into two Huddersfield brothers. Concerns about their extravagant lifestyle, following an anonymous tip-off, appeared to be the trigger for the police probe.

At the subsequent trial in Bradford Crown Court in March, 2011, it emerged in evidence that Nadeem and Thazeem Khalid had exaggerated their earnings to obtain £968,000 from three financial institutions; Lombard, Birmingham Midshires and Kensington Finance.

They had used loans, fraudulently obtained, to buy a £75,000 Ferrari car, and two houses in Salendine Nook; a £650,000 detached house and another, valued at £160,000, that was subsequently used as a rental property.

After the trial, the detective constable based with the Kirklees CID response team, Mark Lunn, told a local newspaper:

“They were living a fast and loose lifestyle well beyond their means.

“Throughout our investigation they both showed an air of arrogance and were always of the opinion the case would never be proved. They were wrong.”

DC Lunn added: “They may believe they are untouchable and they may be enjoying a lavish lifestyle when the honest, hard working members of the public are struggling in times of austerity. But they can rest assured the police will catch up with them”.

At the time of their arrest, and conviction, the brothers were said to be running a company called Advanced Claims UK Ltd although their names have never appeared amonst the directors listed at Companies House. In both the evidence used for the fraud trial, and in the unused materials (for the legally minded, the MG6(c)), there were documents relating to the running of that company that aroused suspicion of bogus motor insurance claims.

Mark Lunn, who lives in the Golcar area of Huddersfield, joined West Yorkshire Police as a special constable in 1988. He served in that role for 6 years. He became a warranted officer in 1994 and remained, in relative obscurity, at the rank of police constable until around 2007 when he passed his basic exams and became a detective constable with the CID Response team in Huddersfield. He was a ‘rookie’ when he was given the task of investigating the Khalid brothers. It is said by the police that he was the ‘officer in the case’ for that investigation.

Following the conviction of the Khalid brothers, Lunn was ‘recommended’ to join the specialist Kirklees Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) Unit at their base in Batley Police Station. The sergeant leading the team, Mark Taylor (now an inspector in Bradford CID), says ‘it was a close knit unit’. Unusually for a detective constable, Lunn was allocated an office of his own. He was also tasked with leading an investigation, codenamed Operation Thatcham, to look further into the activities of not only the Khalid brothers but, more particularly, one of their associates, Sahir Mohammed.

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Batley Police Station

But Lunn was harbouring a dark secret of his own, and the fine words he gave to the Huddersfield Examiner would come back to haunt both him and West Yorkshire Police.

Revelling in his new found ‘celebrity’, he was, soon afterwards, planning a very large loan (or investment) of his own whose provenance was questionable. The leverage for that payment was the success of the Khalid investigation and his position as lead investigator on Operation Thatcham, a joint operation that included the private, not-for-profit Insurance Fraud Bureau (read more here) and the Ministry of Justice as partners.

At around the same time, the IFB had been involved in a controversial prosecution at Southwark Crown Court of doctors and solicitors. It concluded in December, 2011, after the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) dropped all charges, with the judge, HHJ David Higgins, describing the conduct of the case as “scandalous”.

That police investigation, codenamed Operation Triassic, had been funded and driven by the insurance industry and Ian Lewis, at the time the fraud partner at Manchester law firm Lewis Hymanson Small, representing BCR Legal Group, a London-based insurance intermediary, said: “Despite repeated requests to be provided with details of the complaints, the CPS and the police failed to do so, raising speculation that this was an investigation led by the insurance industry with a suspicion of an agenda to continue the civil cost wars in the criminal courts”.

IFB, for their part, maintain that they “….provided good evidence to the City of London Police to investigate the matter further and bring charges against the professionals concerned”. An article published by Legal Futures, covering the case, can be read here.

Questions concerning IFB’s role and whether they contributed funding to Operation Thatcham have been put to both them and West Yorkshire Police.

Police documents show that Mark Lunn added to his publicly available LinkedIn profile, sometime in 2011 he says, the fact that he was a director of private investigation business using a bogus company, ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’, as its trading style. It was not registered at Companies House at that time. He was, it seems, looking to ride the tidal wave of money being thrown at tackling insurance fraud by the big players in that industry. ‘Crash for cash’ motor insurance frauds were one of the biggest concerns for underwriters and brokers.

He subsequently approached two senior managers of a large, well established insurance company based in Haywards Heath, Sussex. They were Glenn Marr (Fraud Director) and Clare Burrell (Claims Director) who both worked for 1st Central Insurance. They are part of the much larger, Guernsey based, First Central Insurance and Technology Group.

Lunn says he had been introduced to 1st Central by an, as yet, unidentified contact made through the ‘crash for cash’ investigations. He made three visits to the insurer’s head office, whilst not on West Yorkshire Police business, during the time he spent running Operation Thatcham.

A business plan for the bogus company was produced by Lunn, on police computers, although he told Detective Chief Inspector Paul Jeffrey, in interview, that he had worked on it ‘only in lunch breaks’. He also admitted sending out emails connected to ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’ using his police email account.

The plan was for 1st Central to pay him £183,000, based on that spreadsheet. Apparently, whilst Lunn was leading one of the highest profile fraud investigations in West Yorkshire Police history. A series of questions has been put to the press office of First Central Group concerning the provenance of this arrangement, given they must have known that Mark Lunn was a serving police officer and it directly conflicted with his leader role on Operation Thatcham.

Lunn had already sourced an office and agreed a rental with a well-known local businessman, Ian Pogson, who passed away suddenly in July, 2014. The premises were situated at Brougham Road, Marsden a short drive from the police officer’s home. Police documents reveal that 1st Central rejected that location as they wanted Lunn’s business premises to be situated in Leeds, the recognised regional economic centre.

Mr Pogson is named, by the police, as someone who could give advice on the drawing up of Lunn’s business plan. The link to Mr Pogson was via a former Metropolitan Police detective, Darren Jones.

Lunn says he met Mr Jones through enquiries as part of the Thatcham investigation. The latter is the principal shareholder in Fraud Consultants UK Ltd (read more here). Mr Jones was asked to verify if Mark Lunn’s account of his intermediary role is true. He states that it isn’t: Mr Jones was not a serving officer at the time and he says that Lunn approached him for advice, out of the blue, as someone who had started his own fraud investigation business. He knew Ian Pogson, as he was a client for whom he was doing professional work. Beyond that, he says he has little or no recollection of Lunn. Operation Thatcham was never discussed between them.

 

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Andel Ltd was the business controlled by the late Ian Pogson

According to DCI Jeffrey, based on the account Lunn gave to him, a Leeds solicitor, John James, was also involved in the plans involving the bogus company, ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’. He is a personal injury specialist presently working for a firm called Legal Studio (read more here). He was described by Lunn ‘as a prospective co-director’.

At the time of the alleged association with Lunn he was working for one of the largest law firms in Leeds, Ford and Warren. His CV on the LinkedIn website describes his role there as ‘Specialising in Insurance Fraud litigation, investigating and defending fraudulent motor claims on behalf of insurer clients’. Both Mr Walker, and Weightmans Solicitors, who took over the business of Ford and Warren, have been invited to give an account of any interaction with this ‘company’, a serving police officer and what appears to be a very large sum of money.

This private enterprise, apparently involving variously, and not necessarily limited to, a serving West Yorkshire Police officer, a former Metropolitan Police officer, a solicitor, and one of Huddersfield’s most successful businessmen, was, plainly, a very serious undertaking. The fact it was being organised from Batley Police Station, using police resources (office space, computers, phones at the very least), a police email address, software licenced to the police, and relying almost entirely on a number of professional connections made whilst on one of West Yorkshire Police’s largest ever fraud operations, is concerning.

On Lunn’s own account, he had been working on the satellite project for up to a year.

A series of questions has been put to West Yorkshire Police press office in order to shed more light on how this could have possibly happened and why Detective Constable Mark Lunn was not dismissed from the force. There is also the latent question of whether any of his conduct met the criminal threshold, particularly the deception over the bogus company.

The police’s position, regarding the sanctions Lunn faced over a lengthy list of serious demeanours, is that he was placed on an Unsatisfactory Performance Plan (UPP). A three-stage process that is more aligned to Human Resources than Professional Standards. Routinely used to tackle issues such as lateness or poor attendance record.

The UPP proposition, advanced by West Yorkshire Police, intended to divert attention from the investigation that it is known did take place into Mark Lunn, is, quite simply, preposterous. Those making it, and those maintaining it, should, themselves, face disciplinary or regulatory investigation.

There are also the residual and more serious issues of (i) what happened to the money that the police say was paid to Lunn and (ii) was it legitimately obtained? Public confidence in the police will suffer a serious detriment if answers are not provided to these questions.

On 14th May, 2012 a Bradford firm of criminal defence solicitors, Opus Law, wrote to the Professional Standards Department of West Yorkshire Police and drew the force’s attention to at least some of Lunn’s nefarious activities. Opus, a ‘Legal 500 Leading Firm’, represented one of the persons arrested, two months earlier, as part of Operation Thatcham: Dr Abdul Rashid, a Bradford GP and medico-legal expert.

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It appears as though PSD was either slow to act, as the third of Mark Lunn’s three visits to 1st Insurance took place eight days later, on 22nd May, 2012, or, by then, they had him under covert surveillance. He had taken that day off as unplanned leave, telling his supervisor, Detective Sergeant Taylor that he had ‘child care difficulties’.  He later told DCI Jeffrey he couldn’t remember saying that and, according to DCI Jeffrey’s notes, Lunn ‘made great play of how bad his memory was these days’.

On Monday 4th June, 2012, Mark Lunn started a planned two week period of leave. At a County Court hearing that concluded recently in Bradford Combined Court Centre, DI Mark Taylor (as he is now) gave evidence about how he came to know of Lunn’s burgeoning private enterprise. It can be paraphrased in this way: ‘On or about the first day of Lunn’s leave, DC Andrew Barrett came to his office and blew the whistle on Lunn, whom had been heard in telephone conversations obviously not to do with his police work’.

In police documents it emerges that, on DI Taylor’s account, DC Barrett was not the only team member to have heard, or seen, Lunn conducting such activities. Others were aware that he had compiled a business plan and had travelled ‘down south’ to make a ‘pitch’ for investment in his business. There was a huge concern as to how this would impact on the integrity of Operation Thatcham’.

DI Taylor’s further evidence in court was that he telephoned DI Andrew Leonard on that day, which he said was ‘at the end of May or beginning of June’ to share the knowledge of DC Barrett’s whistle blowing. There is no contemporaneous document available to support this account by DI Taylor. No emails, entry in pocket note books (PNB’s), or day books, and nothing on the investigation policy log relating to this. A ‘big red flag’ to borrow a phrase the police’s barrister, Olivia Checa-Dover, is fond of using, was not raised anywhere, it seems. Just an internal phone call, of which there is no audit trail.

A remarkable feature of those proceedings was the extent to which DI Taylor’s recollection of events varied from question to question, put to him in his examination-in-chief and, later, his cross-examination.

Another feature was that a significant number of other documents that would have supported DI Taylor’s oral evidence had either gone missing, been inexplicably destroyed or not searched for.

A third feature was how little DI Taylor appeared to know about the day to day running of the Thatcham investigation. For example, on a policy log with a very large number of entries he could not point to a single entry he had made. Almost every single one was made by DC Lunn. He told the court he was involved in thirteen other investigations or prosecutions at the time.

A fourth feature, very obviously of course, was the massive private enterprise, with a dangerous conflict of interest, being organised by the officer leading the investigation, right under DI Taylor’s nose. For up to a year, Lunn must have regarded his supervisor, working in an adjacent office, with scarcely concealed contempt.

Without the letter from Opus Law, it is possible that Lunn would have got away with his plans and scammed both West Yorkshire Police and, possibly, 1st Central Insurance, who were being asked to invest very heavily in a bogus company whilst the principal was a serving police officer.

On 7thJune, 2012, DI Taylor was copied into an email sent by D/Sgt Lockwood. Attached to the email was the letter from Opus Law.

When asked in cross-examination, at the County Court trial, if he had ever seen the Opus letter, before being shown the email in the trial bundle, he answered firmly in the negative.

He didn’t repeat the regular mantra of ‘I don’t recall’ or ‘I can’t remember’. He said: ‘No’

When shown the Lockwood email, he conceded that he must have opened it and seen the letter. The judge, Ben Nolan QC, sitting in this case as a Recorder, characterised this type of evidence as being tendered by a ‘truthful, reliable and extremely professional officer’. The judgment also gratuitously praises DI Taylor’s ‘very good recollection of his role as supervisor of DC Lunn’.

There is, very evidently, a tension between the daily reports of the hearings posted from the press seats and those judicial findings (read here). Not to mention the dangerous enterprise Lunn was perpetrating right under DI Taylor’s nose.

It now transpires, after further investigation, that the Opus letter featured in a meeting with DCI Jeffrey that took place on the day following receipt of the Lockwood email. DI Taylor had actually taken the letter to the meeting for the purpose of bringing it to the attention of ‘the boss’. The letter was not an item on the agenda, this was a routine operational review meeting of POCA team activity, and it seems, from DCI Jeffrey’s own account that this occasion was the first he knew of the Lunn complaint. It was only raised by DI Taylor when the review turned to Operation Thatcham, not as a matter of very considerable importance at the outset. Yet DI Taylor’s best evidence to the court was that he had never seen the Opus letter before being shown it in the witness box.

In DCI Jeffrey’s detailed notes of that meeting there is no mention of the Taylor phone call to DI Leonard. Or, indeed, any contact between Leonard and Jeffrey. It appears that, on all the available evidence, it was the first DCI Jeffrey, the Head of Crime in Kirklees, had heard of the complaints made against Lunn by Opus Law. 25 days after their letter had been sent to West Yorkshire Police.

The apparent delay by the POCA team, and the seeming lack of urgency in managing the complaint up the command chain, over what were, on any independent view, serious allegations, is troubling. Particularly, in the light of knowledge held, by both PSD and those senior officers, over a ‘written warning’ sanction Lunn had received, previously, at the end of a misconduct investigation into misuse of police computers. Given what was alleged, and the fact that the latest complaint came from a leading firm of solicitors well acquainted with policing matters, with documentary evidence supporting it, gives rise to suspicion that other dynamics were in play.

Frequently, police officers are dismissed from the service for computer and data misuse. It is, quite rightly, viewed very seriously and, as such, a curiosity as to why Lunn escaped with such a relatively minor sanction over his previous breach. Nevertheless, in the light of that disciplinary finding, the decision to allocate Detective Constable Lunn an office of his own in Batley Police Station, away from the gaze of the rest of his colleagues, appears highly questionable and smacks of poor supervision and decision making.

There was also one other live PSD complaint running at the time, from a member of the public, over the failure of Lunn to return seized property. The outcome of that complaint is not known. In his written response to PSD, Lunn had declared that he was ‘Team Thatcham‘ and that status, apparently, gave him immunity from any criticism, either internally or from members of the public.

In the same County Court proceedings, featuring the unlawful arrest of Dr Rashid, the court heard at the pre-trial review that there had been three previous complaints made against Lunn, by members of the public, alleging unlawful arrest. None were upheld by PSD. Under force policy at that time, West Yorkshire Police should, however, have placed a ‘red flag’ against Lunn’s name for having three complaints of the same classification made against him, irrespective of whether they were upheld or not.

Dr Rashid’s unlawful arrest claim was also dismissed, after a ten day court hearing, but is presently subject to an appeal to the High Court. He was never charged with any offence, but kept on police bail until June, 2013.

DC Mark Lunn, the officer in charge of the Thatcham investigation was, on the documentary evidence provided by the police to the court, clearly a detective who was prepared to persistently lie; misuse police assets; misrepresent himself using a police email account to further a private enterprise; repeatedly deceive fellow police officers working in the same team; engage in conduct that placed a huge fraud investigation at risk; gratuitously embellish his CV (which he still does to this day); repeatedly breach Police Conduct Regulations and place self-interest well above public service. Added to all that ‘he made great play of how bad his memory was’.

Unsurprisingly, that is not the view Mark Lunn projects about himself.

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Incredibly, this was the officer who planned and executed the arrest of Dr Rashid and wrote the operational order that included a massive, pre-dawn police raid at a residential property in an upmarket suburb of Bradford, the home of a well known professional man deeply embedded in the local community, and in which children as young as seven years old were asleep.

The findings of the judge, at the conclusion of the Rashid trial, seek to strongly downplay the impact of Lunn on the lawfulness of the doctor’s arrest and his role in it. Not only in the face of what was known in court about an officer whose very presence, let alone his position as its leader, appears to taint the entire investigation, or at the very least, up to the point he was removed from it, but the fact that almost all the documents, upon which Lunn might reasonably have noted the reasons he relied upon for the arrest, appear to have been ‘sanitised’. This formed part of the closing submissions of Dr Rashid’s barrister at the end of the trial. A point seemingly not addressed in the judgment.

The officer in charge of disclosure, on behalf of the police legal team, was DI Taylor. Warmly praised by the judge as ‘extremely professional’. From the press seats, at least, across three hearings, beginning in December, 2018 and ending in September, 2019 the drip-feed disclosure process had the appearance of an exercise whose principal aim was not to reveal anything that would undermine the principal plank of the police case.

The police’s various and changing explanations for the absence of key documents, including some of those provided by DI Taylor on oath, pose some difficulty when reconciling what is known as Authorised Professional Practice (formerly issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers, more latterly by the College of Policing), and the internal management of police information (MoPI) policies of a well-run police force. Not to mention their lawful obligations, Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and duty of care.

One reasonable hypothesis, given what is now known about his general character and integrity, is that DC Lunn had exaggerated the reasons for the arrest in the contemporaneous documents pertaining to the arrest, for the purpose of enhancing his ‘pitch’ for investment in his private business by 1st Century – and giving the motor claims industry a ‘prized scalp’, as Dr Rashid was described in pre-trial court proceedings.

Significant support for this line of reasoning is that within hours of Dr Rashid’s arrest, Lunn had written to the General Medical Council to tell them that the doctor had been arrested over ‘serious fraud, money laundering and was part of an organised crime gang’. The words ‘on suspicion of’ or ‘alleged’ were notably absent. Lunn had also told the GMC that Dr Rashid was using drugs, but did not specify their nature, or application.

Lunn went on to say that patient records were found scattered in his home and the boot of his car. That was a baseless allegation, unsupported by evidence, photographic or otherwise. The ‘money laundering’ was an invention, as was the allegation that there was a misuse of drugs. None of these matters were ever put to Dr Rashid in interview.

Apart from this grotesque, and arguably libellous, smearing of Dr Rashid, it was a serious breach of West Yorkshire Police’s policy for disclosure to regulated professions. A task, for very obvious reasons, almost always undertaken by a specialist, qualified officer in the Force Disclosure Unit.

The General Medical Council’s Fitness to Practice Panel rejected West Yorkshire Police’s submissions and cleared Dr Rashid of any wrongdoing.

On 18th June, 2012, on the first day back on duty after his holiday leave, Lunn was summoned to Divisional HQ in Huddersfield for a meeting with DCI Jeffrey and DI Leonard, who was Mark Taylor’s line manager at that time.

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DCI Paul Jeffrey pictured after the conclusion of the Opertion Thatcham trials

Perversely, given what was alleged, and Lunn’s past history of police computer misuse, this was arranged as an informal meeting. The public might reasonably have expected that, given the suspicion of at least one criminal offence, Lunn would have been arrested and interviewed under caution.

A countervailing argument might be that admissions could be coaxed from Lunn by informal questioning, rather than when represented by his lawyer and a Police Federation representative at a formal interview under caution, where he might be advised to give a ‘no comment’ interview and provide a statement prepared by the Fed’s own lawyers at its conclusion.

Dr Rashid, for one, might well point out that he was never given such opportunity. Instead, sixteen police officers turned up at his home at 6.15am banging on the door.

It is clear from Paul Jeffrey’s detailed account of the meeting that an internal investigation had been launched against Lunn on 8th June, and a significant amount of information and material seized prior to the interview on the 18th. It is now apparent that the investigation was codenamed Operation Wademere.

At the outset of that meeting with two of his superiors, Lunn was dismissive of the complaint against him and maintained that the Opus Law letter was ‘a bit of a joke’. The bogus company was ‘only an idea’ he said. He was unaware that an investigation into the complaint by PSD, or, more likely, the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) that falls under the PSD umbrella, had started ten days ago, at DCI Jeffrey’s instigation.

Lunn’s approach to the interview was described by fellow police officers as ‘closed’ and ‘evasive’. He was prepared to lie to two senior officers in an attempt to bluff his way out of the Opus complaint. He only made admissions, they said, when he belatedly realised that his superiors already had the answers to the questions they were putting to him.

Eventually, and reluctantly, it was admitted by Lunn that he had misused police computers again; he was running the private investigation business from his home, rather than the office he had agreed to pay £50 per month to rent; he was using contacts gained specifically through the Operation Thatcham investigation to set up his business; he had breached force policy in not disclosing his business interests; most crucially, there was a clear conflict of interest with his duties as the Officer in the Case and the acknowledged lead investigator in Operation Thatcham.

To the extent he had, potentially, placed the entire investigation in jeopardy. Not least, it seems, by procuring the services of a chartered physiotherapist, Lee Robinson, as a director of the bogus company. Robinson was already a retained expert witness on Operation Thatcham.

That conflict, the police admit, would have led to the collapse of the Thatcham trials if the information was disclosed to the Crown Prosecution Service. The decision was made by a group of officers to deliberately conceal that crucial information from the CPS and the legal teams of those on trial.

Lunn denied any other police officers were involved in the plans.

He was removed from Operation Thatcham on the same day, but neither suspended nor placed on restricted duties (normally a non-public facing role and not adjacent to any evidence chains). Instead, Lunn was posted to the Huddersfield South neighbourhood team. Policing the area both where he lived and planned to set up his private investigation office, with the locals unaware that, in their midst, was a ‘bad apple’ police officer. One with a history of complaints of unlawful arrests (at the time, four), one who had twice misused police computers, and one who had repeatedly lied to, and deliberately deceived, other police officers. With a bad memory, to boot.

DCI Jeffrey also noted after the meeting with Lunn on 18th June, 2012 that there was a clear risk of ‘reputational damage’ to West Yorkshire Police if details of Lunn’s activities emerged into the public domain. The risk to the public of rural Huddersfield appeared not to have even been considered, let alone assessed, by DCI Jeffrey or the Professional Standards officers. That, despite the conclusion being drawn by Paul Jeffrey: ‘There are misconduct issues apparent in the information gathering exercise conducted today and I have no doubt that there is significantly more information [about Lunn] that will come out over time’.

Some of that information may have concerned a registration that was made at Companies House, in the name of ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’., very shortly after Mark Lunn was removed from Operation Thatcham. It is unclear whether Lunn has any connection with any of the officers named as having control of the company. West Yorkshire Police have been asked to clarify.

Following the report of the Jeffrey/Leonard/Lunn meeting, in correspondence circulated to seven officers, up to the rank of superintendent, and who were, in one form or another, stakeholders in the investigation into Lunn’s activities, it was clear that there were serious concerns about what had been extracted from the police systems, by Lunn, to further his own commercial enterprise. Sgt Jonathan Dunkerley (as he was then) said: ‘It worrys (sic) me what he may have ‘taken’ with him from WYP systems that is clearly for personal gain. It’s obvious the monies and stakes are high’.

It also appears that Lunn was involved in another covert ACU investigation, codenamed Operation Waffleedge. ACU investigations are normally given operational codenames, Professional Standards investigations are given unique reference numbers (URN’s). For example, the Opus complaint had the URN ‘CO/797/11’.

The covert investigation was confirmed in an email between the Intelligence Unit in PSD and Stephen Bywater, following additional concerns raised with PSD on 8th June, 2012 by D/Sgt Lockwood, regarding Lunn. It was obvious that DS Lockwood was not in the ACU loop. The Waffleedge investigation was already under way:

‘We have received this request from Andy Lockwood about Mark Lunn. We are working on Mark LUNN for Op Waffleedge. What do you want to happen. Does someone contact DS Lockwood and let him know of our concerns? Or does the Intelligence Unit just do the work as requested?’

The police, in defending the unlawful arrest claim made by Dr Rashid, have given a variety of explanations for the Waffleedge investigation at pre-trial hearings, at the final hearing and in documents disclosed to the court. Including the proposition, submitted in court, that ‘Waffleedge was not a covert operation’. Taken together, they arouse the reasonable suspicion that the true findings of that investigation are being concealed, to the significant detriment of both Dr Rashid, the integrity of the Operation Thatcham investigation and, most crucially, public confidence in the police force.

There is also a freedom of information request in which West Yorkshire Police have refused to provide any information at all. They will not even confirm or deny Operation Waffleedge exists (read more here).

An appeal against the refusal by the police to disclose uncontroversial details about the investigation is, presently, being considered by the Information Commissioner. It is likely to be, ultimately, determined before an information rights tribunal. That is the only conceivable chance of prising at least part of the truth about Waffleedge from West Yorkshire Police.

Mark Lunn was, remarkably, not called to give evidence at the hearing into the unlawful arrest claimed by Dr Rashid. One of the reasons heard in court was an incredible submission by Miss Checa-Dover, at the pre-trial hearing before HHJ Neil Davey QC, that ‘the police couldn’t locate him’.

Amongst Lunn’s Facebook friends are Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC) investigator, Mohammed Ejaz, and the present Chair of West Yorkshire Police Federation, Brian Booth. Which, apart from laying to waste the proposition that Lunn couldn’t be found, presents an interesting challenge to those organisations, and damages public confidence in both by exhibiting a close association with a ‘bad apple’ police officer. Questions have been put to them both, individually, and to their respective press offices.

Quite apart from which, it took less than 20 minutes, using open source material, for the author of this article to locate Mark Lunn. His home address, the names of the two businesses he now runs (jobbing builder and free range eggs vendor), his mobile telephone number, his Facebook account, and his LinkedIn account.

The trail of destruction he left behind as a police officer has lasted rather longer than 20 minutes – and it may not have ended yet. It appears from the various police correspondence, and reports, forming the rump of this article, that senior officers may have taken the decision to hide Lunn away, in what they believed was a noble cause and until the Thatcham investigation was completed, and not disclose his misdemeanours to those charged with offences arising from it. That may have influenced the defendant’s decision whether to plead guilty, or not, at court.

There has to be considerable doubt as to whether the trials would have proceeded if the fruits of the ACU and PSD investigations into Mark Lunn had been properly served on the CPS and the defendant’s legal team, as part of the police’s strict duty under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996.

Dr Rashid’s barrister, Ian Pennock of Park Lane Plowden Chambers in Leeds, raised this issue in court during his final submissions. He said that if the Lunn disclosures were not made, and it is more likely than not they weren’t, this could amount to a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and required further investigation.

The judge observed that it didn’t matter as the defendants had pleaded guilty and the time for any appeal against conviction had lapsed. He did not address the core point of alleged police wrongdoing, or explore with the police legal team whether the criminal defence teams (or the CPS) of those convicted were, in fact, notified of Mark Lunn’s role in the investigation and his taint upon it. The CPS has been approached for comment.

A complaint is being made to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, by Dr Rashid’s legal team, with a request that another police force is appointed to investigate those allegations of perverting the course of justice.

That, regrettably, is founded more on hope than reality.

Recent history shows that the disgraced police watchdog and their local ‘masters’, West Yorkshire Police, will not want to lift the lid on this stinking Thatcham barrel. Both have steadfastly resisted calls to instigate a proportionate and independent investigation into the alleged serious failings of senior police officers over the industrial scale child sexual abuse, drug dealing, human trafficking in Huddersfield by Asian gangs – described recently by one outspoken media commentator as ‘Grooming Gang Central’.

A common link is that the Divisional Commander of Kirklees from 2009 to 2012 was Chief Superintendent John Robins, now, no less, the chief constable of that same West Yorkshire Police (read WYP biography here).

The child sex scandal and the Operation Thatcham debacle both happened on Robins’ Kirklees watch. As were the seeds of the outrageous lawlessless sown that has now seen  ‘Horrible’ Huddersfield grow into the worst place to live in the UK (read more here).

 

Page last updated at 1100hrs on Wednesday 9th October, 2019

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

Right of reply: If you are mentioned in this article and disagree with it, please let me have your comments. Provided your response is not defamatory it will be added to the article.

Photo credit: Huddersfield Examiner

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

Dr Abdul Rashid -v- West Yorkshire Police

Bradford Combined Court Centre is the scene for the opening of a civil claim between Dr Abdul Rashid and West Yorkshire Police. It concerns the arrest and imprisonment of Dr Rashid in 2012 and alleged trespass on his home. The pre-action letter claiming damages, exemplary damages and special damages was sent to the police in October, 2015.

The arrest of Dr Rashid was, purportedly, in connection with Operation Thatcham, an investigation into fraudulent ‘cash for crash’ motor insurance claims. 48 offenders were eventually convicted in two separate trials in 2014.

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Dr Rashid, at the time of the arrest, operated a successful medico-legal practice examining and reporting on those injured in such incidents. He was, in all cases, instructed by either lawyers, or claims management companies, and his reports were for the use of the courts, as independent expert evidence, rather than for the benefit of personal injury claimants.

He was also a general practitioner, operating from two different surgeries, under the auspices of the Bradford Patient Care Trust.

The hearing, expected to last nine court sitting days, starting on Monday 9th September, 2019, will be presided over by Mr Recorder Nolan QC.

The claimaint is represented by Ian Pennock of counsel, instructed by solicitor, Simon Blakeley; the police are represented by Olivia Checa-Dover and Daniel Penman of counsel, instructed by solicitor, Alison Walker, Deputy Head of Legal Services at WYP.

A report on earlier case management and pre-trial hearings can be viewed here.

Monday 9th September, 2019

Proceedings opened at 10.45am.

A panel of eight jurors has been selected (the prescribed number in civil claims) with two reserves. They have been sent home until 10am on Tuesday. Mr Pennock is expected to begin his opening speech shortly after that time.

The court will hear evidence from five witnesses for the claimant and the police will be calling two officers to give evidence on their behalf.

The trial bundle presently extends to 12 densely packed lever arch files.

There are a number of ‘housekeeping’ matters for the judge and counsel to deal with after the lunch adjournment. These cannot be reported until the conclusion of the trial, unless permission is given by the judge.

Court rose at 3.30pm.

Tuesday 10th September, 2019

The judge is now in court and the jury filed in a little late at 10.15am

Following an oral application made by the police yesterday afternoon, the judge has discharged the jury and he will now hear the case alone. The application was grounded in Civil Procedure Rules (CPR 3.1(1)(m) and 3.3) which cover case management powers and section 66(3) of the County Court Act, 1994. The judge ruled that it would be ‘utterly inconvenient’ for a jury to sit and sift through what he described as ‘a shedload’ of documents, including a policy (investigation) log that extended to 200 pages.

There is no automatic right to a jury trial in a civil claim (in legal terms it is a ‘qualified right’) and the applicable legal test is whether it is ‘convenient’ for a jury to do so. Given the sheer volume of paper (4512 pages in total), and complexity of some of the issues to be tried, the judge found that it, plainly, was not convenient and made his Order accordingly.

With no jury in a fact-finding role, the shape of the trial alters and there will now be a reduced number of witnesses on the claimant’s side.

There is a short break whilst legal discussions take place. Detective Sergeant Mark Taylor, as he was at the time of the arrest, will give evidence first, followed by DC Andrew Christie (no relation to retired WYP inspector, Cedric Christie, who features elsewhere on this website). Mr Taylor is now a detective inspector based in Bradford. He will be mostly referred to in these reports as DI Taylor.

The judge returned to court at 11am with a warning against use of mobile phones as cameras or recording devices. He had received a report that there was such use in court yesterday afternoon. He reminded all present that this is regarded as a serious contempt of court.

DI Taylor is now being examined on his witness statement in the case by Miss Checa-Dover. The court has heard a chronology of events, and details of the nominals involved, in the prior investigation that led to the launch of Operation Thatcham, the ‘crash for cash’ investigation. Dr Rashid, the police say, was arrested as part of this wide ranging probe.

The focus of the prior investigation was mortgage fraud and led to the conviction of two brothers, Nadeem Khalid and Thazeem Khalid.

The court heard that the Huddersfield (or Kirklees) district, where DI Taylor was based with the Proceeds of Crime (POCA) team, was an insurance motor claim ‘hotspot’, according to data produced by both the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB). The MoJ is the statutory regulator for those involved in the running of claims management companies; the IFB is a not-for-profit organisation specifically focused on the detection and prevention of organised insurance fraud. Earlier, pre-trial hearings of this claim have heard that the MoJ and IFB were partners in the Thatcham investigation.

Two claims management companies were of particular interest to the police: Advanced Claims Ltd and Concept Accident Management Ltd. There was also an associated car hire company with shared directors, Advanced Car Hire Ltd. Nadeem Khalid and another local man, Sahir Mohammed were the principals involved in those companies, the police say. DI Taylor told the court that Op Thatcham was, initially, focusing on those associated with Nadeem. The police also say that the latter’s business activities also included a company registered as NK Business Consultants Ltd.

Court adjourns at 13.05 with DI Taylor part-heard. He has been taken through a chronology of events, based on policy log entries, that presently stands at the end of November, 2011. DI Taylor has invited the court to view the policy log as more of an investigation log than a record of decisions, rationales and records of actions taken. Detective Constable Mark Lunn was responsible for many of the entries to which the court has been taken. DC Lunn was the Officer in the Case in the prior investigation and had taken credit for it in press reports following its conclusion (read more here). He was ‘recommended’ to the Op Thatcham team, according to DI Taylor.

He told the court that DC Lunn was tasked with scoping Concept Accident Management, looking at lifestyle, houses, cars, and the ‘intel picture’. As a result, it was concluded by the police that Sahir Mohammed had a lifestyle well beyond the means that his association with Concept (and Advanced Claims) might confer that ‘he was involved in wholesale fraud’.

It has been heard in evidence that Dr Rashid first became a person of interest to Op Thatcham detectives, and recorded as such on the police log, in October, 2011, following the discovery of an appointments diary, relating to lists of Dr Rashid’s patients, in the car of another person under investigation, Fouad El-Habbal.

A young man of only 21 years of age (according to Companies House records he was born in May 1990), Mr El-Habbal had come to the attention of police, and the MoJ, by driving around in a Lamborghini motor car, worth £140,000, without any visible means to support the purchase, or lease, of such a vehicle. The court heard that it was registered to an address in Portsmouth.

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A scoping exercise into the business activities of Dr Rashid was launched by DC Lunn on 8th November, 2011. DI Taylor told the court that this followed a conversation with him. The judge sought clarification over other evidence concerning Dr Rashid, apart from the appointments diary. DI Taylor said that it was the only link at that stage. A civilian fraud investigator, Anthony Thornton, was tasked with background checks on Dr Rashid.

The court heard that, in the same month, evidence related to the claims management companies (CMC’s) was seized at a location in Huddersfield known as Stadium Storage. It ultimately formed part of the evidence in the criminal trials that were concluded in 2014. DI Taylor asserted that this material contained the ‘smoking gun’: Details of how car crash claimants were coached to make personal injury claims by the CMC’s.

The judge asked why the documents related to the search, and subsequent prosecution, were not disclosed in the trial bundle. Ms Checa-Dover replied that they had not been located after extensive searches by both the police and the CPS.

The examination of DI Taylor has now reached the point in the chronology where Dr Rashid was arrested on 7th March, 2012. By this time, the court has heard, four decision makers were involved: DS Taylor (as he was then), DI Andy White, DCI Paul Jeffrey and Crown Prosecution Service complex crime specialist, Julian Briggs. The decision to arrest was made the previous month, says DI Taylor. The first operational order for the arrest was drawn up by DC Lunn and was dated 28th February, 2012, there was a subsequent, amended version dated 7th March, the day of the arrest.

The court heard that DC Lunn was, shortly afterwards, found to be in breach of professional standards over activities unconnected to his police role that were, it is said, carried out on police premises using police computers. He was removed from Operation Thatcham by DCI Jeffrey and moved to a non-investigative role with Huddersfield Neighbourhood Police Team [in June 2012]. The court heard that he was placed on a monitoring scheme called an Unsatisfactory Performance Plan (UPP). At an earlier hearing of this claim, before HHJ Davey QC, counsel for the police had submitted that DC Lunn had received ‘management advice’ as the only recorded disciplinary sanction. It was not disclosed whether this related to use of police computers for a non-policing purpose, or as a result of a different complaint. Miss Checa-Dover said the documents relating to the sanction had not been found.

The judge in the present trial noted that Lunn left West Yorkshire Police a short time later. DI Taylor advanced the view that Lunn was unhappy in his new position and that was the reason for his departure from the police service. The court has heard previously that the claimant’s legal team was of the belief that he, later, went to work for the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), situated a short distance from police HQ in Wakefield. For their part, the police said they had been unable to trace him.

The examination of DI Taylor concluded at 3.40pm. Court rose shortly afterwards. A remarkable feature of the evidence heard today was the detective’s recollection of events that took place seven or eight years ago. For the most part he was clear, concise and consistent.

The cross-examination of the same witness will commence on Wednesday morning at 10am. Mr Pennock, counsel for the claimant, told the judge he anticipated being on his feet for most of the day.

Wednesday 11th September, 2019

Proceedings under way shortly after 10am, beginning with cross examination of Detective Inspector Mark Taylor. He was a sergeant based with the POCA team in Kirklees at the time of Dr Rashid’s arrest, as part of an investigation codenamed Operation Thatcham. He was the line manager of the Officer in the Case, DC Mark Lunn, presented by the claimant’s lawyers at pre-trial hearings as a ‘bad apple’. Both worked at Batley police station. [For clarity, DI Taylor’s position is that he was unaware of any activities of DC Lunn, prior to the end of May/beginning of June, 2012 that might support the claimant’s assertions of misconduct].

Ian Pennock is cross examining DI Taylor on behalf of the claimant. The thrust of his early questions is the extent of the role of DC Lunn in the both the initiation of Op Thatcham and its day-to-day running. DI Taylor has been presented by the police, in their written pleadings, and in oral submissions at pre-trial hearings, as the officer in charge of the investigation and the one best placed to present their witness evidence of the lawfulness of the arrest. DC Lunn was also the arresting officer in the actions central to this claim.

At the outset of his questioning, it was put to DI Taylor that DC Lunn was the ‘main man’ in Op Thatcham. He had led the investigation that resulted in the conviction of the Khalid brothers (read more here); he initiated Thatcham; was selected as officer in the case; and the only officer, from a team of six, who was working full time on the investigation; was allocated, as a detective constable, an office of his own. Reluctantly, DI Taylor agreed.

An email dated 26th March, 2012 from DC Lunn to Andrew Lockwood, a sergeant in Professional Standards, was shown to DI Taylor. In it, DC Lunn, when answering a public complaint of failing to return property, described himself as ‘Team Thatcham’. DI Taylor asserted that Lunn was not entitled to make such a claim. He was part of a team of six, that included DI Taylor (then sergeant) as his supervisor.

DI Taylor was taken to the policy log by Mr Pennock. It emerged during questioning that this document contravened a variety of policing protocols and practices (read Authorised Professional Practice here). For example: It was a free standing Word document with no police crest on it; it formed no part of any of the police’s recognised databases or systems; there was no records of decisions taken by the Senior Investigating Officer or rationales for such decisions; there was no restrictive marking on the document; no time or date stamp; it was not even marked ‘confidential’; there was no audit trail of entries or any amendments; no evidence of independent review or sign-off by a senior officer.

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Despite being put forward by the police as the man who could answer all questions pertaining to Operation Thatcham, and the civil claim filed by Dr Rashid, when asked by Mr Pennock, DI Taylor could not take the court to one single entry in that log that was authored by him. Almost all the entries on the policy log were made by DC Lunn.

DI Taylor could not explain, either, why there was a ‘big blank space’, in Mr Pennock’s words, in the policy log, where it appeared that at least one log entry had been erased. He could not say when the gap became apparent.

Eventually, DI Taylor was forced to concede, under questioning from Mr Pennock, that DC Lunn did, in fact, have day to day control of the Thatcham investigation. This is a sea change from the position advanced by the police at the pre-trial review in February, 2019.

DI Taylor also conceded that, as part of his wider policing duties and responsibilities, he had 12 other ‘live’ investigations, apart from Thatcham, and ‘one or two’ that were in the criminal court process.

Mr Pennock put to DI Taylor, in further questions, that his knowledge of Op Thatcham was not what the police purported it to be: The officer conceded that Thatcham was the biggest mass arrest fraud operation in West Yorkshire Police history: 38 arrests were made in Phase 1. In his evidence to the court yesterday, DI Taylor said there were around 10 arrests. Today, he told the court: ‘I got it wrong’.

As part of his supervisory role, the court heard that DI Taylor held regular weekly meetings with his team in order to review actions and progress. This included DC Lunn. A record was kept of these meetings, DI Taylor told the court, and a report sent ‘up the chain of command’, as Mr Pennock put it, as a form of briefing. When asked by Mr Pennock, as the officer presented to the court in charge of disclosure to the WYP Legal Services Department, in this claim, DI Taylor could not explain why those reports were not in any of the twelve volumes of the trial bundle. He did say, however, that, given the opportunity ‘he could find them’.

It was then put to DI Taylor that the decision to arrest Dr Rashid would be contained in at least one of those reports. He agreed that was the case. His recollection was that the decision would have been discussed with his line managers, DI Andy White and DCI Griffiths (the latter was DCI Jeffrey’s predecessor), and was not DC Lunn’s decision.

DI Taylor could not explain to the court why, even though it was what Mr Pennock termed ‘best practice’, the reasons for the arrest were not recorded in the policy log, or why there was no entry between 28th February, 2012 and 7th March. 2012. The first date mooted for the arrest and the actual date it occured. The reasons for the arrest, said Mr Pennock, appeared to be the appointments diary; the 10 minute interval between patient appointments and the charge of £470 plus VAT for the medico-legal consultations. These were set out in a post-arrest report prepared by DI Taylor, he continued. The detective agreed that it was his subordinate, DC Lunn, who had provided the investigation with the reasons.

Mr Pennock also put it to DI Taylor that when DC Lunn put together his reasons to ‘scope’ Dr Rashid’s business activities there was no mention of the appointments diary. He agreed that was also the case.

‘They did not raise suspicion did they?’ said Mr Pennock. ‘Difficult to assess’ was DI Taylor’s response.

Mr Pennock then questioned DI Taylor on the extent of the investigation into the far-reaching activities of the organised crime group, seemingly led by the Khalid brothers. DI Taylor agreed that, to the best of his recollection, during the investigations, no other doctor [apart from Dr Rashid] had been spoken to.

He was also asked if, even now, he fully understood motor claims and the legal proximity, or otherwise, of medical examiners to patients; the widespread use of questionnaires; the admin work done by claims management companies; block bookings. Following a discussion centering on questionnaires, and the examination of a sample included in the trial bundle, involving the judge and counsel for both parties, he answered ‘no’ to the rest of the question. Despite the questionnaire saying ‘Personal Injury Claims Questionnaire’ at the top, DI Taylor’s evidence was that it was not a medical questionnaire.

The court heard that the audio recordings of the patient examinations were seized, examined and investigated by the police. DI Taylor was asked if any analysis was done. The answer was, ‘yes’ to that, but ‘can’t recall’ if any discrepancies were identified. He also told the court that suspicions arising from the apparent high frequency of appointments, quality of reports and ten minute ‘slots’ were those of experts, not his own.

Mr Pennock then turned to those ‘experts’. The court heard that, pre-arrest, these appeared to be Doctors Tedd and Moffatt; mainly looking at Dr Rashid’s examination reports. Asked if these were experts that could be relied upon, DI Taylor told the court that he was ‘content that Dr Tedd was an expert’ and that Dr Tedd was ‘independent’.

Mr Pennock then took DI Taylor to the evidence in the form of an email from DC Lunn to DI Taylor in which it emerged that Dr Tedd was ‘a family friend’ of the Lunns.

The court rose at 11.35 for a 15 minute break.

Dr Tedd remained the focus of attention after the adjournment. DI Taylor could not explain why a reply to an email sent by him, seeking details of the doctor’s qualifications had not been disclosed in the trial bundle.

Mr Pennock asked if DI Taylor had made any enquiries regarding the doctor’s credibility, rationality, thought processes. ‘Not to my recollection’, was the answer. He also answered in the negative when asked about his [Dr Tedd’s] knowledge of medico-legal reports.

The court then heard that Dr Tedd had written to DI Taylor on 10th July, 2012 and offered the view that ‘10% of neck pain is caused by clapping of hands‘. He wrote again to the police in August in what DI Taylor said were ‘eccentric’ terms and in a manner, tone and content described by Mr Pennock ‘not commensurate with that of an expert’. A further exchange betwen Tedd and Taylor contained the doctor’s view that ‘whiplash doesn’t exist‘.

Mr Pennock put it to DI Taylor that Dr Tedd was dropped from the investigation ‘like a hot brick’ after that email exchange. DI Taylor responded: ‘I would not use those exact words’.

The subject of ‘missing’ police evidence was raised with DI Taylor, yet again, by Mr Pennock. This time it concerned materials seized in a raid on one of the rented units at Stadium Self Storage Ltd in Huddersfield and, eventually, used in the Operation Thatcham trials, at which over 40 fraud offenders were convicted in 2014. This comprised, said DI Taylor, of one box containing a large number of wallet files. Mr Pennock was under the impression there were more boxes. By this time, Mr Pennock said, a number of firms of solicitors were co-operating with the police in the Thatcham investigation. DI Taylor agreed that was the case.

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The judge observed that under ‘the six year rule’ the files should have been retained until 2020.

Mr Pennock said that Dr Rashid had been told during the pre-trial process that the files were ‘destroyed at the end of the statutory period’. DI Taylor told the court that the term ‘destroyed’ had come from him. His answer when questioned over non-production of that evidence to this court was ‘they were taken back to Batley police station’. He denied that any other WYP, or external, storage facility had been used. He could not tell the court when the files were destroyed, or by whom.

DI Taylor was then asked, once more, about missing disclosure. This time, Mr Pennock challenged him over the non-production of evidence that would ensure a fair trial and support the proposition that what Dr Rashid was doing, within his medico-legal practices, is not uncommon in the motor claims industry. DI Taylor had made this assertion to the CPS in a report he had sent to them in January, 2019. He said he had ‘no answer to that’. DI Taylor added: “Just because something is commonplace doesn’t mean it isn’t illegal.”

In that same report, the court heard that the police wanted to prosecute Dr Rashid to send ‘shockwaves’ throughout the insurance claims industry and get ‘other doctors to clean up their act’.

Court rose at 12.55pm for the lunch adjournment with DI Taylor’s evidence part-heard. At 2pm, Superintendent Richard Crinnion, acting Head of Professional Standards at West Yorkshire Police gave evidence.

The entirety of Mr Crinnion’s evidence was heard in camera and, as such, cannot be reported. It was submitted in open court that at least part of his evidence would cover Operation Waffleedge, an anti-corruption unit (ACU) investigation in which WYP has, at two pre-trial hearings, firstly submitted that this investigation was into DC Lunn then later said that he was not the target. Miss Checa-Dover told the court, at the pre-trial review, in February, 2019, that Waffleedge ‘was not an undercover operation’. Irrespective of that submission, it would be very surprising indeed if an ACU investigation carried out by any police force was not a covert operation.

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Supt Crinnion was in court for less than 10 minutes. After he had left the courtroom the cross-examination of DI Taylor resumed. Dr Clive Tedd was again the subject of Mr Pennock’s questions. The court heard that in a report dated 7.11.12, authored by the doctor, he stated: ‘I would not consider myself an expert in any medical field’.

Dr Tedd was one of two ‘expert doctors’ consulted by the police prior to the arrest of Dr Rashid. Mr Pennock asked DI Taylor, ‘where are the reports within the disclosure made by the police in this claim’. There was no answer. Miss Checa-Dover rose to inform the court that ‘the police don’t have these’. DI Taylor said ‘I would speculate that they (the reports) would have come via email to DC Lunn’.

Mr Pennock now returned to the activities of the police prior to the arrest of Dr Rashid. He put to DI Taylor that at 8.11.11 the police could not link the doctor to Advanced Claims UK Limited. ‘You had the appointments diary, but still no link’. DI Taylor agreed.

Attention then turned to the meeting, previously referred to in these proceedings, that took place on 19.1.12. It was between DI Taylor, Julian Briggs of the CPS (whom, the court heard, both met on an almost daily basis), DI White and DCI Griffiths. DI Taylor said he remembers this specific meeting. Mr Pennock asked: ‘Did anything stand out? Your memory is vague on other matters’. DI Taylor offered no explanation.

The issue of allegedly underdeclared earnings by Dr Rashid was touched upon by Mr Pennock. He asked DI Taylor if he knew how many reports the doctor had done in that financial year (2008/2009) and if that gave rise to suspicion. The detective did not know the answer.

DI Taylor was then asked if the investigation into his financial affairs revealed any criminal offences committed by Dr Rashid. He said, ‘to my knowledge, no’.

Mr Pennock advanced the view that the police focused on Dr Rashid because he was a high-profile doctor [in the motor claims industry] producing a high number of medico-legal documents: ‘They thought he looked ‘a bit dodgy’ because of the high volume of reports and what he charged [between £90 and £470]’.

At the conclusion of the day’s questioning, Mr Pennock put to DI Taylor the matter of payments by other doctors, solicitors, consultants to claims management companies. One of the companies mentioned was NK Business Consultants Ltd, whose name was raised briefly in evidence yesterday. His reply was: ‘During Thatcham I did not see any payment from any doctor, or agency, to a CMC’.

He was then taken to a document in the trial bundle, by Mr Pennock, who read out a significant list of payments made by such agencies.

The court has heard that the history of NK, according to the police, is that it is a successor company to Concept Claims, and before that, Advanced Claims (as far as is known, the original company).. Both, seemingly, controlled by at least one of the Khalid brothers. The police believed it had been set up to circumvent restraining orders on other bank accounts controlled by the directors.

Court rose at 3.40pm. The cross-examination of DI Taylor will resume at 10am on Thursday morning.

Thursday 12th September, 2019

The trial resumed at 10.15am in Court 7. Counsel for the parties went into closed session in the judge’s chambers and returned to court at 10.45am. Unfortunately, due to illness of one of the members of the legal teams, court has been adjourned for the day.

The judge asked the parties to be in court for 9.30am on Friday.

Friday 13th September, 2019

Cross-examination of Detective Inspector Mark Taylor resumed at 9.40 am. Counsel for Dr Rashid, Ian Pennock, opened by asking DI Taylor questions relating to ‘Frank’ which was the nickname of Fouad El-Habbal, previously identified in these proceedings as a young businessman living beyond his means, according to the police, and driving an expensive Lamborghini motor car.

It was established that the account ‘Frank’ was using to pursue his business as a claims manager, NK Business Consultants Ltd, had been ‘missed’ in the round of restraining orders applied to other bank accounts in the suspected frauds being investigated by the Operation Thatcham detectives.

DI Taylor told the court that the effect of these restraining orders was to monitor [as opposed to freezing] the bank accounts. The court heard that ‘Frank’ was ultimately convicted of perverting the course of justice by way of movement of funds from restrained accounts to the NK account.

It was also heard that no other person was prosecuted in relation to offences connected to that same bank account. ‘Frank”s actions occured after the arrest of Dr Rashid and were not, in any way, connected to him. It has emerged that ‘Frank’ was not convicted of any other offence connected to Operation Thatcham

Mr Pennock then returned to the Op Thatcham policy log that has featured centrally in the trial. The policy log ‘stops at 11.2.12, where’s the rest’ he asked. DI Taylor said he didn’t know. The judge, Mr Recorder Nolan QC then directed the police to check on this point. Olivia Checa-Dover, counsel for West Yorkshire Police, said there was a seperate policy log for Dr Rashid but that she would refer the matter back to her instructing solicitors for further enquiries to be made.

The court heard that there appears to be a gap between the two policy logs. At the pre-trial hearing HHJ Davey QC had ruled that all materials relating to policy logs should be disclosed by the police to the claimant.

In answer to the point, an ancient police adage, made by Mr Pennock, ‘if it’s not recorded, it didn’t happen’, it emerged that DI Taylor’s decisions were recorded in his Work Book (sometimes referred to, at the time, as a Blue Book) not on the policy log. His book that covers the period relevant to the issues in this case cannot be located. A further search is to be undertaken at the direction of the judge.

Miss Checa-Dover told the court that the police had found ‘a huge amount of materials’ in this case. The fact the Work Book appears not to be there could be attributed to a number of possible reasons: incompetence, policy, human error. ‘We are where we are’.

The judge asked that an officer be designated to look into the circumstances of how the Work Book came to be missing and what procedures were followed. ‘We need to know what has happened’, he said.

The evidence of DI Taylor is that he believes his Work Book may have been part of the unused materials in the Op Tahtcham trials which concluded in 2014. [If that is so, one might reasonably ask why the MG6(c) Unused Schedule for those trials has not been disclosed to the Claimant’s legal team].

He also told the court that force policy is that tWork Books are retained for 5 years.

Questioning then moved on to the warrants obtained for the search of Dr Rashid’s home and two offices: One annexed to the surgery and another at the medico-legal practice he ran separately. The notes that would have been attached to the warrant applications, at the time they were submitted to Dewsbury Magistrates’ Court, have not been disclosed to Dr Rashid’s legal team. Under questioning, DI Taylor conceded that these should still be retained on WYP servers. Asked by Mr Pennock if he had looked there for them, DI Taylor said he hadn’t.

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A search is also to be conducted for these items by the police at the request of the judge. As Mr Pennock put it to DI Taylor, these would give ‘reasonable grounds for the suspicion of offences’ that led to Dr Rashid’s arrest and good contemporaneous evidence of those grounds. DI Taylor agreed.

The judge asked DI Taylor how much detail would be attached to the warrant application. ‘Quite lengthy, which is usual for complex fraud’.

DI Taylor also said there were ‘numerous’ officers that attended Dr Rashid’s home at approx 6.15am on Wednesday 7th March, 2012 to execute the warrant. Mr Pennock had put it to him that there were 16 police officers present.

The court has heard evidence, in the form of read emails, that, within a few hours of arresting Dr Rashid, DC Lunn had made contact with the General Medical Council (GMC) with what he described as ‘our [the police’s] findings’. Before any questions had been put to the doctor in interview. Lunn said he was taken into custody over ‘large scale fraud, money laundering, connections with organised crime group’.

Asked if Dr Rashid was ever suspected of money laundering, DI Taylor answered: ‘Not by me’.

Mr Pennock then asked DI Taylor if he was aware that doctors are paid, whether or not personal injury (PI) claimants are found to be injured in a road traffic accident (RTA); DI Taylor said he knew that. Doctors are paid whether or not the claim succeeds: DI Taylor didn’t know that.

He also told Mr Pennock that he didn’t satisfy himself as to how the RTA/PI system worked, prior to the arrest of Dr Rashid. It emerged that the doctors DI Taylor relied on as experts, pre-arrest, hadn’t explained this system to him, either.

‘Did you ever investigate any solicitors, they must have been part of the same [alleged] fraud’ asked Mr Pennock. DI Taylor said ‘no’.

Mr Pennock: ‘No solicitors suspected [of conspiracy to defraud]’ DI Taylor: ‘No’.

When asked by Mr Pennock if the fact solicitors agreed fees with doctors, for between £90 and £470 [per examination], should not cause concern, DI Taylor said ‘no’.

Questions then turned to the custody record and the question of the necessity of the arrest of Dr Rashid. The judge interjected and reminded counsel that the applicable test in law is ‘Wednesbury reasonable‘.

The question of why the arresting officer, DC Lunn, was not giving evidence in this trial was put to DI Taylor. He replied that ‘he was not party to that [decision]’. When asked if he could find him, DI Taylor said: ‘I’m a police officer, I can find anybody‘.

Miss Checa-Dover had told the court at the pre-trial review in February, 2019 that ‘Mark Lunn couldn’t be traced’ by West Yorkshire Police.

The court then heard evidence, in the form of extracts read from police internal emails, that whilst working as a police officer, mainly investigating Dr Rashid, DC Lunn was holding himself out as a private investigator. He was using the name ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd‘. DI Taylor agreed, to the best of his recollection, that this company was not registered at Companies House.

Mr Pennock said that Lunn had been offered £183,000 funding to set up his company. He was corrected by the judge who said that ‘Lunn had asked for £183,000, and was not offered it by the insurance company‘.

Taken to an email from Sergeant Andrew Lockwood of the Professional Standards Department, to DCI Jeffrey, that said ‘he (Lunn) had got the funding’, DI Taylor said he didn’t know of this. He told the judge that the first he knew of Lunn’s private enterprise was when a POCA team colleague, DC John Barratt, told him about some of Lunn’s telephone conversations that he had overheard. He was very upset, the court heard. This happened towards the end of May, or the beginning of June, 2012.

Opus Law, a firm of Bradford solicitors, had made a formal complaint against DC Lunn on 14th May, 2012 regarding the private investigator concerns. This eventually found its way to DI Taylor on 7th June, 2012 when he was copied into an email sent by Sgt Lockwood to DC Lunn seeking an explanation of the matters raised against Lunn by Opus.

Court rose at 12.35pm and resumed at 1.30pm

The court heard that DC Andrew Christie, from whom more will be heard next week, was tasked with producing a disclosure report to GMC. DI Taylor signed off this report. When asked why the force’s specialist disclosure unit was not deployed, DI Taylor said that he had consulted with them, and with Andrew Keeling, his main point of contact at the GMC.

Mr Pennock then took DI Taylor to the dynamics of the investigation, and the shifting ground as it progressed. He asked when it became apparent that Dr Rashid was to be separated from Operation Thatcham; payments to Dr Rashid were no longer a cause for concern; and there was no issue with Dr Rashid’s tax affairs. The detective answered to the effect, on all three issues, that he couldn’t assist with a date.

DI Taylor was asked again about the Advanced Claims UK Ltd evidence seized from Stadium Storage. Mr Pennock put to him that, if his evidence was that there was only one box, why had Advanced rented a storage unit for just that? DI Taylor had no explanation.

Court rose at 2.45pm shortly after the conclusion of the cross examination of DI Taylor.

Monday 16th September, 2019

Proceedings resumed at 10.05am this morning with the examination and cross examination of Detective Constable Andrew Christie. His evidence concerned an investigation he had carried out which led to a large amount of disclosures, and 40 pages of submissions, to the General Medical Council (GMC) concerning Dr Rashid and the allegations being put to him at that time by the police. DC Christie had joined the POCA unit as part of D/Sgt (as he was then) Mark Taylor’s team in March 2012 and started working, more or less straight away, on this probe. The court heard two days of evidence from Mr Taylor (now an inspector) last week.

DC Christie was asked to clarify 4 points, by counsel for West Yorkshire Police, Miss Olivia-Checa Dover: The restraining orders obtained on the bank accounts of Concept Claims UK Ltd operated by ‘Frank’, the nickname of Fouad El-Habbal; the personal injury claimants (referred to also as ‘patients’) examined by Dr Rashid, with the focus being on ‘genuine’ accidents; How this informed what was disclosed to GMC; lastly, an analysis produced by DC Christie that looked at formulaic reporting of the patient examinations.

He told the court that the restraining orders against Frank’s accounts were obtained in October, 2011; ‘genuine patients’ were identified as: not being known to police; the accident was recorded on police systems; and there were no links between the patients and Concept. He was instructed to prepare the report to GMC by senior officers, who relied on medical experts, Dr Colin Holburn and Dr Watson, to assist their decision-making. They principally advised on level of physical contact between doctor and patient when assessing injuries, and ‘good medical practice’; the analysis referred to had formed part of a MG3 document submitted by the police to the CPS [an MG3 is a short overview of the reasons why the police consider there is sufficient evidence to charge a suspect] and it considered the use of identical phrases, and other standardisation, across a number of reports made by Dr Rashid.

The court also heard that as a result of analysis of CCTV, at locations where block bookings of patients were made, the average time for examination by Dr Rashid was calculated by DC Christie to have been between 7 and 8 minutes. Only two went over 10 minutes, and the longest was 16 minutes.

Mr Pennock then began his cross examination by asking if production orders were obtained for solicitors’ files where they were involved in instructing Dr Rashid to carry out examinations.  DC Christie agreed that was the case.

The court heard that none of the contents of these files, including the letters of instruction and personal injury claim questionnaires, were disclosed to the ‘expert’ doctors involved in advising the police. Instead, they were asked to rely on witness statements taken from patients identified from CCTV and the dictaphone recordings that Dr Rashid made of every examination, together with the report of those examinations compiled by him. All except one of the 12 witness statements was taken, face to face, by DC Christie.

DC Christie said he had read the solicitors’ files but couldn’t recall seeing any letters of authority in which patients confirmed they had read Dr Rashid’s report and signed the letter to confirm its accuracy. Those letters were not disclosed to the police experts. DC Christie said he couldn’t see their relevance.

The detective also said some patients said in their witness statements, they didn’t recall seeing their medical reports, or signing them.

The matter of personal injury questionnaires sent to patients, in advance of examination by a doctor, was then ventilated. Mr Pennock put it to DC Christie that these were important in terms of reducing the time needed to examine a patient, DC Christie’s evidence was they gave some information, were more of a general claim form than a medical questionnaire, and that at least one patient who gave evidence for the police investigation recalled seeing one.

Mr Pennock made the point that examinations that only took 4 minutes may have been of a patient with relatively minor injuries who had already made a full recovery. He also said in questioning that the police relied almost entirely on statements taken from witnesses, years later, but didn’t send any contemporaneous documents to the GMC. DC Christie agreed with the latter but said he couldn’t recall whether the patient who was seen for 4 minutes had recovered, or not.

DC Christie said he couldn’t recall seeing a letter, sent by the GMC to West Yorkshire Police, informing them that they had refused to put these matters raised by him, and the patients in their witness statements, to their Fitness to Practice Panel.

DC Christie’s witness box evidence concluded at 11.25am

Dr Rashid entered the witness box at 11.50am and was still part-heard at 1.15pm when court adjourned. His counsel, Ian Pennock asked just the one question and sought to adopt the rest of the doctor’s evidence from his witness statement: Dr Rashid was asked to confirm in what way, and by whom, he would be asked to conduct examinations of personal injury claimants. He explained that instructions would come from solicitors or medical reporting companies.

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The judge asked him to confirm if separate staff were deployed in his medico-legal practice. The doctor told him that, when he started out, he used his general practice staff, who worked overtime. Once established, he had a separate office and separate staff.

Miss Checa-Dover’s questioning this morning focused on text messages received in 2010 and 2011 by Dr Rashid from persons with whom he had a professional, or more familiar, connection.  She explored the duty of the doctor [or any other doctor in the same position], to the court and as an expert medical witness, upon receiving such messages and the actions he took as a result.

A number of those messages were from Jamil Dad, with whom Dr Rashid had a burgeoning professional relationship. Mr Dad was also involved in promoting Dr Rashid’s medico-legal credentials and was paid for that work. They would meet to exchange cheques for the various services each carried out for the other.

The court heard several times that the text messages sent to Dr Rashid had been included, by the police, in the trial bundle, but the replies from him were not.

After a discussion involving both counsel, the judge asked that the police provide a final explanation as to why they were not seized from the doctor’s computer. The incoming messages had been downloaded from a backup of the doctor’s mobile phone which rested on the hard drive of his computer.

The court was also told that the police did not seek to prove that any examinations carried out by Dr Rashid were part of fraudulent claims.

The afternoon’s questioning of Dr Rashid, by Miss Checa-Dover, focused on those text messages. The point she advanced repeatedly was that same one made earlier in the day, Dr Rashid had breached his duty to the court, as an expert witness, by not reporting potential conflicts of interest. Those conflicts arose mainly through contact with members of the families of claims managers, Nadeem Khalid, ‘Frank’, and instructing solicitor Jamil Dad.

Dr Rashid explained that he maintained his professional independence at all times, his prognoses and reports were always open to external scrutiny, and, to the best of his recollection, would have discussed any conflicts with solicitors.

He also said he couldn’t be sure that he knew that those patients were connected to Khalid, Frank and Dad at the time of the examination. The court was of told of ‘a traumatic ten years’ suffered by Dr Rashid which had affected his recall of events

Miss Checa-Dover referred Dr Rashid to practice rules which state: ‘…only continue as expert if there is no conflict of interest’. The doctor conceded that he had not discussed these matters with the courts concerned, or the other parties in the injury claim.

She also put it to the doctor that some solicitors involved in discussions regarding potential conflict of interest would, themselves, have been part of that conflict. It was a ‘red flag’ issue, she said. The judge also pointed out that Mr Dad and Mr McIllaney were ‘not independent of the conflict’.

The court also heard that Khalid and ‘Frank’ had presented themselves to Dr Rashid as personal injury claimants. This was a few months after a meeting had taken place at Akbars restaurant in Bradford, between the three of them; Jamil Dad; and a solicitor from Wakefield, Damian McAlinney, in order to explore how they could further their respective businesses in the personal injury claims field.

A commercial agreement was reached whereby Dr Rashid was to be the doctor of choice of Advanced Claims UK Ltd (ACL) and, in return, he would pay ACL £50 per patient referral. Dr Rashid said that other doctors made payments to claim management companies in the same way. [DI Taylor said in his evidence that it was ‘common practice’ in the motor claims business].

Miss Checa-Dover put to Dr Rashid that he was asked to pay off the debt of a previous doctor to ACL. He said he didn’t recall being asked by Mr Dad to do so and no such payment was made. His recollection of that matter came from police interviews.

Dr Rashid was questioned about an examination where the injury claim patient claimed the accident was a side-on impact, but the injuries claimed were consistent with front to back displacement. He said he couldn’t recall the specifics of that examination but would rely largely on the account of the person being assessed.

The court had heard earlier from DC Christie on this topic. The mechanism of the accident was set out in the personal injury questionnaire, filled in by the claimant before the appointment with the doctor.

The judge asked Dr Rashid if he recalled any adverse reports he had made after examining an injury claims patient. The doctor said he recalled one in particular because it had caused a ‘falling-out’.

Miss Checa-Dover then questioned Dr Rashid on the layout of his report form. She was told that it was developed from a Ministry of Justice template issued in 2010. The doctor also confirmed that his administrative staff typed out the reports from his audio recordings and inserted an electronic signature. He then checked them before they were sent out. The court heard that his proof reading of reports had come under scrutiny by the General Medical Council and found to be satisfactory.

Dr Rashid was asked about his reaction to finding out that Nadeem Khalid, with whom he was conducting a significant amount of injury claims business, had been convicted of fraud in March 2011. He said he was told that Khalid had been prosecuted over mortgage fraud and would have been alarmed at discovering that Khalid was a convicted fraudster.

He tole the court that he had subsequently discussed the matter with Jamil Dad ‘to make sure our work was above reproach’.

The court heard that Dr Rashid had provided Khalid with a reference before the trial and that payments were made to ACL and Concept [the claims management companies] after the conviction of Khalid.

Court rose at 3.50pm

Tuesday 17th September, 2019

The cross examination of Dr Rashid continues. Miss Checa-Dover, counsel for West Yorkshire Police, is asking questions. She carries over the theme from yesterday relating to the conviction of ‘Noddy’ (Nadeem Khalid) in March 2011 and now his arrest, in prison, in October, 2011 as part of Operation Thatcham. He was arrested along with ‘Juggy’ (Sahir Mohammed) and ‘Frank’.

‘Was this another big red flag?’, she asked. Dr Rashid told the court that, although it was a big concern for him, the claims management companies remained regulated by the MoJ post arrest. The court heard that he had been informed of the arrests by Mr McIllaney, but he did not know the reason why.

Counsel then asked the doctor if he considered the option of terminating his working with Concept Claims following arrest. His reply was that his instructions for expert reports came from solicitors, not the claims management company.

The court heard that Dr Rashid had a conversation with Mr McIllaney in which they discussed ensuring that the arrest of the three suspects did not impact adversely on their respective practices.

Asked about contact with Frank the day after his arrest, the doctor said that he had called to find out more details. He went on to tell the court that ‘police have been through my medico legal practice, and all my reports, with a fine toothcomb. At the end of that, my integrity remained intact and there was no finding of my involvement with any fraudulent activities’.

Miss Checa-Dover turned her attention to payments being made to Concept/ACL (the CMC’s) after the arrest of the principals: ‘You were still sending money after their bank accounts were frozen’.

Dr Rashid said that it was industry practice to pay CMC’s promptly and ‘everything I sent is noted and accounted for’. The judge observed that Dr Rashid had been provided with another bank account, at Barclays, into which to make payment. This was the bank account of NK Business Consultants Ltd referred to earlier in the proceedings.

He was then asked by Miss Checa-Dover if he could recall Gill, a solicitor with a firm by the name of JCA Solicitors, telling him they had decided not to work with Concept from 11th November, 2011, one month after the arrest. Dr Rashid told the court that he believed Gill was a marketing manager with JCA, not a solictor, but he couldn’t remember that exchange with her.

It was then put to Dr Rashid, by counsel, that ‘he was in on it with Concept and needed another solicitor’. He said that at any one time he was working with between 30 and 60 solicitors.

Miss Checa-Dover then turned to the matter of the medico-legal reports. By asking a number of sequential questions she sought to establish that Dr Rashid didn’t have time to carry out all that was required for his expert report within a 10 minute time slot:

Patient’s details; Mechanism of accident; Seatbelt; Movement within vehicle at impact; Oral account of symptoms from patient; Time off work; Impact on social life; Medication; Psychological symptoms; Physical examination.

She also put to the doctor that as many as 53 patients had been block-booked on one occasion, when the appointments window was open from 12 noon until 8.10pm, and she took him to statements of two patients who said they had been ‘rushed’. 40 in a day was a more usual number, she said.

Dr Rashid told the court that all these matters had been reviewed, by experts, within a two year investigation at the General Medical Council and no issues found. He also said that he couldn’t understand why these matters were being ventilated again.

An very short audio file was played to the court of a dictaphone recording made by Dr Rashid. Miss Checa-Dover questioned him over speaking into the dictaphone whilst the patient was also talking about his injury. The doctor said that the patient had checked the post-examination report and signed it off.

The issue of whether the proof reading of his draft reports, typed up by his administration team, either took place at all or was rushed was put to Dr Rashid by counsel. One former employee had told the police, post arrest, that the doctor ‘had got sloppy’. As heard earlier, Dr Rashid told the court that the reports were proof read and that the GMC had found in their investigation that this aspect of his work was satisfactory.

Another former employee and personal friend, had made a statement saying that Dr Rashid had told her that “he would be a millionaire in 5 years”. The doctor said she had a good memory but he didn’t remember saying that.

Miss Checa-Dover then pursued the matter of a mistaken entry on Dr Rashid’s CV. She put it to him that ‘he had lied’. Again, in his answer, he said that this was a matter already considered by the GMC. He admitted that he had got it wrong. The Court heard later, in re-examination of the doctor by his counsel, Ian Pennock, that he had included membership of Expert Witness Institute (EWI) on his CV. He was, actually, a member of Expert Witness online. That entry did not appear on his CV. An application form had been filled out for EWI in 2006 but, Dr Rashid said, it, apparently, had not been posted.

Miss Checa-Dover’s cross-examination ended at 12.40. She did not appear to ask Dr Rashid one question pertaining to the events leading up to his arrest; any warrants produced by the police; whether he was cautioned; the events on the day of the arrest; his subsequent detention at at least three different police stations; or the deployment of an estimated 16 police officers at 6.15am on the morning of the arrest at his home, where he was with his wife and young children.

Mr Pennock then re-examined Dr Rashid. It emerged in evidence that after the search at the medico-legal offices ‘the police left thousands of files open and scattered all over the floor’; the phone and laptop that was seized from Dr Rashid was returned in 2014 and, when he tried to access his phone backup on the hard drive of his computer, he found the police had deleted it. This meant that all records of his text messages had been purged. The court has heard a number of times that the police have only exhibited, and questioned Dr Rashid, on text messages sent to him. His replies were not in the bundle.

Dr Rashid was then asked about appointments slots at his GP surgery (as opposed to the medico-legal examinations). He told the court that they were arranged at 10 minute intervals for face to face visits and 5 minute intervals for telephone consultations. He agreed with Mr Pennock that he would see 40 patients a day.

The judge then read witness statements, filed and served as apart of the Claimant’s case, from: Zakiyah Begum; Waseem Ahmed: Dr James McBride and Lawrence Horan.

Mr Pennock told the court that these statements are unchallenged by the Defendant, as is the witness statement of Dr Rashid which the judge said he had already read. The cross-examination of the doctor appeared to concern only matters raised in the police investigation, post-arrest.

The court will hear Final Submissions from both Claimant and Defendant on Wednesday. Thursday is a reading day for the judge. He expects to hand down judgment on Friday morning.

Key tests for determining whether the arrest of Dr Rashid was lawful are: (i) Did the arresting officer, Detective Constable Mark Lunn, reasonably suspect the doctor was guilty of the offence for which he was arrested (conspiracy to defraud); and (ii) Did DC Lunn have reasonable grounds to believe that the arrest was necessary.

Wednesday 16th September, 2019

Judge in court at 10am but, after a short discussion with counsel, he rose for 45 minutes to allow each to read a copy of the other’s submissions they are putting orally to the court today. Mr Recorder Nolan QC said that ‘the days of trial by ambush are long gone’.

Miss Ceca Dover has made her final submissions to the court on behalf of West Yorkshire Police. In summary, they set out to:

(i) Justify the arrest of Dr Rashid based on reasonable suspicion.

(ii) Justify the necessity of an arrest (as opposed to, for example, a voluntary interview).

Points (i) and (ii) are referred to as the Primary Liability issues

(iii) Provide an alternative scenario whereby if DC Lunn did not have the required suspicion of guilt, or belief in the necessity of the arrest, whether Dr Rashid would have been lawfully arrested anywayIf so, no harm was caused by the unlawful arrest meaning substantial damages will not be awarded. This was described in court as the Lumba/Parker test. [The Parker case is better known in the stage name of the former television celebrity, Michael Barrymore, who was unlawfully arrested by Essex Police in 2001. By an odd dint of circumstance, the solicitor representing Mr Parker all the way to the Court of Appeal, was Damian McIllaney, referred to a number of times elsewhere in the present proceedings]. For the legally curious, the Parker judgment can be read in full here. The Lumba case, which went all the way to the Supreme Court, and concerns the various legal tests for damages awards, can be read in full here.

Miss Checa-Dover submits that DI Taylor was present when the Claimant was arrested. He shared the reasonable suspicion in Dr Rashid’s guilt and is entitled to rely on what he has been told, including by his fellow officers, in order to form his own suspicion.

(iv) Provide a further alternative, in the event the arrest was found to be unlawful, by way of the ex turpi causa principle. That would require a finding by the judge that Dr Rashid’s conduct in preparation of medico-legal reports and/or his involvement with others, facilitating motor accident injury claims, was so culpable, negligent or reckless as to extinguish his claim. [In legal terms it engages ‘moral turpitude’.

Miss Checa-Dover submits that the duty owed by doctors conducting medico-legal work is onerous and of significant public importance. Where the motive becomes to get more reports out and make as much money as possible, to the expense of proper adherence to the duties owed, a serious risk to the proper administration of justice arises.

In reply, Mr Pennock, for Dr Rashid, said that to make such a finding the judge would have to ‘go behind’ the findings of the General Medical Council who cleared the doctor of the matters raised in Miss Checa-Dover’s submissions. He suggested that the judge ‘exercises caution’.

Mr Pennock, on behalf of Dr Rashid, completed his submissions shortly before 4pm. In some tense and, at times, intemperate exchanges between the bench and counsel the principal points advanced were:

(i) The burden of proof is on the Defendant to prove they had objectively assessed, reasonable grounds to suspect Dr Rashid of conspiring with Advanced Claims to defraud insurance companies with fraudulent claims for personal injury.

(ii) Dr Rashid had never reported in his medico-legal role on any fraudulent claim or even a suspected fraudulent claim. Requests for the police to produce any evidence of such claims had been ignored.

(iii) Detective Constable Mark Lunn was the designated Officer in the Case and, also, the arresting officer. At the time of the arrest, DC Lunn was holding himself out as a private detective to the insurance industry and he had received some, or all, of a payment of £183,000 from an insurance company, according to an email in the trial bundle from Andrew Lockwoood, a detective sergeant in Professional Standards, to DCI Paul Jeffrey.

(iv) There is no evidence of any credible investigation being carried out, by the police, into the payment of that money to DC Lunn and where it went (as opposed to a lesser investigation into DC Lunn holding himself out as a private detective). Similarly, there is no credible explanation of why an insurance company would want to give a serving police officer such [a large sum of] money when the insurance industry have set up the Insurance Fraud Bureau (frequently referred to earlier in these proceedings) working alongside the police as an open and transparent co-operation between them.

(v) In the circumstances, Mr Pennock submits that the bogus company run by DC Lunn, a company which did not actually exist in Companies House records, was, arguably, invented as a vehicle for an inducement for Lunn to arrest Dr Rashid. If the payment ‘to set up his business’ was discovered he could attempt to claim it was an ‘investment’ in his company by the insurers. [Lunn had attempted to set up the business from offices in Marsden, close to his home, but the insurance company said they wanted it to be based in Leeds, the regional economic centre].

(vi) The court, and the wider public, would expect DC Lunn to give evidence on oath to justify the arrest of Dr Rashid and explain the alleged receipt of a substantial sum of money from an insurance company, and running a substantial private investigation business, whilst a serving police officer. He could readily have been summoned to court, by the police, as their main witness. But, on the police version of events, that should not be needed, in any event, because he left the police service of his own accord without any duress being placed upon him.

(vii) Surprisingly, and very unusually, submits Mr Pennock, the Defendant is not calling DC Lunn to give evidence the court would normally expect to hear in such circumstances. There has been no explanation for his remarkable absence, other than ‘the police cannot trace him’.

(viii) In the circumstances, Mr Pennock invited the court to draw an adverse inference [against the police] from DC Lunn’s very notable absence.

(ix) The ‘reasonable grounds’ upon which the police suspected Dr Rashid of committing an offence have changed at least five times. First version is their original defence; second version their amended defence; third version within DI Taylor’s witness statement; fourth version given in his oral evidence (appointments lists kept by Advanced Claims of the appointments they made on behalf of Dr Rashid, the payment of £825 into the account of NK Consultants and the adequacy of his reports); fifth version found in the document now produced by the police, at the request of this court, to identify the reasonable grounds they rely upon, with reference to matters known pre-arrest.

(x) The court heard that it should expect the reasonable grounds for suspecting Dr Rashid in the alleged fraud conspiracy, for which he was arrested, to be recorded by the police (as was accepted by DI Taylor in his oral evidence). That would be the best evidence. The court should expect the decision to arrest Dr Rashid and the reasons for it to be recorded in;

DI Taylors day book; the Operation Thatcham policy log; the Application to the magistrates’ court for the search warrant; in the policy log set-up for Dr Rashid [as opposed to the Thatcham policy log].

The police have not disclosed any of those records.

(xi) The police obtained a Production Order for Dr Rashid’s mobile phone airtime provider to produce all call and text data from his phone, yet only disclose the police’s version of text messages, without any replies to those texts made by the doctor. After the police had Dr Rashid’s laptop and phone he can no longer access any of his mobile phone data.

(xii) Mr Pennock submits that it is hard to avoid a very strong suspicion that the police documentation has been ‘sanitised’ to remove anything harmful to them and helpful to Dr Rashid. A culture of failing to disclose evidence helpful to any opponent is corroborated by the alleged failure of officers to inform the criminal defence teams in the Operation Thatcham fraud case. The police should have known that DC Lunn’s activities would seriously compromise such a prosecution, if not lead to a stay [as an abuse of process]. A decision was taken by those same officers to keep DC Lunn’s activities secret until after the Operation Thatcham prosecutions were finalised two years later. In order words, convict the fraudsters and stay silent about Lunn.

(xiii) He further submits that the whole presentation of the police case smacks of hiding contemporaneous reasons given by DC Lunn for the arrest of Dr Rashid and the scrabbling around ex post facto for whatever justification they could find for the arrest.

At the end of Mr Pennock’s submissions there was an animated discussion between the bench and both counsel regarding undisclosed materials. The upshot is that the judge, who described it as ‘a grumble’ by Dr Rashid’d legal team, directed that such issues be dealt with overnight, by the two parties to this civil claim, and to report back to him if there was any outstanding issues following completion of that process.

Those present at the two previous hearings of this claim, heard before a different judge in December, 2018 (a case management hearing) and February, 2019 (pre-trial review), would place the repeated complaints over disclosure by Dr Rashid’s lawyers, and the numerous troubling explanations by the police, as rather higher than ‘a grumble’. A contemporaneous report of the second of those two hearings – sent to the police press office at the time – can be read here.

There is also an obvious tension in the police’s choice of disclosure officer, Detective Inspector Mark Taylor, who gave evidence as their main witness.

Similar tensions appear in the submissions of Miss Checa-Dover, presumably on instructions from the police, across the pre-trial hearings referred to above. Most notably, she claimed yesterday that it was never said, by her, to HHJ Davey QC that ‘the police could not locate Mark Lunn’. Regrettably, the transcript of that hearing will tell a different story. As does the contemporaneous report of those proceedings, to which the weblink is provided above, that has stood unchallenged by West Yorkshire Police, and Miss Checa-Dover, for over 6 months.

She also told the court, on that day, that the actions of DC Lunn ‘were at all times lawful and proportionate’ (see excerpt from that article below).

The various versions, again, presumably, on instructions from the police, of the disciplinary action taken, or, indeed, not taken against Lunn can, most charitably, be characterised as a muddle. As are the various explanations of what Operation Waffleedge is, or is not, about. A matter presently exercising the Information Commissioner. The police position, before her, is that they can neither confirm nor deny it exists.

Although Thursday 19th September, 2019 is a designated reading day, the judge said that the court would be open and he would make himself available to attempt to resolve, with counsel, any unfinalised issues over disclosure.

Disclosure failings by the police has been a very high profile news topic over the past year. From the press seats, at least, it is utterly extraordinary that disclosure is still being sought, on the ninth day of a trial, in a civil claim first intimated to the police in October, 2015.

Public confidence in both the police, and the civil justice system, is ill-served by such a debacle.

Friday 20th September, 2019

The police and Dr Rashid were told yesterday afternoon that judgment would not be handed down first thing this morning. Instead, there will be a hearing of the unresolved disclosure matters first.

This morning’s hearing was listed by the court for three hours.

Handing down of judgment commenced at 11am.

The court was told earlier this week that Olivia Checa-Dover is not in Court 7 this morning.  She is elsewhere in the building on another matter. The judge excused her, and Daniel Penman (Miss Checa-Dover’s junior throughout this final hearing) will represent the police at today’s hearing.

Detective Inspector Mark Taylor and Detective Constable Andrew Christie are in court this morning. They gave evidence earlier in the trial.

Mr Recorder Nolan QC completed the oral delivery of his judgment at 11.50. He dismissed the claim of Dr Rashid, finding that the arrest of the doctor, by Detective Constable Mark Lunn (as he was then), was based on reasonable suspicion, and as part of ‘an emerging picture’ of evidence that may have linked him to others who were running fraudulent claims management companies. He found that it was ‘a team decision’ to arrest Dr Rashid, not that of DC Lunn.

Dr Rashid was never charged with any offence. He was on bail for 15 months.

It was also found, by the judge, that if the arrest by DC Lunn had been ruled unlawful then, on the Parker principle referred to in Wednesday’s report, Dr Rashid would have been arrested anyway.

Dr Rashid is contemplating an appeal against the judgment. It appears to contains a significant number of factual errors. A full analysis will be posted over the weekend.

There are also grave concerns about the manner in which this trial has been conducted. A matter also exercising the author of this piece. At one point, when a National Union of Journalists press card was produced to the judge for inspection he said: “They give those out to anybody“.

 

Reporting restriction

The judge ruled, orally, that none of the patients examined by Dr Rashid, and named in court proceedings, can be identified in the reporting of this case. The exceptions being ‘Noddy’ (Nadeem Khalid), convicted of fraud and money laundering in 2011 and, again, for conspiracy to defraud in 2014, and ‘Frank’ (Fouad El-Habbal), convicted of perverting the course of justice in 2014.

Note

Fouad El-Habbab is also reported elsewhere by the name of ‘El Habbab Fouad’.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page last updated at 2200hrs on Monday 7th October, 2019

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Photo credit: Telegraph & Argus

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

Cost of GMP’s disastrous IS Transformation Programme rises to £80 million

Greater Manchester Police (GMP) is the UK’s fifth largest police force, with over 7,000 officers, and around 3,000 civilian staff, whose mission is to ensure the safety and security of a diverse local population of over 2.5 million people, spread over 11 Divisions (plus 6 City of Manchester sub-divisions), 10 specialist units and covering an area close to 1,300 square kilometres.

In 2010, GMP began a near ten-year journey that would see their out-dated computerised crime databases and paper-based systems, including the Operational Policing Unit System (OPUS), and an older system purchased from Northumbria Police, replaced with a new multi-million pound installation that is now widely dubbed as iOPS: An acronym of Integrated Operational Policing System.

Or, less generously, ‘iFLOPS’. The name given to a closed Facebook group where reports of the new system’s many failures could be posted, without fear of reprisal from GMP’s feared Professional Standards Branch (PSB). iFLOPS attracted an astonishing membership of over 1,400 GMP officers in just over two days. A large number of posts revealed genuine fears that lives could be lost whilst iOPS remained in its present dysfunctional state.

OPUS was introduced in, or around, 2004 and has, for the moment, been retained as a read-only database to cover intelligence gaps or inputting errors within iOPS.

The new system would accommodate the force’s ambition to have every front line officer equipped with mobile devices that can link directly with its data and also integrate seamlessly with body worn video footage taken at the scene of incidents. This film would later be used to support prosecution of alleged offenders. The mobile devices would all have eight core policing applications (apps) installed, together with such as Google Maps and Outlook email. Elimination of duplicate entries is said to be a key feature of the new technology.

This critical new capability gives officers the tools and information they need at street level. More crucially, they can, in theory, access and update databases, including the Police National Computer (PNC) whilst out on patrol. The estimated £10.7 million cost was additional to the iOPS software purchase. £1.8 million was paid for the devices the rest was spent was to be spent on training, the policing apps, airtime and data use.

Other forces using the same mobile systems include the Police Service of Northern Ireland; an East Midland collaboration between Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Notts and Northants; Kent Constabulary and Essex Police.

By any measure, conversion to iOPS and the introduction of the mobile devices was an ambitious change project for GMP and forms part of the force’s wider Target Operating Model (TOM).

A version of iOPS is presently in use at four other police forces, including the Metropolitan Police Service and South Wales Police, which was the first to successfully deploy the ControlWorks system in 2015. A comprehensive, easy to follow overview of iOPS can be read here. On paper, at least, it looks highly functional, effective and efficient.

In September 2013, two senior GMP officers, believed to be the then chief constable, Sir Peter Fahy, and one of his assistant chiefs, Garry Shewan, reported to Tony Lloyd, at the time the police and crime commissioner for Greater Manchester, that the contract for a £30 million overhaul of GMP’s computer systems should be given to professional services giant EY, formerly Ernst and Young, without inviting rival contractors to bid for the work.

By that time, EY had already been paid £300,000 by GMP for preparatory work to scope the merits of introducing a single new system, which would unify the existing GMP databases, transfer them to a virtual infrastructure (Cloud), and allow officers to access key information whilst out on patrol or responding to incidents.

In the event, the PCC couldn’t countenance such a large contract being effectively handed to a single favoured contractor and, quite correctly, ordered that the project be put out to tender:

“GMP needs to have an IT system that is fit for the 21st century. The current system is in need of radical overhaul.

“In the current financial climate, a major piece of investment like this has to be done correctly – failure is simply not an option [Emphasis added].

“Following the initial scoping work that has been done by EY, a delivery partner now needs to be appointed to work with GMP to drive this project forward.

“I’ve decided that the right thing to do is to appoint that partner organisation through a competitive tendering process. This demonstrates transparency and also allows us to test the market so that the system developed will not only represent best value for money, but is also of the highest quality.

“An open [tender] process also minimises risk to the project of delay by legal challenge and enables us to see how we can work in partnership with industry experts to develop a system that will equip GMP to provide the best possible service to the people of Greater Manchester.”

GMP now say iOPS is part of a wider information services transformation programme initially budgeted at £60 million: Double the original figure of £30 million approved by Mr Lloyd.

The software designer who succeeded in the tender process is the Capita Group, and consultants appointed to manage the installation were, indeed, EY, who had, of course, already carried out the scoping work. It is reported that GMP commissioned the ControlWorks and PoliceWorks elements of the trademarked Capita system. The status of the EvidenceWorks part of the system in GMP is not known, at present. This usually involves, at the very least, replacing ageing and increasingly unreliable two deck tape recorders with digital devices and associated technology.

Screen Shot 2019-09-03 at 15.12.30

In its promotional materials, Capita boasts that it has been a supplier of mission-critical solutions to law enforcement agencies for over 30 years – and works closely with clients to support evolving operational requirements and future business needs in policing, namely; providing mobile access to data for responding officers, data sharing with partners and truly multi-channel, two-way communication links between the force and the public.

Capita’s portfolio, they say, directly addresses core policing needs to deliver a public-facing, locally-based, modern and intelligence-driven service. Capita’s products and services are proven to help reduce operational risk, deliver a better service to the public and increase the effectiveness of operations.

But during the present iOPS crisis in Greater Manchester Police not a single word has been heard from their company about what have been described in the local press as ‘catastrophic’ failures. Enquirers are directed to GMP statements on the topic.

The relationship between Capita and GMP dates back many years, with GMP being the first force in the UK to outsource support for Airwave (the now outdated national police radio communication system) to a third party supplier. The two organisations, they say, developed an excellent working relationship over the years and built a strong, trusting partnership. The Capita team is based on site at GMP’s radio workshops to enable them to work closely with force employees and officers. As part of this service, Capita provides mobile radio engineers who are deployed when required to support vehicle radio incidents. Technical advice is also provided for hand-held and vehicle radio assets, and control room first line enquiries. GMP’s control rooms are also supported by a 24/7 regional field service team.

The police’s project leader for the IS Transformation Programme was Assistant Chief Constable Garry Shewan; assisted at that time by Chief Superintendent Chris Sykes (pictured below), since promoted to assistant chief constable, project leader and lead spokesperson. Another key member of the IS team is Assistant Director, Bill Naylor, involved in the programme at a senior level since 2011 and leading teams of up to 95 officers on associated projects. The officer responsible for delivery of training was recently retired inspector, Richard Easton. Unusually, there is no operational codename for the project, according to GMP’s press office.

 

Screen Shot 2019-09-03 at 17.42.48
Assistant Chief Constable Chris Sykes

Details of the IS Transformation Programme tender process, via open source, are sparse. There did not appear to be any media coverage of the outcome. A copy of the contract award, dated 25th November, 2015 can, however, be read here. But, apart from naming the four successful project ‘partners’ (Capita Secure Information Solutions Ltd; Accenture Ltd; Intergraph (UK) Ltd and Northgate Public Services (UK) Ltd), and giving the values of the lowest and highest bids (£7 million and £25 million) it reveals very little more apart from the fact that the lowest bid was not chosen. The box for ‘the most economically advantageous’ is ticked. There were 14 bids, in total, for the four different contracts awarded. [The sharp-eyed might notice that Intergraph was wrongly referred to as ‘Integraph’ in the Decision Notice].

In May 2017, reportedly a year late, GMP issued a £17m pre-tender to overhaul and transition its data centre services to a virtualised infrastructure. Several potential suppliers were sought to express interest in the contract.

According to GMP’s tender documents, virtualisation techniques were being sourced as a means to transform large sections of the force’s existing infrastructure that is built around ageing in-house technology.

“[The proposed contract] will provide a managed service to support and maintain such services and facilitate the migration of the services to alternative locations if required,” said the pre-tender notice.

“GMP is committed to improving technology to enable staff to work more effectively and efficiently, the IS Transformation Programme (ISTP) have, and will continue to introduce new technology to support core operational policing,

“This includes how users will experience IT as part as their roles alongside building a better IT infrastructure to be more dependable and flexible in the future.”

Enquiries are ongoing to discover the name of the successful contractor and the amount tendered. It is not clear at this stage if the GMP migration to Cloud-based data storage was linked to the wider 43-force Microsoft Azure transformation that now falls under the National Enabling Programmes. For which BT and Deloitte have been awarded lead contracts (read more here).

iOPS was scheduled to go live in November, 2017. Two years after the contract award. The business case for the new system required cost savings to come on stream shortly after that date. By that time it had already been beset with serious issues, necessitating software re-writes. These mainly involved the flawed transfer into the new system of millions of records, stretching back over 40 years relating to crimes, convictions, suspects and victims.

An external audit of GMP’s finances, shortly before the intended launch, warned that the plan to go live with the all the component parts of the new information system, in the same moment, was a high risk strategy. They also noted that the problems already identified were responsible for a budget excess, but GMP was looking to claw back the overspend from the contractors. On-time delivery was central to the force’s cost saving plan.

Grant Thornton wrote to the Chief Constable and the Mayor’s office saying: “GMP has decided to go for the ‘same day’ approach to implementation proposed in the iOps deployment approach and recently signed off by the Organisational Change Board (OCB)”.

“It will be important to ensure that the planning, testing and readiness assessment are robust given the inherent risk of this approach.”

The Grant Thornton report also featured robust advice from an independent IT adviser and consultant, Gerry Pennell OBE, who warned it was ‘critical’ that the system was thoroughly tested, and staff properly trained, before it was launched.

“Given the ‘big bang’ nature of the deployment, and the scale of the impact on GMP’s operation and its criticality, I would counsel that considerable thought is given to ‘operational proving’ before going live,

“I appreciate that there are some real logistical challenges in standing up an effective operational testing/rehearsal opportunity. However, those challenges need to be balanced against the risk of encountering major operational issues when going live.”

Mr Pennell, also expressed concern the force ‘does not have adequate involvement with iOPS from a technical perspective’. GMP had made ‘good progress’ in recruitment but there were still ‘some significant gaps’, he said.

An information systems heavyweight, he is presently retained by both the International Olympic Committee and the Cabinet Office, and is a former IT Director at the University of Manchester.

The concern over remoteness of GMP’s own staff from the IS programme was also echoed by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabularies in their 2018 PEEL assessment.

When asked about ‘operational proving’, a GMP spokesperson said: “Prior to launching, we carried out extensive testing to ensure all new systems were usable and fit for purpose.

“We were continually engaged in a range of testing activity throughout 2018 and up to the launch date. It was unfeasible to carry out a live pilot of our new systems for operational and logistical reasons, which is clearly acknowledged and anticipated in the independent advice provided to us.”

There were also dark rumblings at that time, from insiders, about serious data breaches, with unauthorised personnel allegedly able to view the crime records. GMP denied any breach, as a reflex reaction, but the Information Commissioner’s Office was not contacted and no investigation took place.

March, 2018 was mooted by GMP as the revised go-live date, but this deadline came and went and was notable only for the departure of ACC Shewan a short time before. He had given indication of his retirement on 24th December, 2017 in a short message on Twitter; there was no valediction from his senior colleagues, including Chief Constable Ian Hopkins, when he left; nothing in the local press: Shewan just vanished, or so it seemed, with just a Twitter posting on 21st February, 2018 that read: ‘So the day has arrived….these 4 little things (epaulettes, warrant card, name badge) have dominated my life for over 30 years and today I get to hand them back for someone else to enjoy. They physically weigh ounces but without them I feel so much lighter. Thank you my friends for your love and support’.

A very short time after he left GMP, a company was incorporated bearing the name Garry Shewan Consulting Limited, with a retired police officer as its only director (read Companies House records here).

On his LinkedIn profile, Garry Shewan makes the remarkable claim that he is a ‘highly skilled strategic change leader who has led a wide range of transformational programmes including the delivery [emphasis added] of a unique £60million IS Transformation Programme – transforming operational policing, re-thinking the use of data & digital applications, and delivering significant business improvements.’

Set against the facts that iOPS has been repeatedly described in the local press as ‘a disaster’ or ‘catastrophic’ and on television as ‘a health and safety risk both to the public and police officers’ it can be inferred that the core of Shewan’s claims are not true. Not least because the system did not go live until 9th July, 2019, 17 months after he left the force; it is still not ‘delivered’ in September, 2019 and remains beset by serious problems.

Screen Shot 2019-09-03 at 17.37.35

What the Shewan LinkedIn profile does not mention is that he is currently employed by a company that he was actively promoting during his time as a serving police officer, Mutual Gain Ltd. Also a strong proponent of the insidious Common Purpose, he has been absent from Twitter since 10th August, 2018. Two days after the scandal broke on regional television and in the local press. He, again, repeats the claim that he ‘delivered’ the £60 million techology programme in his Mutual Gain bio.

At the end of March 2018, GMP had admitted to the local newspaper that the iOPS budget had been exceeded, but refused to say by how much. The budget figure for the overarching IS Transformation Programme was reported to have increased from £60 million to £66 million. The launch date, they said, was ‘several months away’. 10,000 police officers and staff who had already been trained on the new system were asked to do virtual refresher training as a result of the delay. The ‘bugs and defects’ of November, 2017 had now become ‘data quality issues’, according to GMP.

There was little in the way of further news about the long-overdue launch of the new computer systems until late July, 2019. An article in the Manchester Evening News revealed that GMP had gone live earlier that month (on the 9th). It also disclosed a raft of serious problems highlighted by police officer whistle blowers who had contacted the local newspaper (read the article here). The force said the installation was ‘progressing well’ and there was no risks associated with response, front line officers said its failings were ‘catastrophic’ and they were ‘working blind’.

GMP did concede, however, that there were problems associated with the interface with the Crown Prosecution Service: “We have experienced some issues with regards to processing court case files, however we are working around-the-clock with our suppliers to resolve this as a priority. We have appropriate contingency plans in place while this issue is ongoing, to ensure the administration of justice continues”.

This turned out to be another GMP lie, as criminal defence solicitors and police whistleblowers were still coming forward weeks later to say that GMP’s Criminal Justice Unit was in complete meltdown and 90% of case files were either incomplete or not sent to the CPS.

The nature and extent of the iOPS scandal reached a far wider public on 8thAugust, 2019 when a further MEN article, and a seven minute ITV Granada Reports package that led their evening transmission, appeared within a few hours of one another. Central to the TV broadcast was a leaked email sent to all GMP officers from the rank of chief inspector down to constable. It warned of serious safety risks to officers and the public arising from iOPS failures.

They produced a furious response from the force, and in particular the chief constable, Ian Hopkins, which included an extraordinary, public attack on journalist, Matt O’Donoghue, via Twitter. Hopkins followed that up with a formal complaint to his employers, ITV Granada.

The police chief has since had good cause to regret both as he has come under repeated, and well-aimed, fire from the author of this piece, Neil Wilby, the MEN’s Jennifer Williams, an increasing number of police whistleblowers, and a number of politicians and senior public officials in the region. These include, Anne Coffey who believes the new computer system is putting children at risk. A view later endorsed by every Children’s Director across Greater Manchester’s ten boroughs.

Screen Shot 2019-09-04 at 15.03.51

The default position of CC Hopkins, and the GMP press office, has been to consistently downplay the problems with the new system and infer that the very many police officers who have contacted journalists and whistleblowers, to air their concerns, are either at fault with their own lack of understanding of the new system or are disgruntled trouble causers. In the meantime, the local newspaper published seven articles on the iOPS topic within one month, some of them lengthy and highly forensic. The latest, and most wordy, that summarises most of the matters in issue, can be read in full here.

What was revealed, however, in the course of the tense exchanges between the press and police was that the force conceded that the latest budget figure for the IS Transformation Programme was now £71.2 million. The uplift from £60 million, then £66 million is, as yet, unexplained. The force has also, at the same time, retreated from its position in March, 2018, when they said that the iOPS part of the transformation had exceeded its £27 million budget, and have now repeated several times that it is still within the original budget. Again, that is unexplained.

Insiders have reported that the current overall figure is nearer £77 million than 71, and that the force, in keeping with the overall media strategy, is downplaying the budget over-run.

Towards the end of August, 2019 support for iOPS and Chief Constable Hopkins appeared on social media for the first time, during a period notable only for the complete absence of any mention of the iOPS system on any of the many hundreds of authorised GMP Twitter accounts. A civilian communications officer turned iOPS trainer, Stephen Blades, began attacking the most notable critics of the failed computer system: Journalist Neil Wilby, and police whistleblowers that included Peter Jackson and Scott Winters. Hiding behind the Twitter handle of @TheGourmetGays he derided its critics, and in the case of the latter two, falsely accuses them of being homophobes.

Blades’ take on the crisis is this: ‘Folk [police officer users of iOPS] haven’t got a clue, because they refuse change, refuse to learn, refuse to embrace something that replaced a 25 year old system and basically now feel inadequate. But they also refuse to get more training. It’s that simple’.

On iOPS itself, he is equally emphatic: ‘It’s effective, it’s stable, it works and it ain’t going away. As a Command and Control system it’s phenomenal’.

Given the strident nature of his social media commentary, and his assertion in other tweets that he has worked on the system every day since 2017, some merit has to be attached to Stephen Blades’ current, and very public, estimate of the total cost of the IS Transformation Programme: £80 million.

Blades LinkedIn

What is not explained by Blades in his permanently aggressive Twitter output is how he made the transition from call handler, at the very bottom of the GMP food chain, to being responsible for training 3,000 officers. Especially, as he doesn’t know the difference between ‘learning’ and ‘teaching’.

It might also provide an explanation as to why the quality of the iOPS training, and its delivery, is one of the recurring criticisms of a system that the Police Federation, representing 6,000 warranted police men and women, say is a risk to the safety of all their officers and members of the public.

This is a certainly a story with plenty of mileage left in it. It will be interesting to see whether Chief Constable Hopkins (and Mr Blades) is there to see the end of the journey.

Just as interesting is the prospect of a forensic inspection of the estimates, and actual costs, of the technology transformation. How can a £30 million project in 2013 become an £80 million (and rising) project in 2019, a rise of over £8 million per year?

The man who signs the cheques, Mayor Andy Burnham, cannot say he wasn’t warned of the impending disaster. On 6th August, 2018 three whistle blowers met him at Churchgate House, Manchester and iOPS was one of a number of scandals that serving officer Paul Bailey, and retired officers Peter Jackson and Maggie Oliver highlighted. Burnham has since, after a long delay, contemptuously brushed away the many GMP failings (read more here).

He, too, may not see the end of this particular road as he attempts to explain away his failings to voters in the Mayoral election in May 2020.

The press office at GMP has been asked to confirm the latest budgets for (i) the overarching IS Transformation Programme (ii) the iOPS element of that programme (iii) the mobile device roll-out (iv) the virtualisation of the force’s data stores.

Right of reply has been offered to Stephen Blades and Garry Shewan.

Page last updated: Thursday 5th September, 2019 at 1355 hours

Photo Credits: Capita Secure Information Solutions Ltd and Greater Manchester Police

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

Right of reply: If you are mentioned in this article and disagree with it, please let me have your comments. Provided your response is not defamatory it will be added to the article.

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

Disabled protesters unpick litany of lies

When it comes to calculated deception, witch-hunts and cover-ups, Greater Manchester Police (GMP) are generally in the vanguard of police forces in the UK.

A recent article on this website, ‘Scandals that shame the two-faced Mayor of Manchester’ (read in full here), highlights a significant number of them, grounded in protected disclosures by the country’s best known police whistle blower, Peter Jackson.

At the foot of that article there was reference to another GMP scandal involving surveillance of disabled protesters and the passing of data to the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP).

What has come to light since is truly shocking: GMP has admitted that it has a written agreement to share information with the DWP about disabled persons, and other activists, who take part in protests. This revelation came about despite previous denials by both the police force, and the Government’s permanently under-siege Department, that any such agreement existed.

In December, 2018, the DWP told The Independent on-line newspaper that there was “no formal arrangement” between their Department and “any police force” that encouraged officers to pass on information.

Their spokesperson said, at that time, that the DWP “could not discuss the details of any on-going cases or provide further details”. In the light of what GMP are now saying either they, or the DWP, are not telling the truth.

In a recent article published by the Disability News Service (DNS), written by John Pring, the Greater Manchester Coalition of Disabled People (GMCDP) said it was “extremely concerned” that its local police force was “spying on disabled protesters and passing on their details onto the DWP”. GMCDP said the agreement was “yet another example of the punitive and unwarranted targeting of disabled people”.

Concerns about links between DWP and police forces such as GMP – and the impact on disabled people’s right to protest – first emerged last December after DNS reported that forces had been targeting disabled protesters taking part in peaceful anti-fracking protests across England.

The Independent piece had also set out how neighbouring Lancashire Police had admitted passing on details, and video footage, of disabled anti-fracking protesters to the Department for Work and Pensions.

“The DWP are a partner agency and where we have information to suggest that fraud may be being committed we have a duty to pass that on, including video footage if we have it,” a spokesperson for Lancashire Police said in a statement.

“They are the appropriate agency and it is their decision what, if any, action should be taken. We will, of course, facilitate the right of anyone to protest lawfully.”

Police officers supervising protests at the Cuadrilla shale gas (fracking) site at Preston New Road, near Blackpool, claimed they became suspicious of some disabled protesters who temporarily got out of wheelchairs.

In response to their enquiries late last year and earlier this year, GMP told DNS that it had passed to the DWP information about protesters taking part in anti-fracking protests at Barton Moss, Salford. These took place in 2013 and 2014. GMP were regularly criticised over their heavy-handed approach to protesters. The force also confirmed that it had shared information with DWP from protests not connected with shale gas extraction.

This disclosure raised further concerns that GMP might have passed information to the DWP about disabled persons who protested in Manchester about the government’s austerity-related social security reforms, particularly during high-profile actions around the Conservative Party conferences held in the city in 2015 and 2017. GMP later claimed that it had not shared any information with DWP about disabled activists who had taken part in those particular protests. The heavy-handed approach of the city’s police force towards protesters was also widely reported on social media.

It is a matter of considerable concern that GMP has previously denied, in response to a freedom of information request, having a written agreement to share data with DWP. The resort to deceit, on an almost routine basis, by this police force has been well rehearsed elsewhere. Whilst their permanent approach to the Freedom of Information Act (and Data Protection Act) is utterly deplorable. A matter upon which the author of this piece can report with absolute certainty.

As referred to above, the DWP has said that it has no such “formal arrangement” with “any police force”. GMP’s press office had initially suggested that it did have an agreement with DWP, before later denying there was one.

Greater Manchester’s beleaguered Deputy Mayor for Policing, Bev Hughes, told DNS in February this year that she had “consulted with senior officers within GMP, who have assured me that there is no formal ‘sharing agreement’ in place, and that the police act on a case by case basis, sharing information in accordance with the Data Protection Act”.

The Deputy Mayor has legal proximity to one police officer within GMP, the chief constable Ian Hopkins: Whose approach to the truth can safely be described as haphazard. Not least, over another emerging scandal involving the catastrophic failings of GMP’s Integrated Policing Operations System (better known as iOPS).

But, after DNS submitted a second freedom of information request to the force, a member of its information management team confirmed that there was such an agreement. Asked if GMP had an agreement to share information from various protests with DWP, he said he had “located a multi-agency agreement to which DWP are one of many partners”, but he said this had “not yet been assessed for disclosure to you”.

He added that most of the agreement “relates to controls/rules partners must adhere to when handling information”.

The disclosure officer later told DNS, on 17th April, 2019 that he had “identified the area of the force that is responsible for the sharing agreement” and had “posed your question to them, and am awaiting a reply”.

The force, as they so often seem to do, then failed to respond to further emails – which placed them in breach of the Freedom of Information Act – until late July, 2019 when a member of GMP’s information management team said he would “risk assess the agreement next week for disclosure” to DNS.

At the same time, the force’s press office refused to comment or explain why it had previously claimed there was no such agreement.

A disclosure request by information rights activist, Edward Williams, is visible, via open source. It is lawfully due for finalisation on 27thAugust, 2019 (follow its progress on the What Do They Know website here).

  1. Provide the written agreement with GMP to share information about disabled people and other activists who take part in protests.
  2. How many people has GMP provided information about under the agreement?
  3. State the protests or other events where information was gathered and sent to you in last 12 months. By this, I mean the place the event happened, and the date(s).

This may well duplicate some or, indeed, all of the request already made by the DNS, as part of their persistent, determined and highly commendable investigation. It is unlikely that Mr Williams will receive information before the end of this year: As yet, the information request has not even been acknowledged by the force.

Network for Police Monitoring (Netpol) coordinator, Kevin Blowe, pulled no punches as he told on-line, independent news magazine, The Canary:

“The police decision to collaborate with the DWP is about disrupting people’s ability to take part in protest and campaigns. It’s a perfect example of this type of disruption. It’s bad enough that the DWP already humiliates people who claim benefits. But if it’s going to go out of its way to find ways to stop people’s benefits – if they exercise what is supposed to be a fundamental human right – then I can see why people would be reluctant to potentially participate in something that may have a really terrible effect on their life.

Blowe continued: “This is a really worrying development, that I think is entirely vindictive. The suggestion that anyone who… takes part in protest if they’re disabled is likely to be committing fraud – which is what’s implied by the police getting involved in this – is about trying to make sure that the effectiveness of protest is undermined”.

Nationally known whistle blower, and retired murder detective, Peter Jackson, offers this view of his former force: “I have recently written to the Greater Manchester Mayor highlighting a large number of scandals concerning the leadership of GMP. This is a police force that is repeatedly gaining media attention for all the wrong reasons. Serious operational failings, senior officer misconduct, lies, cover-ups, deceit: Scandal after scandal. I was proud to have completed 31 years service with the force where my focus was on crime, locking up criminals and keeping people safe. Spying on disabled protesters, and reporting them to the DWP, was not what we were about during my time. I blame the leadership. GMP urgently needs a clear-out at the top, starting with the chief constable. We need proper ‘coppers’ in charge, inspirational leaders who command respect. People who can bring about changes to the embedded rotten cultures that now infest the force. We need openness, honesty, integrity and transparency. We need someone who can inspire their officers and restore confidence in policing. Sadly, for a number of years now GMP has had shockingly bad leadership and it is a broken force, failing the people of Manchester.’

Neil Wilby concludes: It is time for change, the Chief Constable is hanging on to his job by a thread, as droves of his own frontline officers lose confidence in him, and there is little or no oversight from those elected to provide it. Notably, the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Greater Manchester. The region must also have the most supine group of MP’s in the country.

Page last updated: Wednesday 21st August, 2019 at 1005 hours

Photo Credit: Disabled News Service

Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.

Right of reply: If you are mentioned in this article and disagree with it, please let me have your comments. Provided your response is not defamatory it will be added to the article.

© Neil Wilby 2015-2019. Unauthorised use, or reproduction, of the material contained in this article, without permission from the author, is strictly prohibited. Extracts from, and links to, the article (or blog) may be used, provided that credit is given to Neil Wilby, with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

 

 

 

 

Catalogue of policing scandals that shame the two-faced Mayor of Manchester

On 6th August 2018, two retired Manchester police officers, Peter Jackson and Maggie Oliver, and one serving officer, Paul Bailey, met with the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham and the Deputy Mayor, Beverley Hughes. Also present in the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) HQ were Deputy Director of Policing, Clare Monaghan and policy adviser, Kevin Lee.

The purpose of the meeting was for the police officers, past and present, to provide extensive disclosures of alleged wrongdoing by the senior leadership team of Greater Manchester Police. Most of those disclosures either directly concerned the chief constable, Ian Hopkins, or could be tracked back to him via vicarious liability or his role as a very much hands-on, directing mind.

When that meeting was eventually brought, after thirteen months of prevarication by the Mayor, he told the whistleblowers that he ‘only had an hour’. He was asked by Peter Jackson, in that moment, if he could quote the Mayor’s position as: ‘You only had an hour to discuss the rape and abuse of kids, the deaths of police officers, the deaths of members of the public, a corrupt police command team etc…’. The response of Andy Burnham was: “No, no no, this is just the first meeting, the first of many”.

But Jackson had formed the distinct view that all Burnham wanted to do, at that time, was to escape the room, escape the meeting, escape the challenges of the three whistleblowers. He really didn’t want to hear what they were saying and, of course, there has been no further meetings between Mayoral team and the whistleblowers, no further discussions. Not an email, a phone call. Nothing.

Beverley Hughes, a long term political crony of Burnham, was upbraided during the meeting, and afterwards, over face-pulling, negative body language and generally dismissive attitude. Kevin Lee played on his phone virtually throughout. Abuse victims and bereaved families will be horrified to hear of such grotesque conduct by those charged with safeguarding them and their loved ones. For his part, Burnham never once challenged their behaviour. Which is a measure of how weak he is behind the public-facing bravado.

Another is the fact that it took Burnham almost nine months before he finally responded to the very serious issues raised in that meeting. Despite, during that time, repeated email requests from the whistleblowers asking what action was being taken over the large amount of information passed over and the numerous ancillary issues raised in the arbitrarily allocated time of one hour.

Peter Jackson has this opening message to the Mayor: “It is clear that you have no desire to properly investigate the whistleblower complaints about GMP’s chief constable, and other senior officers, and no desire to hold him to account for the many scandals and failings that we have brought to your attention. These either directly relate to him, or have occurred in Greater Manchester Police on his ‘watch’.

“How can you defend your actions when myself, Maggie, Paul [and Scott Winters] are all such credible witnesses? We have over 100 years of exemplary police service in GMP between us. We have unrivalled insight into what goes on in GMP, gained from our first hand experiences, from our extensive networks of friends, colleagues and acquaintances built up over all those years. We have information sources that go to every corner and every level of the organisation, yet you are very keen to discount and ignore what we say.

“Maggie [Oliver] is one of the country’s best known whistleblowers; the driving force behind the BBC’s real-life drama series ‘Three Girls‘ and BBC documentary ‘The Betrayed Girls‘. Referred to as emotionally unstable by Sir Peter Fahy when she was a serving officer trying to expose the ‘grooming gangs’ scandal, her character besmirched by his colleagues and, yet, despite that smearing, which continues to present day, she is now a nationally respected voice on child sexual exploitation. Along with Sarah Champion MP and abuse survivors’ advocate, Sammy Woodhouse, she is, arguably, one of the most influential persons in the UK in putting the scandal of Pakistani grooming gangs firmly on the political agenda.

“Paul, a highly experienced serious crime career detective and now in his 30th year of service, was for many years the Chair of GMP’s Black and Asian Police Association (BAPA) and is, again, a nationally respected figure in that role.

“I completed 31 years’ service in GMP, was a senior officer and Head of GMP’s Major Incident Team.

“We are not alone; we are aware of many others who have complained to you about what is going on in GMP. We, personally, have provided you with extensive information and evidence about factual events and yet you treat us with utter disdain. Why is that? Is it that you and the Deputy Mayor are too close to Ian Hopkins?

“I count at least 21 different issues, or what I would describe as 21 scandals, that you catalogue within your response letter. All factual incidents that relate to serious failings and serious misconduct. All that have occurred under the watch of the present chief constable.

“The [alleged] lies, the deceit, the cover ups. the endemic senior officer misconduct, the fact that assistant chief constable after assistant chief constable [Steven Heywood, Rebekah Sutcliffe, Terry Sweeney] has left the force in disgrace, should surely raise serious questions about the present state of Greater Manchester Police, the leadership of the chief constable and the infected culture that cascades down from the top of the force through to the federated ranks. Another, Garry Shewan, did a ‘moonlight flit’ when the sky fell in on the catastrophic Integrated Operational Policing System (iOPS) technology project. Now set to be one of the biggest policing scandals in recent times after featuring as lead story on ITV Granada Reports (view 7 minute clip here).

“Please be assured that myself, Maggie and Paul, assisted by other whistleblowers and former and serving officers, will continue to hold you, Beverley Hughes and Clare Monaghan to account for dereliction in your duties, in failing to hold the chief constable to account”.

Devastating though it is, the statement of Peter Jackson, as one might expect of a renowned murder detective, is carefully and fully documented. The Mayor’s office, by contrast, is becoming notorious for its haphazard record-keeping and absence from its sparsely-populated website of specified information that should be published under the applicable elected policing body regulations. The office is a shambles at every level visible to either the public, or through the keener eye of an investigative journalist.

This is the genuinely shocking catalogue of scandals that were highlighted by the whistleblowers, and contemptuously dismissed by Andy Burnham, in his much delayed response dated 18th April, 2019. The citizens of Greater Manchester, who fund their regional police force, and the wider public with even a passing interest in the safety and security of those close to them, can now judge whether the train and tram-obsessed Burnham is discharging one of his primary functions as Mayor: To hold the chief constable of the region’s police force to account – effectively, efficiently and with the necessary level of rigour.

1. Operation Poppy – an IPCC (now IOPC) investigation into Peter Jackson’s whistle blower disclosures.

(i) Operation Nixon

A senior GMP officer, Dominic Scally, allowed a dangerous violent paedophile to take a child into a house, and remain there for over two hours, whilst under police surveillance, and stopped his officers from safeguarding the child. Officers under Scally’s command were outraged. GMP PSB, directed by senior leaders, took no disciplinary action against him.

At the conclusion of the IPCC investigation, Peter Jackson met with Sarah Green, the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, as she was then. He saw her face glow red with embarrassment when he asked searching, but perfectly fair, questions over the outcome she had signed off. He asked, “Would it have been gross misconduct if it had been your son? Would it have been gross misconduct if the paedophile had killed the child whilst police watched?”.  Jackson reports that she couldn’t wait to get out of the room and end the meeting. In much the way that Andy Burnham closed down the whistleblower meeting at GMCA.

(ii) Dale Cregan and the deaths of PC’s Fiona Bone and Nicola Hughes

That same officer, Dominic Scally, who had little, if any, homicide investigation experience, and in full knowledge of his failings on Op Nixon, was placed by GMP Command in charge of the Mark Short murder (Dale Cregan case). Jackson, a very experienced and efficient murder detective, warned at the time that such actions were placing the public and officers at risk. Whilst Scally was leading that investigation, Short’s father and two police officers were murdered. Jackson highlighted the numerous failings in that investigation. He now asks: “Does that not require review, or judicial inquiry, especially given the utterly damning Grainger public inquiry report? Especially, given that two young, female police officers lost their lives? Very arguably, preventable deaths?”

(iii) North West Counter Terrorism Unit

Scally was promoted to Head of Intelligence in the North West Counter Terrorism Unit and in February and March 2017, Jackson raised concerns with Chief Constable Hopkins via emails, about his ability and others in Command of the NWCTU to keep the people of Manchester safe. Within two months Manchester Arena was suicide bombed. A coincidence? Did Jackson have a crystal ball? Was Salman Ramadan Abedi a GMP covert human intelligence source (CHIS) or registered informant, as some informed sources suggest?

ACC Rebekah Sutcliffe and ACC Steve Heywood were the two consecutive Heads of the NWCTU, and both left GMP in shame amidst nationally-known scandal. ACC Heywood the subject of humiliating criticism over Grainger, astonishingly avoided prosecution and yet to face a much-delayed gross misconduct hearing. GMP has primacy for the NWCTU. The problems and scandals that have infested GMP Command have consequently led to dysfunctional leadership in the NWCTU and at what cost? Bearing in mind what the Mayor now knows about his antecedents, the issue of whether Dominic Scally was an appropriate appointment to head up the NWCTU intelligence function is a matter of high public concern. Particularly, given what has followed.

Everything about Operation Nixon, the Cregan investigation and subsequent NWCTU promotions was flawed and, yet, since the Mayor/whistlebower meeting in August, 2018, Scally has, incredibly, been promoted again. He now heads up the NWCTU under the overall command of his long-term ally and supporter, Russ Jackson, a senior officer who had not attained the substantive rank of ACC at the time of his own promotion, and who has failed at the Senior Police National Assessment Centre twice, where necessary competencies are Serving the Public. • Leading Strategic Change. • Leading the Workforce. • Managing Performance. • Professionalism. • Decision Making. • Working with Others. In which of these is Russ Jackson (no relation to Peter) deficient according to PNAC? Can public confidence be maintained in these circumstances, given the legacy issues from the previous NWCTU leadership?

(iv) Shipman body parts scandal

Senior police officers secretly disposed of body parts without consulting the victim’s families in the face of strong objections of the Force Coronial Officer at the time. His protestations were ignored. He was present at a meeting when questions were raised about how they might deal with future requests under the Freedom of Information Act, which could reveal what they had done.  The same Coronial Officer witnessed Simon Barraclough, recent recipient of the Queens Police Medal, suggest that all documentation be burned to stop people finding out what had happened.

“Another shocking example of GMP operating in an unethical, unprofessional and unlawful way; a secretive manner, covering up their actions. Their motives? To avoid negative publicity, reputational damage and, most importantly, avoid damage to their own careers”, says Peter Jackson.

(v) Unauthorised bugging of police premises and Operation Oakland armed robbery incident.

A senior officer at the rank of temporary superintendent, Julian Snowball, bought covert recording equipment via the internet, then (unlawfully) repeatedly entered the office of his Divisional Commander in Wigan, C/Supt Shaun Donnellan, and the office of another senior leadership team member, DCI Howard Millington, and inserted covert surveillance equipment, subsequently and secretly recording months of private conversations.

This behaviour clearly constituted gross misconduct. The ‘spy’ was, however, a crony of ACC Terry Sweeney. Snowball had admitted to Peter Jackson that he was ‘one of Terry’s boys’, treated very favourably as a result and kept his job in the police. The disciplinary investigation was irregular. The outcome was only a written warning, followed by a posting to a detective position he coveted, close to his home.

T/Supt Snowball had almost no front line detective experience, yet was placed as the most senior detective at Stockport. He subsequently headed up a policing operation, codenamed Oakland, where he allowed violent armed robbers to commit an attack on licensed premises that were under police surveillance at the time, and where he stopped his officers intervening to ‘protect the victims’. Snowball also unlawfully changed details on a warrant after it had been granted. This officer was allowed to take a career break without facing disciplinary action, until the whistleblowing disclosures were made to the IPCC.

As rehearsed earlier, Jackson met with the IPCC Deputy Chair Sarah Green at the conclusion of the Poppy investigations. On this particular topic he asked her, “Would it have been gross misconduct if the armed robbers had killed someone in the pub whilst the police watched?”

“As with the Op Nixon questions, I saw her face colour bright red. She didn’t answer the question”.

The IPCC returned the bugging incident disclosures to GMP and, Jackson asserts, didn’t complete their gross misconduct investigation.

In his April, 2018 letter dismissing the disclosures of the whistleblowers, Mayor Burnham relies on the thoroughness of the IPCC investigation to give GMP a clean bill of health regarding the bugging and armed robbery incidents. Yet appears to have forgotten that he was a ferocious critic of the same IPCC over their Orgreave investigation, carried out in much the same timeframe (read more here). Burnham also overlooks the fact that Jackson was the whistleblower, a very experienced and highly regarded murder detective, and is a first hand witness.

Conversely and perversely, the IPCC deployed inexperienced and unimpressive officers with no recognised detective credentials (PIP1 or PIP2). As one might expect, Peter Jackson takes this unvarnished view: “As an organisation, they do not know how to secure evidence, or how to investigate senior police officers impartially. They act with deference to them. The IPCC’s Senior Investigating Officer was Dan Budge, taking over from a deputy position whilst the original SIO was on sick leave. He was a very inexperienced investigator who had to admit to me he had never prepared a criminal case file, or even been to court. Many colleagues reported back to me about being interviewed by very young, new to the IPCC, investigators. One witness, a very experienced DCI, told me he actually had to show the IPCC investigator how to take a witness statement.

There is in existence, of course, as now revealed in a front page article in The Times newspaper, a tape recording of Chief Constable Ian Hopkins, at a meeting with other senior GMP officers, saying he thought the IPCC were ‘abysmal and incapable of conducting a thorough investigation’ yet ironically both Burnham and Hopkins now rely heavily, and frequently, on ‘the IPCC have conducted a thorough investigation’ to defend themselves and the failings of other members of the GMP Command Team.

Irrespective of the well catalogued and wider inadequacies of the IPCC (now IOPC), the incidents they investigated still happened. Reflecting badly, and bringing shame and substantial reputational damage onto both Greater Manchester Police, the Mayor’s office and the wider police service.

2. The questionable purchase of ACC Heywood’s house by the Police and Crime Commissioner.

The background to this complaint is the purchase of Steven Heywood’s house on the perceived threat that a small-time criminal, who went on to murder two police officers, was going harm him. The whistle blowers assert, with confidence, that the alleged threat to ACC Heywood’s house was, at its highest, temporary; it only came to light after Cregan was in prison on remand. He was held as a Category A prisoner. When spoken to in prison by psychiatrists, and other specialists, Cregan said he had gone to Bury Police Station to look for ACC Heywood, and to shoot him as he was angry about the harassment and treatment of his family. He had seen Heywood on the news as the figurehead of the investigation. ACC Heywood however had no connection to that station and Cregan soon realised it was a pointless plan. As he had no idea how to find him, he decided ‘just to kill any cops’ instead. That led to the murders of Nicola Hughes and Fiona Bone, following which he handed himself in.

The threat to Heywood had been momentary. It was not a real or present danger at the time of the house sale. The supposed threat was hidden from the purchasers of the house who were, understandably, outraged when they discovered the truth. The expenditure hidden in subsequent police accounts.

The ‘briefing’ relied on by Andy Burnham to exonerate the GMP Command Team, and ex-PCC Tony Lloyd, was provided by those with a clearly vested interest. The actions surrounding the Heywood house purchase would not stand up to the slightest external scrutiny and have not been properly investigated. The superintendent in charge of GMP Covert Policing told the Command Team at the time that, ethically and professionally, they couldn’t do what they were doing with the house sale and purchase. Burnham’s willingness to accept, at face value, anything told, or provided to him, by GMP Command highlights his lack of desire to investigate matters, robustly, independently and thoroughly, to establish the truth and properly hold CC Hopkins to account.

3. Incident involving ACC Rebekah Sutcliffe at the Senior Women in Policing 2016 Conference – ‘Titgate’ or ‘Boobgate’

ACC Sutcliffe was drunk at the event, and bullied, harangued a junior officer over a lengthy period – and then publicly exposed one of her breasts. That is well rehearsed in the public domain. But the extent of her drunkenness, perhaps, less so; she was very highly intoxicated.

It was a national event to highlight and promote the work of senior female officers in policing. Sutcliffe’s actions brought huge negative publicity, discredited the event and brought shame on herself and GMP.

Chief Constable Hopkins was present on the night and saw the increasingly drunken behaviour of his Command Team colleague. He failed to take charge of the incident and, instead, left early, leaving a junior officer to attempt to deal with Sutcliffe.  His failure to take control of the incident, and deal with the matter himself, could be argued as a lack of moral courage and necessary leadership. What cannot be argued against is that his inaction subsequently led to what was very widely reported as the ‘Titgate’ or ‘Boobgate’ incident in the media.

This was in the early hours of Sunday morning, she reported for duty that morning at Police HQ as duty Gold and, of course, Head of NWCTU. She cannot, conceivably, have been fit for duty. Hopkins must have known this by the state she was in. Yet, he did nothing.

Hopkins was, subsequently, made aware of what happened after he left the event – and was going to do nothing at all about the incident. No sanction against Sutcliffe, not even ‘words of advice’ for conduct that, on any independent view, was gross misconduct. He, eventually, had to take action when details of the incident was revealed on several social media platforms, one week later, and picked up from there by alert newspaper reporters.

ACC Sutcliffe should have been dismissed for gross misconduct. The fact that she wasn’t appears to be connected to an investigation carried out on behalf of Hopkins, by Durham Constabulary, that did not, seemingly, go where the evidence should have taken them. Other incidents, at least one where excess alcohol, and abuse of her rank, was a feature at another high profile event, and Sutcliffe had discredited the force. There was no finding by Durham that Hopkins was largely responsible for the escalation of the incident at the women’s policing event, after the point when he should have ordered Sutcliffe off the hotel premises, ensured her access to alcohol was cut off, and denied her access to police premises until she was sober. A point not lost on the Chair of the subsequent disciplinary hearing, Rachael Cernow QC.

After the disciplinary hearing, Hopkins said Sutcliffe was undeployable in GMP and she was subsequently placed into a senior position at Oldham council on secondment, funded by GMP, later taking the job full time on a salary in excess of £120,000. More than she was paid as a police officer.

This ‘rewarding’ of an ACC for gross misconduct is something not lost on the rank and file, and it is why the GMP Command Team are held in such contempt by many of the officers they lead.

The investigation report following the Durham investigation into Sutcliffe has never been published, despite the massive public interest in the matter.

4. Child Sexual Explotation, Operations Augusta and Span, Pakistani Grooming Gangs.

Now one of the most respected commentators and authors on child sexual exploitation, former GMP detective, Maggie Oliver, very recently heard from the Burnham CSE inquiry for the first time in well over a year. She has little confidence in either the Mayor, those involved in it, or the process itself.

She says, with justifiable force: “I spent several hours talking to the Burnham Review team in 2017, and made it crystal clear to them that as the only senior officer still in post who had failed CSE victims in 2004/5, when he was head of GMP Child Protection Unit, I considered that the buck stopped with Steve Heywood – and he should be held accountable.

“Unsurprisingly the Review team chose not to to speak to him about the disclosures I had made and allowed him to retire unchallenged, over a year later. This is a complete disgrace.

Maggie concludes: “Judgement as to what their findings will be is reserved, as I haven’t yet been given sight of the full Review and no date has been given for publication”

The last ‘deadline’ for publication of the Review, emanating from the Mayor’s office, was ‘end of March, 2019’. At the present rate of progress, Spring 2020 looks a reasonable guess. An agonising, and unnecessary wait for victims, witnesses and campaigners.

In Peter Jackson’s disclosures to the IPCC, he alleged that [Name redacted], GMP’s Force Review Officer at the time, had re-written, or was a party to the re-writing of a critical report that reviewed GMP Command’s approach to CSE in Rochdale. It is alleged that process involved nine separate revisions, after the original authors refused to amend their report. The Review Officer’s brief from senior officers was to cover up the criticisms and initial findings, which had reported that GMP had prioritised volume crime over the rape and abuse of children. It has emerged that at least one other senior female officer, [Name redacted] was involved with what might best be termed as historical revisionism.

As Maggie Oliver explains, ACC Heywood was again involved in another dreadful scandal. Interviewed on TV, he denied there was a cultural issue at play in the grooming gangs phenomon.

Jackson has offered to provide, in confidence, details of witnesses to this grotesque ‘cover up’ who can assist the Burnham CSE inquiry. But is still waiting to hear from the Mayor, or the inquiry team, so that the necessary protections can be put in place and arrangements made for an Available Best Evidence (ABE) interview.

5. Inappropriate relationship between ACC and junior officer.

ACC [Redacted] was the senior officer involved in the inappropriate relationship. The other officer involved was Temporary DI [Redacted]. Her husband, [Redacted] was at that time a temporary DCI. He had just failed his promotion assessment in GMP to substantive chief inspector. He kept his own counsel, didn’t create a fuss and then succeeded in gaining a double promotion to Cheshire Police, jumping two ranks to become a detective superintendent. Thus enabling a departure from the Force and avoiding embarrassment all round in the workplace. Ms [Redacted] was promoted to inspector during the currency of her relationship with ACC [Redacted].

The relationship was known to a large number of rank and file GMP officers and, again, contributes to their very negative view of the Command Team. The Mayor was invited to make a short phone call to CC Hopkins to confirm the facts, ask why this situation was tolerated and to enquire into the merits of the promotions, as opposed to their personal, or political, expedience. It appears that, from his written response to the whistleblowers, Andy Burnham has opted not to do so.

6. Complaints referred back to GMP by IPCC rather than be subjected to external scrutiny.

Following earlier whistleblower disclosures to the IPCC (now IOPC), there were several incidents referred back to GMP for investigation, including the cronyism, nepotism and promotion scandals, the Cregan investigation and a Major Incident Team being called out to deal with the domestic incident involving Supt [Name Redacted] (see para 10 below).

Andy Burnham in his assessment of more recent whistleblower disclosures makes no reference to GMP or what actions may, or may not, have taken on these matters. Peter Jackson asserts that Burnham’s willingness ‘to be satisfied’ that matters have been concluded, without any independent investigation or scrutiny, simply highlights his lack of desire to lift the stones and scrutinise the many misconduct, leadership failings and properly hold the chief constable to account.

7. The Metropolitan Police Peer Review of GMP PSB

It is, by now, well rehearsed that Ian Hopkins misled his officers, and the public, by purporting to have commissioned an in-depth investigation into GMP’s Professional Standards Branch by the Metropolitan Police Service. This was in response to numerous complaints and repeated negative media stories about GMP PSB. The so called six-week review consisted of a visit to the Force by four Met officers and was completed within 24 hours.  The senior officer in that group described his role as a ‘critical friend’ of GMP. None of the issues raised about the alleged PSB corruption were investigated or even lightly addressed. Or even discussed in the pre-planning for the visit. The Met involvement was nothing more than a ‘tick in the box’ exercise that Hopkins could point to and say, ‘Well, the Met have been in and scrutinised PSB. They found nothing wrong’.

Journalist Neil Wilby has investigated this scandal via a number of FOI requests and reported extensively on it. Read more here.

Post peer-review, the scandals surrounding GMP PSB and its closely associated Legal Services Department continue, Peter Jackson claims he is a victim, as does DC Paul Bailey, retired Inspector Scott Winters and a host of others. Jackson describes GMP PSB as “the Command Team’s Praetorian Guard, there to protect senior officer reputations, limit reputational damage to the force, cover up and shut down damaging complaints and pursue, vendetta-style, those who seek to challenge and expose failings within the force”.

8. Operation Holly

Holly was a five year investigation into money laundering, and a serious organised crime group which included one of Manchester’s most infamous criminals, the now deceased Paul Massey. ‘Mr Salford’, as Massey was known, was murdered by a hitman from a rival gang. A strong evidential case had been built up during that period. Numerous reports, and specific allegations, of senior GMP officer corruption were also received by detectives during the investigation. The money laundering against the serious criminals was, subsequently, dropped and no charges were brought. All the detectives involved on the case were outraged by the senior management decision to abandon the investigation and prosecution.

The total costs of the investigation are estimated at £10 million. Peter Jackson knows all the officers on the case. It is common knowledge amongst those officers that the case was dropped because the prosecuting counsel had informed GMP Command Team that the case could not proceed unless all the corruption allegations were fully investigated. GMP Command chose to drop the case, rather than investigate the allegations against its own officers. This, by necessity, would have involved another force or the National Crime Agency.

The Times newspaper has reported on this matter, extensively, and called for an independent inquiry into GMP. (Read more here). Despite very serious corruption allegations being received against senior police officers, the Mayor and his Deputy allowed GMP to investigate itself which rode against the Police Reform Act and Statutory Guidance (and natural justice). The investigation was only requested by Burnham and Hughes after Jackson had raised the issue and The Times had reported on the case.

Jackson concludes: “You (Burnham) repeatedly rely on briefings by the chief constable, and investigations into itself by GMP, to give the force a clean bill of health. Such actions clearly lack integrity or transparency and are, quite frankly, shameful”.

9. Incident during DC Paul Bailey Employment Tribunal proceedings involving alleged malpractice by a GMP lawyer

Peter Jackson was contacted by a witness who asserted that a GMP solicitor [Name redacted] sought to have the Senior Investigating Officer in Operation Holly make a false statement about Detective Constable Paul Bailey in support of GMP’s defence at an Employment Tribunal Hearing brought by the serious crimes detective.

DC Bailey was present when the whistleblowers met the Mayoral entourage in August, 2018. In the months that followed the meeting, not one single member of  Burnham’s team, or the Mayor himself, made any further contact, sought to conduct any further enquiries or launched an investigation into this matter. This is not an isolated incident. says Jackson: “Several others have raised similar issues with you (Burnham) concerning alleged criminal conduct, or alleged gross misconduct, involving GMP PSB and/or Legal Services”.

In Burnham’s response letter, eight months after the only meeting with the whistleblowers, he says he will take appropriate action if the name of the witness is supplied. He offers no protection for the witness, or explanation as to how his/her anonymity would be preserved, fails to disclose whether a severity assessment has been conducted, does not reveal how the matter would be investigated and, particularly, if this would be another police force, statutory body, or member of the Bar or judiciary, rather than GMP, leading it.

The actions, or rather inaction, of Burnham and weak, defensive response to the entirety of the Jackson whistleblower disclosures, and those of others, have engendered genuine mistrust. The perceived closeness of his relationship with the chief constable, and lack of desire to thoroughly investigate the Force does nothing to undermine that proposition. The whistleblowers say, perfectly reasonably, that they need concrete assurances before putting their witness at risk of reprisals from the GMP Command Team.

10. Major Incident Team attending domestic dispute between Superintendent and wife

A Major Incident Team was deployed to deal with a domestic incident involving Superintendent [Name Redacted] and his wife. The domestic argument arose around the allegedly prolific extra-marital sexual activity of the senior officer, involved threats from his wife to go to the media, a scratch on Mr [Name redacted]’s finger, the arrest of his wife for common assault and the search of her home address. The MIT Team was deployed at the request of senior officers. Peter Jackson has spoken to the elite officers who were turned out on the night and, as a result, has extensive knowledge of the incident.

Jackson says: “Why wasn’t this incident dealt with by neighbourhood police? Why was a murder team turned out? How could a search of premises be justified? Who authorised the arrest of the wife? Which senior officers were involved? I know; the ones who run as a thread throughout my disclosures. It is an abuse of powers and authority. A grotesque misuse of police resources”.

“This incident provides yet another window into the broken and rotten cultures at play in GMP. The secrecy, cover ups, lies. The cronyism, the cliques, the misconduct. the wrongdoing. The two-tier system of response from the Professional Standards Branch: Those well connected are treated favourably, wrongdoing overlooked, their actions minimised, examples include Rob Potts, Dominic Scally, Julian Snowball, [Officer involved in DV incident – Name Redacted]. Whereas those not in cliques, not well connected, or who have invoked the wrath of Command are dealt with disproportionately. Examples include John Buttress, Mo Razaq, Rick Pendlebury (both high profile with mass media coverage), Paul Bailey, Scott Winters, Clara Williams, Maria Donaldson, Lee Bruckshaw and myself”.

“Chief Constable Ian Hopkins is well aware of all these matters and I also provided this same information to the IPCC. They returned it to GMP to investigate themselves.

“What has happened since? Nothing”.

11. GMP Professional Standards Branch (PSB) – Group think, toxic, defensive culture.

Over the past few years, there has been many negative news stories and TV broadcasts featuring the troubled and widely derogated PSB. Alleged witch-hunts against such as Chief Inspector John Buttress, Inspector Mo Razaq, Sergeant Rick Pendlebury, Chief Inspector Clara Williams, Chief Superintendent Lee Bruckshaw, Chief Inspector Maria Donaldson, Detective Inspector Andy Aston, Detective Constable Paul Bailey, Inspector Scott Winters, Inspector Laura Escott, Superintendent Jane Little and, of course, Peter Jackson, to name but a few, have also sapped morale within the force and public confidence in those running it.

For example, the grotesquely disproportionate response, expenditure and resources deployed over the John Buttress case, on any independent view, was an outrage. Especially when other misadventures, many much more serious, are deliberately minimised, or dispensed with, by the same PSB. It spawned a BBC Inside Out programme, produced by Neil Morrow and presented by the late and much lamented Dianne Oxberry, and Judith Moritz, that embarassed and enraged the Command Team (view programme here), as did a similarly explosive BBC File on 4 broadcast, extraordinarily titled “Bent Cops”.

Similarly, the resources and seemingly bottomless public funds deployed against Rick Pendlebury was another outrage. Operation Ratio spawned numerous employment tribunals all of which GMP lost. against the investigators and investigated. Jackson asks with considerable and justifiable force; “How much has it cost in legal fees defending the claims and in damages paid out? How much did the Op Ratio investigation cost? This case is a scandal. All for a £25 shoplifting incident. How many hundreds of thousands or millions of pounds has Op Ratio cost? As clear an example of a vexatious, obsessive, oppressive response, from within a police force, as you would find. Accompanied, of course, by reckless spending of huge sums of public money”.

Concerns over Paul Bailey’s case is referenced above at para 10, and recent disclosures by Scott Winters, to the IOPC, are alarming. With PSB officers, aided and abetted by senior officers and legal services, prepared to falsify and/or delete records in order to advance their case in tribunal proceedings, or subsequently seek to defend those actions when later challenged. Yet another case that warrants an urgent independent criminal investigation.

12. Victimisation of Peter Jackson as a police whistleblower

Peter Jackson has this to say about his own experiences:

“I suffered victimisation, was investigated by PSB and secretly referred to the IOPC for my involvement in detecting the perpetrator who assaulted, and nearly killed, my son in Manchester city centre. Did my actions warrant disciplinary investigation, and referral to the IPCC (now IOPC), simply because I expressed my disappointment at having to find evidence myself to identify the serial violent criminal, following a neglectful police investigation.

“Complaints about my treatment following my son’s assault were whitewashed by GMP PSB.

“The adverse referral to the IPCC was uncovered inadvertently, via a data subject access request surrounding my whistleblowing, This contrasts sharply with many other much more serious misconduct, or criminality, that is not referred to the watchdog. Even when there is a mandatory requirement to do so.

“What I allege to be subsequent victimisation and constructive dismissal, at the hands of Russ Jackson, Rebekah Sutcliffe, Ian Pilling and Ian Hopkins, is now the subject of Employment Tribunal proceedings against GMP. The listing of the hearing of the claim has now been delayed until April 2020, almost three years after it was lodged. GMP Command having employed their usual obstructive, underhand and delaying tactics, for the past two years, using the public purse as a bottomless pit.

“And what of the serious consequences for the high-profile Operation Leopard investigation which I had been leading at the time? The negative impact my treatment, and departure from the investigation, had on bringing the leaders of two of Manchester’s most dangerous and violent organised crime groups to justice?

“I had made a major breakthrough, as reported in the media (read more here), arresting the leader of the notorious Salford A Team, equipped with a loaded firearm, and stopping him killing the leader of the rival Anti A Team. Both major targets for GMP. The case against Stephen Britton, who was caught red handed, was dropped after my premature departure from the force.

13. Morale and staff survey

Peter Jackson was ‘tipped off’, by one of his many reliable sources within the force, about a visit to the Mayor’s office by Ian Hopkins, and a Professor from Durham University, with the results of a GMP staff survey the chief constable had commissioned. The survey was weighted towards new recruits, excited at joining the police and with few, if any, negative experiences of ‘the job’ in their early months of service. It gave Hopkins and the Command Team the results they wanted. An improving picture of morale.

“It doesn’t reflect the true landscape and the contempt in which the Command Team are held by many rank and file officers”, says Jackson. “A picture those longer in service have gleaned from seeing repeated senior officer misconduct and misapplication of resources”.

“For example, ACC Sutcliffe exposed for ‘Titgate’, keeping her job despite being found guilty of gross misconduct, then being rewarded with a better paid job at Oldham Council.

“ACC Heywood ‘retiring’ after being exposed lying, and altering his policy book post-incident, in the Grainger public inquiry. The subject of damning criticism by Judge Teague in his recently released Inquiry report. Heywood went on sick leave the day after he gave evidence at the Inquiry, and never returned to work, costing the taxpayer a six figure sum.

“He was portfolio holder of NWCTU. The force has refused to say who was in charge in Heywood’s absence, at home drawing full salary, when the Manchester Arena was bombed two months later

“ACC Sweeney also receiving damning criticism. having left the Force in shame after the Shipman revelations

“Experienced officers, longer in service, being fully aware of the many integrity questions around the PSB, all the adverse findings at ETs, all the operational failings, are sickened by these scandals. By contrast, new recruits are wide eyed learning the job. They are almost completely unaware of any of the scandals. The survey that Hopkins, and now Andy Burnham, relies upon does not reflect an accurate picture and would not stand the slightest scrutiny.

“Another glaring example of how easily Burnham is hoodwinked by the very officer he is charged with holding to account” Jackson concludes, and not without justification. The Mayor looks, increasingly, as though he is as easily schooled as a fourth form pupil taking lessons from the headmaster. When the roles should, actually, be in reverse. Burnham appears to have forgotten that he has the power to hire and fire chief constables, not constantly suck up to the sub-standard one presently deployed in the Greater Manchester region.

14. Local Policing Review

This new policing model saw the introduction of a different shift pattern; changes to the  neighbourhood team model; the dismantling of the well-established, effective and efficient main office CID [Criminal Investigation Department] function; detectives working with PCSOs; frontline patrol officers reduced to a small number of response officers.

Yet, Andy Burnham claims, in his April, 2019 response to the whistleblowers’ meeting, that he has no knowledge of the Local Policing Review issues and needs evidence of its alleged failings. This recent article in his local newspaper might give the hapless Mayor some clues (read more here)? The headline is a give away: “Has Greater Manchester gone soft on crime?”. The reporter centres on how criminals are ‘laughing’ at the police and victims of crime virtually abandoned, even those with compelling evidence, often gathered themselves in the absence of any investigative support from GMP.

The response of the force within that article, by Superintendent Andy Sidebotham, is by way of an obvious untruth about the availabilty, delivery of evidence in a specific case concerning a £10,000 caravan theft. Filmed in its entirety by the victim’s own CCTV and published on the newspaper’s own website just four days after the incident. Weeks later, Sidebotham claims that none of the three emails sent to the force by the victim, and bearing the CCTV file, had been received and, presumably, no-one in GMP’s Salford Division reads the Manchester Evening News.

Peter Jackson expresses his incredulity over Burnham’s response to the LPR crisis: “Surely as Mayor, and surely your Deputy, statutorily charged with setting the policing plan and budget, are fully aware of the Local Policing Review? A model that has been an unmitigated disaster and I simply cannot believe you have not been briefed on its failings by the chief constable in your regular meetings”.

He continues: “Over the years I saw lots of unnecessary changes brought to GMP, with many millions of pounds wasted on vanity projects by senior officers trying to advance their careers. However, none more so than CC Hopkins signing off the LPR model.

“In the whistleblowers meeting with the Mayor, I described the changes to CID as tantamount to corporate vandalism and seriously undermining the investigative capabilities of the police force. And at what financial cost? How many millions to implement all the changes?

Jackson concludes with another broadside: “The result – a system that doesn’t work and after years of trying to force a failing model to succeed we now have acceptance of reality and Operation Ergo is seeing the return to the policing model we essentially had in the 1980’s”.

15. CC Ian Hopkins ‘lies’ in response to The Times paedophile story.

Following what can only be described as an attempted ‘brushing under the carpet’ of this incident by Deputy Mayor Beverley Hughes, Peter Jackson’s appeal was upheld by the IOPC after assessing her so-called ‘investigation’. As a result, Andy Burnham elected, on advice from the same IOPC, to have the matter ‘independently investigated’. The Mayor, or his advisers, chose to hand it to Durham Constabulary.

This proved to be a controversial choice and has spawned three other articles on this website. Peter Jackson says: “As you know I expressed a vote of no confidence in the Durham Senior Investigating Officer, Darren Ellis, at an early stage, but Burnham allowed him to continue, even though the SIO behaved in a totally unprofessional, defensive, biased, aggressive and belligerent manner”.

“The same SIO harshly exposed in the media over his dealings with the Loughinisland controversy (read more here).

“It, therefore, came as no surprise that the Durham investigation report was a whitewash, reeking of confirmation bias, cherry-picked evidence and a conclusion of ‘no case to answer’ for CC Hopkins. Ellis refused to interview the witnesses I identified and ignored the welter of evidence that demonstrated that CC Hopkins and ACC Russ Jackson, who was involved in drafting the statement, must have known what they said was not true.

“I did, however, note that the report also contained evidence of CC Hopkins having been advised by former PCC Tony Lloyd regarding a previous incident of apparently ‘not intentionally lying’. Repeated ‘accidental’ lying or not telling the truth to the media is certainly not a quality one would want of a Chief Constable, is it?”

16. The Grainger Inquiry

Anthony Grainger was shot by a GMP officer (anonymised ever since as Q9) whilst sat in a stationary car in Culceth, Cheshire in 2012. There were many appalling failings by the police before, during and after the killing.

Through the tenacious, relentless efforts of his partner, Gail Hadfield Grainger, and his mother, Marina Schofield, a public inquiry eventually sat in Liverpool Crown Court in 2017 to hear those circumstances and take evidence from those involved

His Honour Judge Thomas Teague QC’s damning report, published over two years later, can be read in full here.

It is a crushing condemnation of Greater Manchester Police by the Inquiry Chair. Particularly, its leadership and its specialist firearms unit. The report attracted close attention from almost every mainstream media outlet. There is little point rehearsing the catalogue of deceit and operational failures again.

In this instance Peter Jackson simply says, “As far as the whistleblower meeting with the Mayor goes it is a case of ‘res ipsa loquitur’, although if Andy Burnham wants me to point out some of the more damning comments about senior GMP officers from the Inquiry report, which I foretold during our meeting, I would be happy to assist”.

17. iOPS scandal

Presciently, the early failures and alleged cost over-runs of GMP’s were raised in the whistleblower meeting in August, 2018. One year later, almost to the day, it was the lead story on the ITV’s Granada Reports daily news broadast and a full blown scandal has developed.

Once again, Peter Jackson has strong words to say to Mayor Burnham: “I note in your response to our meeting, and my disclosures and complaints about IOPS, you seem to imply all is in order and you even take some ownership of this project, as you say ‘expenditure is monitored very closely and spend agreed… now by me or the Deputy Mayor with advice on the investment provided independent of GMP.’

“I also note in the first MEN article on the subject (read article in full here) it says there has been a ‘glitch’ and cites ‘GMP chiefs’ as saying the system is progressing well.

“The reference to ‘chiefs’ rather than ‘chief’ is interesting, as if it had been in the singular CC Hopkins would be caught in a lie again. Costs are cited at £27 million, but as you know the true figure of the project with implementation costs has to be, in reality, well in excess of an estimate first broadcast over three years ago. What’s more, I have ample evidence from many other police whistleblowers that the system is not ‘progressing well’. It has been a complete and utter disaster.

Jackson continues his attack on the Mayor: “Are you alarmed Mr Burnham? Is that enough of a scandal for you to take action? Live feedback from officers is pouring in. The Police Federation say there is a serious risk to officers and the public.

“Are you concerned about Intelligence System failures? Everyone should know of the dangers of that from the murders of PC’s Fiona Bone and Nicola Hughes committed by Dale Cregan. Most recently, the intelligence failures that were exposed at the Grainger Inquiry. Also, it is well known that GMP officers went to the wrong house and killed the ‘wrong’ Jordon (Jordan) Begley.

“And what of the many other ‘glitches’? Are you waiting for a blue light call to a non-existent job to end in tragedy before you take action?

Conclusion

Peter Jackson’s conclusion on the response to his own disclosures, and those of other whistleblowers, can be summarised thus:

“Margaret Oliver, Paul Bailey and myself are three voices that represent the views and concerns of many other ex-, retired and serving officers.  After the meeting last August, we were, more or less, blanked for eight months by Mayor Andy Burnham, his Deputy, and Clare Monaghan. All three failed to positively engage with us and repeatedly resist taking serious, determined action to investigate our disclosures and complaints. All we have faced is delays, prevarication and been treated as a nuisance. The unacceptable behaviour of such as Beverley Hughes and Kevin Lee in that meeting foretold what came later.

“I would, respectfully, remind you, Mr Burnham, of some of your comments in your House of Commons speech on Hillsborough (read in full here).

  • This is a time for transparency, not secrecy

Let me turn to collusion between police and the media. The malicious briefings given in the immediate aftermath were devastatingly efficient. They created a false version of events which lingered until yesterday.

  • At many inquests today, there is often a mismatch between the legal representation of public bodies and those of the bereaved.Why should the authorities be able to spend public money like water to protect themselves while families have no such help?
  • This cover-up went right to the top.
  • This police force [South Yorkshire Police] hasn’t learned and hasn’t changed.
  • Mr Speaker, let me be clear – I don’t blame the ordinary police officers, the men and women who did their best on the day and who today are out keeping our streets safe. But I do blame their leadership and culture, which seems rotten to the core.
  • One of the lessons of Hillsborough is that there must be no arbitrary time limits on justice and accountability.
  • This is a time for transparency, not secrecy—time for the people of South Yorkshire to know the full truth about their police force.

“I agree, completely, with all the sentiments you expressed. They all apply to GMP today. Yes, it is time for the people of Greater Manchester to know the full truth about their police force.

“It is time that they also knew that their Mayor failed to take action, failed to hold the Chief Constable to account.

He signs off with a very powerful message to the Mayor: “Your failure to tackle the scandal that is Greater Manchester Police is a serious neglect of your public duties and ultimately should, if justice is served, mean that you lose your position as Mayor next May. This great city, and the wider region, deserve much better than you can provide. I, and many others associated with the police, will be actively campaigning against you both on the streets, at hustings, public meetings and on social media”.

Which means that Andy Burnham was right after all about the whistleblower meeting being the first of many. But, perhaps, not in the way he might have envisaged.

Earlier today, (12th August, 2019), senior reporter Jennifer Williams broke the mould of the Manchester Evening News exempting the Mayor and his Deputy from any critisism over failings of their regional police force. In a short, but sharply pointed, piece she sets out clearly and concisely just where she considers the democratic deficit to lie: Squarely at the feet of Andy Burnham and Beverley Hughes (read in full here).

This Neil Wilby piece,  a mammoth 8,200 words epic, might go some way to fleshing out the MEN and Jennifer’s argument.

Other scandals outside the scope of the police whistleblower disclosures

There are a series of other scandals that were not part of the Bailey, Jackson, Oliver (and Winter) disclosures to the Mayor of Greater Manchester. Associated articles have either appeared, or due to appear in the near future. It is a depressingly long list, and reveals a police force so badly run that it, in all conscience, should be placed in special measures by the Home Office and the chief constable served with a Section 38 notice.

As for the Mayor and his Deputy, they should fall on their sword and announce that neither will stand in the local regional elections next May:

(i) Industrial scale breaches of Freedom of Information Act and Data Protection Act.

(ii) Mabs Hussain promotion to Assistant Chief Constable (read here).

(iii) Spying on and reporting disabled protesters to Department of Work and Pensions (read here).

(iv) Chief constable’s behaviour in and outside the courtroom at the Grainger Inquiry

(v) Destruction of weapons, assets following death of Ian Terry. Undertaking signed off by present chief constable, Ian Hopkins. Destruction didn’t take place until at least 2017.

(vi) Death following police contact of Jordon Begley.

 

Page last updated: Wednesday 22nd August, 2019 at 1705 hours

Photo Credit: Getty Images/PA/Huffington Post

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