The hearing ws listed to commence at 10.30am on Thursday 14th May, 2020 before Mr Justice Nicholas Lavender in the Leeds District Registry of the High Court. It got under way shortly after 10.45am after dealing with some minor technical glitches.
Pemission to appeal was granted on the papers by the same judge on 17th December, 2019 sitting in Newcastle Cown Court.
The judgment under appeal was handed down by Mr Recorder Ben Nolan QC on 20th September, 2019 at the conclusion of a ten day trial (read full daily reports here). Dr Rashid is claiming damages against West Yorkshire Police (WYP) for unlawful arrest, unlawful detention and trespass over events that took place in March 2012 when 16 police officers attended his home in Bradford at 6.15am.
The parties were represented, respectively, by Ian Pennock of counsel, instructed by Simon Blakeley and Olivia Checa-Dover of counsel, instructed by Alison Walker, Deputy Head of Legal Services at WYP.
The background to the appeal can be read here. There was palpable tension between the two legal teams, throughout the substantive hearing, most notably concerning disclosure.
The appeal hearing was held remotely via Skype Business. Quality of transmission was generally good and proceedings progressed smoothly. Particularly, as the judge’s dexterity in dealing with an elecronic bundle filed by the Claimant which, because of its size (232MB) was slow to load, and two lever arch files, supplied by the police, improved markedly during the morning session.
Mr Pennock, on behalf of Dr Rashid, took the court to the eight Grounds of Appeal upon which his client’s case is based. There are two further alternative Grounds that would only be triggered if the appeal succeeds.
But the first part of his submissions were taken up with what he characterised as ’22 bad points’ in the police’s skeleton argument, that had necessitated a supplementary skeleton argument from him, extending to 40 pages. He lamented that ‘the sideshow’ of correcting WYP’s version of facts and evidence, from the court below (the hearing at Bradford County Court), was not at all helpful to this court. It had, Mr Pennock said, required ‘a root and branch approach’, occupying a large amount of time, and the necessity of exhibiting a large number of passages from the court’s approved transcript.
The judge made clear that, whilst he would scan read the supplementary skeleton, it was not part of his judicial function to referee such class of disagreements between competing counsel unless, of course, they went to the heart of the matters under consideration in the instant appeal.
Mr Pennock focused to a significant extent on the police’s ‘shifting goalposts’ of the reasonable grounds for arrest of Dr Rashid, of which there are five different versions as things stand. The necessity of the arrest was also the subject of extensive discussion as another of the key appeal points.
There was a moment of levity after Mr Pennock explained that the ‘eccentric’ Dr Clive Tedd, upon whom the police relied for their ‘expert’ medical advice, claims to be able to induce whiplash injuries by clapping his hands. Something he had learned by buying second hand books on Amazon. Mr Justice Lavender enquired, deadpan, if Dr Tedd ‘had clapped his hands at trial’.
The final ten minutes of the morning session were taken up by Miss Checa-Dover, on behalf of West Yorkshire Police, and continued with her client’s response to the Grounds of Appeal after the lunch adjournment. She maintains, on behalf of her client, that the judgment from the substantive hearing was adequate, sufficiently well reasoned and that Detective Inspector Mark Taylor, the main police witness came through the examination and cross-examination of his evidence “with flying colours”.
As expected, Mr Justice Lavender indicated that judgment would be reserved and handed down at a future date, yet to be determined. There was a discussion with Mr Pennock as to whether, in the event that the appeal was upheld, he would be able to substitute his own findings for those of the court below and dispose of the matter substantively.
A more complete report of the hearing will appear in conjunction with the handing down of the judgment.
Page last updated: Thursday 14th May, 2020 at 1915 hours
Photo Credits: Bradford T&A
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On 20th September 2019, Mr Recorder Ben Nolan QC handed down his judgment in a £5 million civil claim brought by Dr Abdul Rashid against West Yorkshire Police. It followed a Bradford County Court liability hearing lasting two weeks, during which evidence was heard from three police officers repesenting the defendant. The claimant, a well-known Bradford GP and medico-legal practitioner also gave witness box testimony.
The claim concerns wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and trespass over events that happened in March, 2012 during a police investigation codenamed Operation Thatcham. It, ultimately, resulted in the conviction of 45 men over what have become known as ‘cash for crash‘ fraud offences.
A terrifying pre-dawn raid, in a middle class suburb of Bradford, saw eighteen police officers turn up at the doctor’s home where he, his wife and three young children were asleep. Other squads of officers had been despatched to his two surgeries and other business premises. It was alleged he was part of a conspiracy to defraud, relating to the cash for crash claims, although no particulars were ever put to Dr Rashid in thirty-five hours of police interviews, across a seven month period. He was never charged with any offence.
Interview records show that the questioning of the doctor, by purportedly experienced detectives, was largely infantile and almost entirely pointless. The police simply had no evidence of criminal offences, but were down a rabbit hole without an escape route. Not least, because there is no incentive for any medico-legal practitioner to commit fraud: He (or she) is paid by an instructing lawyer, whether an injury insurance claim succeeds or not – and irrespective of the content of the doctor’s report. A point that seemed completely lost on the police.
Dr Rashid was eventually released from police bail in June, 2013. The justification for the arrest or, in legal terms, the reasonable grounds for suspicion of the offence for which he was arrested, lie at the very heart of the matter.
Notable for his absence from the civil court proceedings was the arresting officer, DC Mark Lunn, described in court as ‘a bad apple’, and about whom much has been written elsewhere (read here, here and here). The police, via their barrister Olivia Checa Dover, had told the court at a pre-trial review, seven months earlier, that they were ‘unable to locate’ DC Lunn – a matter later denied at the substantive hearing. The detective (the term is used loosely) was, in fact, working for the police watchdog, the discredited and now dissolved Independent Police Complaints Commission (re-badged in January 2018 as the Independent Office for Police Conduct), just 300 yards from police HQ, in a job actually facilitated by those who said they couldn’t locate him.
An account of that pre-trial hearing, before HHJ Neil Davey QC, can be read elsewhere on this website by clicking here and has stood unchallenged since that time, including by the police to whom right of reply was offered.
A comprehensive day-by-day account of the final hearing can also be read on this website by clicking here. West Yorkshire Police tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent the author of this piece reporting on those proceedings in an attempt, not only to frustrate open justice (routine for them), but, more crucially, to prevent public exposure of the rotting effect of the ‘bad apple’ officer, culminating in what appears to be a shocking conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, by six of their officers in the same barrel, that has left an unpleasant stench hanging over the large number of Operation Thatcham convictions.
At the conclusion of those proceedings in Bradford Law Courts, conducted in a palpably toxic atmosphere throughout, Recorder Nolan dismissed the claim in controversial circumstances. Not least, because of the bitter and long-running battle over disclosure, or, more to the point, the lack of it, by the police. The handling of those matters, viewed from the press seats at least, appeared to fall short of the standards one might reasonably expect of an alert, fair-minded judge. It also must be said, by way of balance, that it is a feature of many civil or tribunal claims (and in some notable criminal trials) involving West Yorkshire Police; the latitude the force is frequently given from the bench, and a tame local media, simply encourages their bad practices.
A permission appeal to the High Court by Dr Rashid was, unsurprisingly, filed by his lawyers soon afterwards. It was granted on the papers (without a hearing) on 17th December, 2019 by Mr Justice Lavender. Not a common occurrence in such matters.
A full appeal hearing is listed for 14th May, 2020 before the same judge, sitting in the Leeds District Registry. It is, however, more than likely, in the prevailing SAR-COV-2 crisis, that the hearing will take place via video conference.
The written judgment of Recorder Nolan, typed, unusually, in 16pt with generous margins top and bottom, runs to 14 pages. It is littered with schoolboy syntax errors; headed ‘judgement’ not ‘judgment’; pages are not numbered; it is undated; and carries no unique case reference or details of the parties’ representation. It even includes an exclamation mark at the end of one sentence, unprecedented in the author’s experience, encompassing many hundreds of court judgments. Likewise, the sight of a barrister being addressed only by his surname is, similarly, unheard of.
All of which gives it an amateurish look: Surprisingly so, for a part-time judge who has been at the Bar for 49 years and, plainly, has a very high opinion of himself – and one not at all slow in derogating others, both in his courtroom and on social media. A memorable example being that hard-won press cards, hologrammed and with photo ID embedded, authorised by the National Union of Journalists and the National Police Chiefs Council, are “handed out to anybody“.
There was no perfected copy of the judgment provided to the press and it was not published electronically by the court. So, this piece is grounded in what was handed, by the court clerk, to the two members of the press present at the time.
By the tenth, and last, sitting day, the claimant’s legal team knew what to expect. A hearing where one party, and their counsel, appeared to be favoured throughout was not going to end well – and so it proved.
But, it was not just the judge’s decision to dismiss the claim that caused dismay; that was already built into the claimant’s expectations. It was the perplexing way the background narrative was rehearsed, and the equally puzzling finding of fact, that gave rise to very considerable concern. As did the judge’s consequent rulings on the applicable law.
It is well-established case law that parties to a civil claim should be able to understand why they succeeded or failed. Indeed, it can be a ground upon which an appeal can, in some circumstances, be upheld.
In interview after the trial, Dr Rashid, a highly intelligent and accomplished individual with an acquired, if reluctant, knowledge of civil law and procedure, was, it is fair to say, completely bewildered. As was his legal team, Ian Pennock of counsel (the barrister simply referred to as “Pennock” in one section of the judgment) and his instructing solicitor, Simon Blakeley.
Moreover, taking the daily court reports as a starting point, it seems as though the Nolan judgment concerned a different trial altogether. Those reports, amounting to almost 12,000 words, stand unchallenged by both the police, and the judge, despite dark, but unspecified, mutterings during the trial.
The handed down judgment, most regrettably, gives the appearance of a pre-formed decision with threadbare, and in places, inexplicable or, indeed, a complete absence of cogent analysis or reasoning. The background narrative, and consequent fact finding, also appears to leave too many crucial issues unresolved and bizarre, apparently unsupportable, conclusions on at least two of the central matters: The credibility of the principal police witness and the diligence (and record keeping) of the Operation Thatcham investigation.
More crucially, to those adjacent to the applicable statutory framework, the judge appears not to have turned his attention to the state of mind of the arresting officer and each of his alleged reasonable grounds for suspecting Dr Rashid of committing the offence, for which he was arrested, and attached to them his reasoning for finding in favour of the police. That, one might say, was his primary function as sole arbiter of this claim.
From the press seats at least, the claim largely turned on the evidence of one police officer: Detective Inspector (DI) Mark Taylor. A sergeant at the time of the arrest of Dr. Rashid and the supervisor of the errant former detective constable, Mark Lunn.
Having previously served as a custody sergeant, DI Taylor was part of the Kirklees-based Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) recovery team. Lunn was seconded to that team from his previous role as a beat officer in Huddersfield and, later, that town’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID).
As reported contemporaneously, DI Taylor’s evidence underwent a remarkable transformation between examination on his evidence-in-chief by Miss Checa Dover and cross-examination by Mr Pennock. From a witness giving ready answers, with quite remarkable recall of detail from events 7 or 8 years previously, to a hesitant police officer constantly having to think carefully about what he was saying, and who answered thirteen times in the mode of ‘don’t recall, don’t remember, don’t know, can’t answer that, got that wrong’. Despite having been very closely involved in the police’s defence of the civil claim for almost three years before he gave his testimony in court – and in other connected regulatory proceedings, in which the police were the prime movers, since 2012.
In answer to Mr Pennock’s probing, he frequently had no explanation as to why many of the key documents that would have assisted the claim of Dr Rashid had either gone missing, been destroyed or were concealed from the claimant. Particularly, those that were effectively under his control, if the judge’s version of his role in the case is to be taken at face value. These include his own pocket books, day books, email trails, weekly reports to his superior officers, meeting notes, seized materials, copies of warrants and their supporting documentation (At the pre-trial review it was heard in legal submissions that DC Lunn’s emails were no longer available on the police’s ‘Cloud’ data storage. The judge at that hearing did pointedly observe that someone must have taken pro-active steps to remove them).
During cross-examination, DI Taylor was unable to direct the court to any document in the trial bundle – running to twelve densely packed lever arch files – where the reasons for a decision to arrest Dr Rashid are set out, and properly recorded, in accordance with authorised police practice. He did, however, concede, in evidence, that for such a major decision affecting a high profile and well-established local doctor he would have expected them to be recorded in the investigation’s policy log at the very least, together with pocket books or day books of those involved in the decision, meeting notes and his own weekly reports. It is a specific requirement under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (PACE) that notebook records are kept of actions preceding, during and after arrest of a suspect. DI Taylor, the supervisor of the arresting officer in Dr Rashid’s case, is unable to explain where those specific records are – or why they were not retained. Or, indeed, if they were ever made.
The court also heard that DI Taylor was centrally involved in the presentation, by West Yorkshire Police, of no less than five different versions of the ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ that underpinned Dr Rashid’s arrest. The first, in May 2017, being in answer to the filing and serving of the claim form, by way of their formal Defence; the last one during the trial, at the request of the judge whom, presumably, like most others present in court, was bewildered at the constantly changing police landscape. The second version was in an Amended Defence filed in July 2018 when it became clear that the original Defence was unlikely to resist the claim; the third and fourth differing versions were, respectively, DI Taylor’s witness statement dated December 2018 and his oral evidence from the witness box at trial nine months later.
One of the three remaining grounds cited by DI Taylor as the support for the decision to arrest the doctor, in that witness box testimony, from a list that at one time comprised twenty-one purported reasons, concerned a matter that only became known to the police over five months after the arrest. The other two were (i) an appointments list found in the vehicle of a person arrested in the first phase of the crash for cash investigation, but not subsequently prosecuted, and (ii) the alleged inadequacy of Dr. Rashid’s medico-legal reports. Those two grounds alone, says the detective, are sufficient to resist the claim of wrongful arrest and false imprisonment.
Examination of the trial bundle now reveals a different ground advanced by DI Taylor that is not in either of his witness statements or his court testimony. In an email to the Ministry of Justice he states baldly: ‘The main thrust of our fraud case: Was the doctor [Rashid] doing anything different to other professionals’.
The fact that all five (or now six) police versions of the reasonable grounds for suspicion are different is an important point; one that an independent reviewer might consider strikes at the heart of both the police force’s probity, and DI Taylor’s own credibility as a witness in these proceedings, yet is completely absent from the judgment. There is no reference to them at all, including the fact that the twenty-one shot West Yorkshire Police machine-gun had been reduced to just two weak blows on a pea-shooter.
Furthermore, on at least three occasions in the witness box, DI Taylor gave oral evidence that directly contradicted written evidence of his own that was to be found in the trial bundle. They were not minor points either, they were central to the police’s defence of the claim. It is more difficult to conclude that this class of historical revisionism was the product of innocent mistakes, or memory aberrations, given his remarkable powers of recall on his first day giving evidence.
Fortunately, for Dr Rashid, when taken to a compromised Third Party Disclosure Order (in successful proceedings wherein the decision of the General Medical Council tosuspend the doctor from medical practice, at the instigation of DC Lunn, was quashed) which confirmed, many months after his arrest, that ‘WestYorkshirePoliceconfirmthat [Dr Rashid] wasnotarrested onthebasisofaspecificallegationmadebyanindividualoutside,orwithin,WestYorkshire Police’, DI Taylor, as Lunn’s supervisor, agreed that was how he understood the position to be. He was the disclosure officer in those GMC proceedings and, as such, attached to the persistent smearing of the doctor, by the police, then and ever since.
He could not, however, explain to the court why the note of a meeting, recorded on the policy log as taking place on 19th January, 2012, at which he claimed he was present, did not feature his name amongst the list of attendees posted by DC Lunn. That ‘team’ meeting was to assume high importance in the judgment, by way of deflecting Lunn’s central role in the arrest. DI Taylor claims that the grounds for Dr Rashid’s arrest were discussed there, even though the log only records that the decision to proceed was maintained. That strongly infers there was at least one other meeting, about which there appears to be no entry on the policy log, or entries in day books, or post-meeting email notes, or follow-ups. There was also conflicting testimony from DI Taylor as to whether the meeting was held in Batley or Bradford.
This January 2012 meeting appeared to be the only area of his cross-examination where DI Taylor’s powers of recall were revived. Distinctly remembering detail of a meeting with a Crown Prosecution Service lawyer, Julian Briggs, whom, on his own admission, he either met, or spoke to on the telephone, almost every single working day during that era. Quite remarkably for a meeting of such purported gravity, no-one at that meeting, it seems, made any record of the grounds of arrest of Dr Rashid. Including the CPS lawyer. Or, if they did, the police chose not to disclose them. Another, one might say crucial, point absent from the judgment.
Under questioning, it emerged from DI Taylor that the policy log itself was a key part of the general shambles that threaded through the running and supervision of Operation Thatcham. DC Lunn, on the evidence and with his shocking disciplinary record, was an unwelcome cuckoo in the POCA nest at Batley Police Station. Curiously, as a lowly, inexperienced, self-aggrandising detective constable, with a history of unlawful arrest complaints against him, albeit unsubstantiated, and a stranger to the department, DI Taylor allocated Lunn an office of his own. In the face of him still being on a written warning over a previous internal police finding of misuse of the force’s computer systems.
The policy log created by DC Lunn did not, incredibly, form part of those same police systems and was not linked to either their force-wide servers or the more local Infoshare network. He could add, amend, delete any entry on the Word document and no-one would be any wiser. Operation Thatcham was, to all appearances, a one man maverick operation that breached any number of authorised police practices, management of police information protocols, codes of conduct and, very arguably, was operated outside data protection laws.
DI Taylor told the court Lunn had been ‘recommended’ to his POCA team, but he did not say by whom. It was not explained, either, why this major investigation did not fall under the remit of one of the specialist criminal divisions in West Yorkshire Police under the supervision of a qualified Senior Investigating Officer (SIO). [In response to a post-trial freedom of information request, West Yorkshire Police made a number of palpably false responses concerning these matters in order to further conceal Thatcham’s procedural shortcomings].
Although presented by the police as the officer in charge of Operation Thatcham, in an attempt to downplay the role of the discredited DC Lunn, DI Taylor gave conflicting evidence over the number of suspects arrested in the first phase of the investigation. He told Miss Checa-Dover it was ten, when it was put to him by Mr Pennock that the actual number was thirty-eight, it was conceded, reluctantly, that he ‘got it wrong’.
Thatcham was the biggest fraud investigation in the history of West Yorkshire Police with ninety one suspects arrested in total. DI Taylor, as noted elsewhere, had been involved in regulatory and civil proceedings against Dr Rashid for seven years, in matters arising from it. Yet couldn’t answer correctly a simple, basic question concerning the operation.
Mark Taylor’s dual role of supervisor of the discredited arresting officer in the criminal matter, then sole disclosure officer, conflicted but apparently unsupervised, in the civil claim, should have given rise to concern amongst those anxious to maintain public confidence in the civil justice system. But the seriously alarming catalogue of disclosure failings, with implausible explanations, or simply no explanation, attached to most of them, did not appear to cause any anxiety to the judge at all. Indeed, his verbal attack on Mr Pennock, on the last day of the trial, when the issue of disclosure failings was raised, yet again, was as unnecessary as it was unpleasant.
These were, in essence, the disputed disclosure points which should be read with these two comments from the judge very much in mind; (i) ‘I don’t want to deprive Mr Pennock of material which he quite rightly wishes to use’, (ii) ‘I don’t want this case to go wrong by dint of disclosure error’ and also the admission from DI Taylor that he was ‘exhibits officer trained’:
– The reasons for arresting Dr Rashid do not, or no longer, appear in the operational policy log. No audit trail relating to that document has been filed and served by the police.
– The Word document setting out reasons for suspecting Dr Rashid of criminal offences, given to Dewsbury Magistrates’ Court by way of a formal application for search warrants of Dr Rashid’s premises, is not retained on the police server.
– DI Taylor’s workbook, covering, according to his own evidence, twelve significant police investigations during that period, and, more crucially, recording the reasons for arresting Dr Rashid, was missing. As is that of every other officer involved, including the arresting officer, DC Lunn.
– The police have not produced the weekly e-mail reports, from DI Taylor to his superiors, setting out the reasons why they wanted to arrest Dr Rashid. He told the court that they still exist and could be accessed via the force’s Enterprise Vault.
– During the phase one arrests in Operation Thatcham copies of scripts that were to be used by personal injury claimants, during their consultations with doctors, were seized. When both Mr Pennock, and then the judge, asked DI Taylor where they were, and why they had not been retained, there was an interjection from Miss Checa-Dover who asserted that ‘it has been years since the criminal prosecutions had ended [in fact, April 2014] and the civil claim issued [in fact, letter before claim issued December 2015].
– Appointment diaries seized by the police from other medico-legal practitioners involved in ‘crash for cash’ claims are missing. DI Taylor told the court, ‘they are no longer in the police’s possession because it’s [the criminal trials in Operation Thatcham] gone through the statutory appeals process’. He could not explain to the court, when asked by the judge, why, when the requirement is to retain such materials for 6 years, they were no longer available. He did confirm that a CD disc for each of the doctors’ diaries had been exhibited at the trial.
– Not one contemporaneous record of the reasons given for the decision to arrest Dr Rashid can be located anywhere in the many police records where one should find them or, indeed, where it is a serious breach of Police Regulations not to find them.
– The police seized Dr Rashid’s phone and laptop. From those devices they extracted text messages (SMS). They disclosed only part of those text messages (oddly enough those that might fit the police narrative). The PC and phone had been ‘wiped’ when eventually returned to him. DI Taylor, or the police lawyers when asked, have provided no plausible explanation beyond a haughty ‘we can’t disclose what we don’t have’.
– DI Taylor’s evidence in the witness box concerning both his own philosophy as an experienced detective and, more crucially, wider police force policy: ´If it is not recorded, it didn’t happen’.
Mr Pennock submits that these provide a more than a sufficient evidential base to advance the proposition that the police records had been ‘sanitised’ to remove (or conceal, or an admission that they never existed) all the contemporaneous reasons for deciding to arrest Dr Rashid. A plausible, indeed likely, reason is that the police subsequently believe such reason(s) to be insufficient to justify that arrest and, as such, resist the civil claim.
However, none of his highly questionable evidence, or witness box testimony that was not in either of his witness statements (very often fatal to the credibility of a live witness), or the list of disclosure failures, either of, or involving, DI Taylor, appeared to trouble Mr Recorder Nolan even slightly. Indeed, his judgment, incredibly, records him as ‘a truthful, reliable and extremely professional police officer of the highest calibre’. He embellishes that claim by asserting that ‘his evidence was wholly corroborated by contemporaneous evidence’ and, to top off, gives his ‘firm view’ that ‘this [Operation Thatcham] was a well-run, closely-monitored, highly competent criminal investigation’.
It is, set against the evidence heard first hand in court, contemporaneous reporting and, for certainty, a review of the section of the transcript covering DI Taylor’s testimony, a passage in a judgment that is as astonishing as it is shocking. Even without taking into account the number of times he had to be ‘rescued’ or led by either the judge himself, or Miss Checa-Dover, when stuck for answers to questions put to him by Mr Pennock. Indeed, Dr Rashid’s lawyers submit that on at least three different occasions the judge appeared to stray into giving evidence himself.
The only conceivable explanation being, that if an objective conclusion had been drawn from DI Taylor’s variable and selective memory, and his contradictory, frequently unimpressive evidence; his troubling supervisory failings in the criminal investigation; and his highly questionable role as disclosure officer in the civil proceedings, then he would have been found as a witness whose reliability was open to serious question and the defence of the claim dangerously, and probably fatally, undermined.
Recorder Nolan, in the face of an invitation from Mr Pennock, also drew no adverse inference from the absence of the arresting officer from the proceedings, saying ‘although he is in name the arresting officer his importance to the case has been overblown’. An inexplicable finding given that it was drawn out in evidence that DC Lunn was the only officer working full time on Operation Thatcham during its first year, and, more particularly, the period leading up to the arrest of Dr Rashid, and, of over 200 entries on the investigation’s policy log in that timespan, the definitive record of decisions, rationales, actions and outcomes, every entry except one was made by that same officer. A policy log, under authorised police practice, is required to be the domain of the SIO, usually at detective chief inspector or superintending rank.
More crucially, the records of the trial clearly reveal that DI Taylor had conceded, very early in his cross-examination, by Mr Pennock, that Lunn was ‘the main man’.
DC Lunn was also, unusually, the author of the operational orders that were drawn up in connection with two different planned arrests of the doctor. DI Taylor said in evidence these orders would have been approved by a senior officer at chief inspector rank, or above. But couldn’t point the court to any written document evidencing such approval, although he asserted that the approval would not have been by telephone.
On any view, this was a one man band operating well outside conventional police constraints, with minimal and ineffective supervision. Indeed, the court heard that, in an email to a superior, Lunn described himself as ‘Team Thatcham’ in answer to a complaint about his conduct – and in a way that appeared to suggest that his pivotal role gave him a shield against any disciplinary action over any complaint from a member of the public.
The judgment is also absent of discussion, analysis, reasoning and reasons in relation to whether, or not, DC Lunn’s unauthorised, pirate activities as a private detective to the insurance industry; or an inadequately explained payment of £183,000 by a motor insurance company to that same serving police officer, via a bogus company, around the time of his arrest of Dr Rashid; the associated leverage to obtain the ‘scalp’ of a high profile medico-legal professional to promote both DC Lunn’s and motor insurance company interests; and, the startlingly deliberate decision by senior officers involved in Operation Thatcham, and three Professional Standards Department (PSD) officers to engage in what appears to be a prima facie conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, by keeping DC Lunn’s ‘extra-curricular’ activities secret from the criminal defence teams in the ‘cash for crash’ fraud prosecutions.
There is also no evidence that a thorough, proportionate investigation was ever carried out by the police, or the IPCC to whom the matter should have been mandatorily referred, into the whereabouts of that £183,000, or whether Lunn was acting alone, or in concert with other police officers, over monies that give off the strong whiff of an inducement to extend his powers beyond what was, necessarily, lawful. The judge again strays into error with his finding that, by leaving West Yorkshire Police in August, 2013, Lunn “jumped before he was punched (sic)”. It is clear from the trial bundle that disciplinary proceedings had concluded with ‘words of advice’ and DI Taylor’s testimony, during the hearing, is that he left because he had been sent to work back on the beat and was unhappy about no longer having detective status.
Even though in almost every other civil claim of this class he would be the very first port of call, DC Lunn never even provided a witness statement in the these proceedings, and West Yorkshire Police have gone to the most extraordinary lengths to conceal both his true role in the Thatcham investigation and the full extent of his own misdemeanours – and those, it appears, of many others involved in this case. In Lunn’s case that included lying in a post-arrest report about ‘patient records being strewed about the doctor’s home and car’. A matter that both the judge and DI Taylor found very uncomfortable to deal with when when taken to the evidence by Mr Pennock that there was no such occurrence.
The police were, and still are, condoning that alleged conspiracy to pervert the course of justice in order to do so. At least one person, convicted via the tainted Operation Thatcham, has complained to their PSD about the conspiracy, since the conclusion of this civil claim, and the police have sought to disapply the requirement under the Police Reform Act to investigate this very serious matter.
The IOPC (formerly the IPCC), the notoriously toothless ‘police watchdog’, with so much to lose themselves, have also chosen to further break the law by not ‘calling in’ the investigation as a Recordable Conduct matter arising out of civil proceedings. They stonewall any questions about their shielding of the corrupted ex-DC Mark Lunn for over three years in their Wakefield office. The Home Office similarly block any press enquiries on the topic.
Returning to the Nolan judgment, Dr Rashid and his lawyers point to some of the matters that the judge sought to highlight in the background narrative that did not appear to have the necessary relevance to the matters to be determined in this trial or carried disproportionate weight. For example:
– Reference to a company named NK Business Consultants Ltd, and a payment of a £825 administration fee by Dr Rashid to that company, when the police had no knowledge of either the company, or the payment, until alerted by Stuart Davies of the Ministry of Justice on 17th August, 2012, over five months after the arrest. The fact that NK never appeared on the policy log supports that fact. [The judgment goes so far as to say that the payment to NK raised ‘intense suspicion’ pre-arrest based on DI Taylor’s witness box evidence].
– The appointment of his 19 year old nephew as a director of a company Dr Rashid has formed.
– A tenant of Dr Rashid who runs a claims management company, completely unrelated to the organised crime group featuring in Operation Thatcham, or any fraudulent claim, from the downstairs shop premises of the doctor’s private medico-legal offices above (thus keeping his private practice completely separate from his NHS surgeries), is suspected to be his brother. DI Taylor had confirmed in his testimony that ‘there was nothing unusual in this’.
– The police claim that Dr Rashid’s reports are of a poor standard [relying on an ‘eccentric’ doctor who admits to the police he ‘is no expert’ and just happens to be a friend of DC Lunn’s mother] and the scale of fees charged for the reports [which DI Taylor conceded in evidence were consistent with the market rate in the personal injury arena].
– Whilst being questioned about Dr Tedd, DI Taylor conceded that despite the entry on the policy log that the doctor was a family friend of DC Lunn, he knew nothing at all about the relationship until asked about it by Mr Pennock during the trial. ‘It´s actually news to me, even at this late stage’ said the officer purorted by West Yorkshire Police to have been running Operation Thatcham.
– How quality of medical reporting became a police matter rather than a regulatory issue [The GMC in a protracted four year investigation found nothing untoward with the reports].
Conversely and perversely, Dr Rashid and his legal team might well contend, taking the contemporaneous reporting, and their own legal note-taking during the trial, as guides, that much more relevant points were either omitted from the judge’s discussion of the case, or understated as to their relevance within the factual matrix:
– The police were told pre-arrest, by a number of personal injury specialists, that the way in which Dr Rashid runs his private medico-legal practice was not uncommon and the impact that would have on any of the alleged reasonable grounds for arrest or, indeed, its necessity. This was also confirmed by DI Taylor in oral testimony as was the fact that the police had omitted to disclose this in trial documents.
– The refusal of the police to call the arresting officer to give evidence of what he considered the reasonable grounds to be. Or for him to provide a witness statement when at the material time he was working, as a public servant, and for the police watchdog no less, in very close proximity to WYP HQ.
– The failure to preserve, or disclose, one single document where the reasonable grounds for arresting Dr Rashid could be expected to be contemporaneously, and expressly, recorded.
– The alleged failure to apply for an arrest warrant for Dr Rashid at the same time that they applied for a search warrant [In earlier preliminary hearings the police had told the court that there was no arrest warrant, a position they appeared to resile from at the final hearing].
– The failure of the police to produce evidence they seized, showing block appointments, appointment duration, fee charged, standard of reports, payments made and to whom, by other doctors. Especially, those in claims that were ultimately proved to be fraudulent.
– The fact that it is common ground that Dr Rashid never reported on any of the numerous proven fraudulent claims, or the fact that the police cannot prove and refused to disclose, any evidence that could even form a basis to say Dr Rashid had actually reported on a claim even suspected of being fraudulent.
– All the transcripts of Dr Rashid’s audio tapes, taken during patient consultations, are entirely consistent with his subsequent reports. The judge might have anxiously considered whether tape recording these interactions was consistent with alleged wrongdoing. If he did, it was omitted from his verdict.
– The fact that West Yorkshire Police knew pre-arrest that a number of other doctors actually reported on numerous proven fraudulent claims, and at least one of those doctors reported on all 14 fraudulent claimants in a completely fabricated ‘accident’ wherein all were said to have been in the same mini-bus, yet did not suspect that doctor of complicity with those fraudulent claims.
– There is no reference to the use of scripts by personal injury claimants or the fact that the police offered a ludicrous explanation for their absence from the trial bundle.
– The lawfulness of alleged reasonable grounds for arrest to be determined on a communal basis between a team of officers against the alleged reasonable grounds having to be held and believed by the actual arresting officer alone.
– Assuming there were reasonable grounds to suspect Dr Rashid of the stipulated offence, the law requires the police to also prove it was ‘necessary’ to effect an arrest. They already had search warrants for all Dr Rashid’s premises (obviating the need to arrest him to invoke powers of search). DI Taylor’s evidence in court was that he had no reason to suspect Dr. Rashid would not co-operate with them and would have voluntarily attended for questioning. The priority, he said, was obtaining access to his mobile phone.
– The failure by the police to put even one specific allegation to Dr Rashid during 35 hours of interview over a five month period subsequent to the arrest.
– The immediate revelation, within six hours in fact, to the GMC and local Primary Care Trust of the fact that Dr Rashid had been arrested, the grotesque exaggeration of the alleged offences for which he was arrested and the avoidance of required protocol by DC Lunn, and his supervisor DI Taylor, and the circumventing of the WYP Force Disclosure Unit, who would normally undertake such sensitive matters involving regulated professionals. [The extraordinary and unauthorised missives from DC Lunn asserted to the PCT the commission of very serious offences as fact, even before one question had been put to Dr Rashid in interview. They were never, subsequently, corrected].
– The police repeatedly failed to identify any actual fraudulent claim or even suspected fraudulent claim, that Dr Rashid was even involved in.
– None of the medico-legal practitioners who were proved to have reported on fraudulent claims within Operation Thatcham, or indeed on a wider view, were arrested. This included Dr Ayoub whom had reported on the ‘headline’ case in that investigation, a bogus mini-bus crash that resulted in 14 fraudulent claims.
Other mistakes, ambiguities, under- or over-statements in the judgment include:
– No mention of the number of officers attending at Dr Rashid’s arrest (16) or its timing (6.15am).
– Dr Rashid’s release from bail in June 2013 came after a review of their original decision not to charge by a more senior lawyer, requested by the police, not after ‘a review of the evidence’.
– The false, improper and malicious notification to the GMC by DC Lunn is simply noted by the judge as ‘in the course of the investigation WYP notified the GMC’
– The judgment is silent on the point that Dr Rashid’s suspension was quashed by the High Court in September, 2012 after a senior judge presiding in that review, HHJ Mark Gosnell, had observed that ‘the police evidence against him was sparse’. Evidence gathered and put to the court by DI Taylor.
– Judgment records that the Insurance Fraud Bureau ‘assisted with’ Operation Thatcham which is a position from which their press office resiled when asked.
– The judgment asserts that one of the ‘crash for cash’ organisers, Nadeem Khaled, was a Director of Advanced Claims (UK) Ltd. That was not heard in evidence and, in any event, has no grounding in fact – as a simple check at Companies House reveals.
– The judgment repeatedly refers to Concept Accident Management Ltd as ‘Concept Claims’. It also asserts that Khaled was ‘replaced as a director’. It is a matter of public record that he never was an officer of any description in that company.
– A Lamborghini car leased from a finance company in Portsmouth was described as being ‘of dubious provenance’. It was the driver about which there were police and Ministry of Justice concerns, not the vehicle.
– The driver of that vehicle, Fouad El Habbal, was said in the judgment to be 19 or 20 years old. It is a matter of public record that he was 21 years old at the time of his arrest (born May 1990).
– The judge describes the prestigious 4 star Cedar Court Hotel as ‘a budget hotel’.
– The judgment states that CPS lawyer, Julian Briggs, ‘was present on earlier occasions when the team had met’. That, put shortly, was not the evidence of DI Taylor.
– The judgment makes no mention of DI Taylor’s unequivocal evidence that ‘the policy log was compromised‘ by the lack of time, date, entry identification (usually by author’s initials) and its remoteness from police systems.
– A passage in the judgment concerning how the nefarious activities of DC Lunn first came to the attention of senior officers also falls into error. The judge’s acceptance of DI Taylor’s account of events, against the factual matrix and another of the detective’s losses of memory is concerning to say the least.
– The judgment refers to pre-arrest interview notes (that were, strangely, undated and with no author identified): Because they refer to events that only came into the knowledge of the police many months later, they were plainly post-arrest notes.
– During the proceedings the judge referred to a payment by Dr Rashid to a solicitor as a “backhander” (in Yorkshire, and probably elsewhere, a term for a bribe). That is not how the GMC characterised it during their lengthy investigation into Dr Rashid, nor was any such suggestion, oblique or otherwise, heard in evidence from the police officers. The solicitor has never been subject of complaint, application or arrest over that payment.
– The judgment refers twice to the number of Operation Thatcham convictions as 48. That was not heard in evidence and no source is quoted. West Yorkshire Police, by way of a freedom of information request, say the number was 45.
That is a long and troubling list and readers are invited to form their own view as to what might, in the interests of fairness and balance, have been an appropriate level of care, attention and impartiality from the bench and, more crucially, might reasonably be included in the judgment of Mr Recorder Nolan, or excluded, and the impact on his decision to dismiss the claim. His almost complete absence of note-taking, throughout the trial, may have contributed to this catalogue of errors.
There are also similar misgivings from Dr Rashid and his legal team as to how the law was applied to the judge’s finding of fact. They will be dealt with more fully, in a separate article, after Mr Justice Lavender has unpicked the competing arguments and made his decision.
Whatever the outcome of the this appeal by Dr Rashid, neither the police, for the manner in which they routinely conduct civil or tribunal litigation, or the judge who was, arguably, prepared to overlook too many of their shortcomings and sharp practices, emerge with credit. The latter, in the twilight of what appears to have been a distinguished legal career, might well, in future, take a leaf out of the book of the Recorder of Bradford, HHJ Jonathan Hall QC, when presiding over court proceedings. An exemplar in how to conduct any hearing.
Page last updated: Wednesday 13th May, 2020 at 0900 hours
In July 2019, after serving for over 27 years with a backwater county police force, Nicholas Bailey took the short, but well worn path, from Cheshire Constabulary to its metropolitan neighbour, Greater Manchester Police, the fourth largest force in the country.
He followed in the footsteps of past chief constable Peter Fahy; the present incumbent Ian Hopkins; and a former assistant chief constable, Garry Shewan, to name but three, who had all passed through the same revolving door.
At the time of the appointment, GMP’s beleaguered chief constable said in his standard hyperbolic style: “We are delighted to welcome Nick to our GMP family. He is an extremely experienced officer with a wealth of knowledge and skills from a vast policing career, spanning over three decades [emphasis added by author for reasons which should become clear as this piece unfolds].
“His extensive background in policing will help us continue to protect the people of Greater Manchester and his work around local policing will help us continue keeping our communities safe.”
Rather clumsy, one might observe, in the wake of the Manchester Arena Bombing and the Grainger Inquiry, at which the force was thoroughly disgraced, and described by leading QC, Leslie Thomas, as “rotten to its core“.
For his part in the usual mutual backscratching that, inevitably, accompanies these appointments, Bailey said: “I’m thrilled to join GMP as it gives me the opportunity to give back to the city [whilst drawing a salary of around £110,000 per year plus substantial benefits] and surrounding areas where I have lived and spent most of my life. My father was a GMP officer and to follow in his footsteps is a great honour, as well as being a challenge in such a high profile force, with so much ambition.
“When I started my role as a police officer I found my vocation and understanding of how I could help the public. Since then I’ve had many memorable moments and found there was no better feeling than locking up an offender and making a difference to victims of crime or vulnerable people [Bailey has been asked to recall the last time he locked up an offender].
“Unfortunately, a sad reality of the job is the tragic and traumatic incidents that stick in your mind and remain with you forever. I was one of the first officers to arrive at the scene of the [IRA] Warrington bombing in 1993 [Bailey presumably refers to the second bombing on Bridge Street in which two children died and 56 other people were injured] and was the senior officer on duty at Cheshire Police on the night of the Manchester Arena bomb. Both these events ended in a huge loss of life, which only further increases my motivation to be a police officer and do all I can to help. [‘Huge’ equals 2 at Warrington and 22 at Manchester Arena. Tragedies both, but not on the scale to which Bailey carelessly alludes. Which might give rise to doubts about his ability to objectively assess evidence and give straight answers].
“I look forward to the challenges ahead and being involved with a force that has the ambition to have such a positive impact on the communities, particularly through placed (sic) based partnerships.” For the unitiated, including the author, read more here.
What neither Hopkins nor Bailey alluded to was the swathe of deep scandal in which GMP was mired, or the trail of Command Team officers that had left the force in disgrace over the past few years. Or indeed, the perennial scandal surrounding Hopkins’ most recent recruit at that rank, Assistant Chief Constable Maboob Hussain. Now known irreverently as ‘Mabel’, the former West Yorkshire officer apparently prefers ‘Mabs’.
Or, indeed, the even bigger scandals surrounding the senior officer that Bailey replaced: the despicable Steven Heywood. Very fortunate to escape prosecution over his antics at the Grainger Inquiry, amongst a lengthy tariff of other alleged misdemeanours, he still faces a much-delayed public gross misconduct hearing at which neither his former force, nor himself, will likely emerge with any credit.
Add in Terry Sweeney of Shipman body parts and Domenyk Noonan notoriety, Rebekah Sutcliffe’s ‘Titgate’ outrage and Garry Shewan scuttling off, once it became apparent how disastrously his much-vaunted IT Transformation Project, including the now infamous ‘iOPS’ installation, was turning out to be, and the question that simply begs to be asked is: Why would any self-respecting, law-abiding officer want to be involved or associated with persons of such questionable character? That is another question that has been put to GMP’s newest and, for the present, shiniest ‘top brass’.
Bailey, for his sins, appears to have recently taken over the iOPS poisoned chalice from the hapless Chris Sykes, another recent assistant chief constable appointment, commenting for the force on social media, and in the local newspaper, as another catastrophic failure beset the ill-fated project in early February, 2020. One day after this article was published, more whistleblowers came forward to highlight another round of problems. This time, it is reported, connected to Crown Prosecution Service interface, access to crimes and reports, and, most crucially, huge backlog of child protection cases.
It has also emerged that, whilst an iOPS inspection report by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary is constantly delayed, the force are trying to implement as many of the HMIC recommendations as possible, before publication, in order to mimimise reputational damage and hoodwink the public.
Another GMP Command Team member, the seemingly gutless Debbie Ford, accepted a rare neutral transfer back to her previous force, Northumbria Police, rather than confront the wrongdoing of the senior leadership miscreants amongst whom she sat every morning and, she said, were making her feel ‘uncomfortable’.
But the most persistent, and obvious, Command Team ‘villain’ within GMP is, very arguably, the chief constable himself. The persistent failings of this belligerent and self-adoring individual are well documented elsewhere on this website (read more here). The most recent scandal post-dated the publication of that widely read, and shared, article when the outcome of the Greater Manchester Mayor’s Assurance Review of Operation Augusta (an abandoned investigation into child sexual exploitation in Rochdale in 2004) was pubished on 14th January, 2020. Hopkins had planned to abdicate responsibility for appearing at a press conference, offering up arch-sycophant ACC Hussain instead.
But the assembled media was having none of that and, eventually, Hopkins was coaxed down from the 4th floor at GMP’s plush HQ. But, only to read out a prepared statement after which he departed in high dudgeon, refusing to answer any questions. A shameful performance, by any measure, and one for which he has been quite rightly and robustly criticised in the press, on television and on social media.
The full Augusta report, which some readers may find distressing, can be read here.
Hopkins deleted his Twitter account later the same day, or early the following morning. He had disgraced himself previously on the social media platform, appearing to abuse his position of authority – and an official ‘blue-ticked’ Greater Manchester Police account – to attack fellow users (read more here). The GMP press office, unusually for them, refused to even acknowledge the request for a statement from Hopkins over his sudden and unexplained disappearance from Twitter. Remarkably, the story didn’t make the mainstream media, particularly the Manchester Evening News whom, conversely and perversely, draw a significant amount of their output from daily social media trawls and, in particular, police force users.
Apart from Grainger, iOPS and Operation Augusta, commentary on another disgraceful GMP scandal now appears very frequently on social media. This concerns the tragic death of 17 year old Yousef Makki, a Manchester Grammar School pupil stabbed to death in a leafy street in the millionaire village of Hale Barns.
Yousef’s family, close friends and supporters have, through their grief, moulded themselves into a formidable and well-informed campaigning group against the apparently woeful police investigation led by DCI Colin Larkin (unsurprisingly nicknamed “Pop”) and, it seems, half-hearted prosecution. The senior police officer with overall responsibility for the investigation is the aforementioned Maboob Hussain. He has emerged as the force’s spokesman on the scandal and ‘Mabel’ has met the Makki family, where his focus appeared to be attempting to discredit former Head of the Major Incident Team at GMP, Peter Jackson, who has been assisting Jade Akoum, Yousef’s exceptionally resourceful and articulate sister and Debbie Makki, his distraught mother. The popular and widely respected Jackson is now well known, nationwide, as the country’s most vocal and effective police whistleblower and, as such, a persistent thorn in the side of GMP and Mabel, it seems.
Jackson has brought Employment Tribunal proceedings against Greater Manchester Police, listed to commence on 20th April, 2020, over the highly questionable treatment he received from fellow senior officers after he blew the whistle on a lengthy, and truly shocking, list of failings by them (read in full here). The Tribunal is expected to sit for 12 weeks as some very dirty GMP washing will get a public airing from a lengthy list of police witnesses.
But Hussain has not been able to shake off the controversy surrounding his own appointment to his senior position in GMP and the serious doubts about his own integrity that flowed from it. It is covered in forensic detail elsewhere on this website (read in full here) and, devastating though it is, stands completely unchallenged. The Hussain/GMP/West Yorkshire Police strategy of stonewalling and attempting to silence critics has not worked – and in the modern era of instant and connected communication was never likely to, either. Especially as local, regional and national politicians, and policing figures, are now seized of the matter due to the significant adverse publicity being generated, and the consequent damage to public confidence in the police service more widely, and GMP in particular.
On any independent (or political or regulatory) view, Hussain should not be near any evidence chain until the doubts over his own trustworthiness, and those of a large number of other senior officers alleged to be involved in the ‘cover-up’, are resolved one way or another. Those include the deputy chief constable at GMP, Ian Pilling. A man with whom the author of this article has had extensive and mostly unsatisfactory dealings. Those interchanges may, very arguably, persuade anyone reviewing them that Pilling’s conduct, generally, and his approach to the indisputable misconduct of others, is highly questionable. To the extent that his seat as deputy chief constable is untenable at least until those doubts are satisfactorily, and independently, resolved.
After choosing to intervene in a Twitter thread concerning the Makki killing, Nick Bailey has been asked twice, on that social media platform to confirm if he believes that, on the basis of what is set out in the ‘When The Cover Up Becomes The Story‘ article, and the evidence behind it, three of his GMP Command Team colleagues, Hopkins, Pilling and Hussain are officers of unimpeachable integrity.
This is not a trick question, but one of the highest public interest and should, one might expect, have produced an immediate, and unequivocal, response in the affirmative. Especially, with Bailey having eulogised so profusely about the force, and those running it, when he joined Greater Manchester Police a short time ago.
It is also relevant to point out that he is highly qualified to make judgements on the integrity of policing colleagues, having spent a significant period of his Cheshire Constabulary as Head of their Professional Standards Department.
But the problem for Assistant Chief Constable Bailey is that he cannot endorse the integrity of any of those three senior colleagues, having read the Hussain article, without compromising his own.
So what will he do about it? An educated guess is NOTHING. Zero. Zilch. He will, presumably and having ignored the invitation on social media, be prepared to breach the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics requiring him to challenge inappropriate conduct and, of course, his first duty to those precept payers funding his huge salary by keeping them safe from other senior police officers whom, seemingly, cannot be trusted to do their job with unimpeachable integrity, without fear or favour and in accordance with the Oath of a Constable (read in full here). In the case of the Hussain ‘transfer’ from West Yorkshire to GMP there were, demonstrably, a fair few favours called in. It hangs over both police forces like the stench of fish, rotting from the head down.
Why is this situation allowed to pertain? Because that is how the top echelons of policing work. Almost every NPCC-rank officer will cover for another. Omertà is the operational code. We have seen another high profile example of that, very recently, in GMP, with the revelations and naming of the involvement of very senior officers in the premature closing down of Operation Augusta – and all that has happened since to stifle accountability and to silence another nationally-known, high octane whistleblower, Maggie Oliver. Where, undoubtedly, selective memory and refusal to co-operate with the enquiry were some of the most troubling revelations. Two ex-GMP officers who went on to become chief constables elsewhere head that list: Dave Jones, who suddenly quit North Yorkshire Police in mysterious circumstances in April, 2018 and Dave Thompson, still serving at West Midlands Police and known by former colleagues for his remarkable recall, across decades, on matters unconnected to the child sexual exploitation in Rochdale.
It is not clear what Bailey actually does to earn his six figure salary at GMP, apart from publicly support menopause campaigns on social media. His biography on the force website appears completely absent of detail as to what his portfolio responsibilities might be (read here).
He is, however, National Police Chiefs Council lead for information rights, covering the Freedom of Information Act and the Data Protection Act: On this basis alone, Bailey should resign from GMP as they are, in the extensive experience of the author of this article, persistent and mendacious law-breakers of both Acts. The cavalier and unacceptable approach by GMP to disclosure in civil claims is also the subject of repeated and vitriolic criticism by claimants and their lawyers.
If he has national responsibility for information rights, as appears to be the case, then the reader can add, for certain, the disgraceful antics of such as the three Yorkshire police forces, Humberside and Durham to the list of law-breakers. It should also be noted that the situation is getting worse since Bailey was appointed, not better.
In conclusion, it appears that Greater Manchester Police has landed itself with another dud, out of depth assistant chief constable to add to a depressingly long list of previous failures. If he finds this article an uncomfortable read then he should begin today and start to put matters right. Make his family and the beleagured junior ranks in GMP proud of him: Challenge those around him that are, at present, deemed untrustworthy; forget mealy-mouthed excuses and come clean about iOPS; robustly sort out the information rights catastrophe across the police service, starting urgently with GMP; spend less time fretting about menopause; and then another article can be written, and published, enthusiastically lauding those achievements.
Over to you, Nicholas Bailey and please use your right of reply.
At present, over three days after publication of this article, the email sent to ACC Bailey requesting comment has not been acknowledged. GMP’s press officer were copied in to that communication.
That failure to respond is, of itself, a breach of the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics under the headings of Respect and Courtesy; Duties and Responsibilities. But as this article sets out, in the main, if you are a senior police officer engaged by Greater Manchester Police you regard yourself as above the law.
It would, after all, take just a few seconds to type: “Thanks, but no comment“.
Page last updated on Monday 2nd March, 2020 at 1445hrs
Picture credit: Greater Manchester Police
Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.
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Please Note: An Order under Section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act has been applied to the reporting of this case. A copy has been posted in the court precinct and in the press office. Details of the restriction cannot be published, but may be obtained from the county court office. The Order has been sent to the Legal Department of the National Union of Journalists with a view to a challenge.
This court report is arranged in reverse chronological order. Latest post appears at the top. Daily updates, where possible, will be provided at lunch adjournment and after court rises at the end of each sitting day:
Tuesday 3rd December, 2019
HHJ Neil Davey QC has found in favour of West Yorkshire Police. ‘Both causes of action fail and the claim is dismissed’. He set out his reasons in a detailed judgment handed down orally in open court, taking just under an hour.
For the second time in just over two months, I’ve sat in this same court in Bradford and listened to a judge deliver ‘cherry-picked’ findings that appear to be from a different trial to the one I’ve sat through from start to finish. The other was Dr Abdul Rashid -v- WYP and the full report of that trial can be read here. That judgment is presently the subject of a permission appeal to the High Court. Manifest, and admitted, breaches of policy, procedure and, arguably, the law were all overlooked. Most incredibly, the judge accepted the proposition that the misconduct of PC Perkins (as she was then), which received the minor sanction of a written warning.
So, West Yorkshire Police remain at large, as an organisation, to cut a swathe through more or less any piece of legislation, such as PACE; CPIA; DPA; and FOIA, as they frequently do on the watch of this court reporter. Authorised Professional Practice, Code of Ethics and their own internal policies are, also, often treated with scant regard. That is a formidable, but not exclusive list. It does not serve the public interest at all well if the judiciary see, as part of an unspoken public policy, to not only ‘whitewash’ these failings, but lionise those officers at the very heart of such breaches. There may be the noble intention of ‘maintaining public confidence in the police service’ but all it does is, conversely and perversely, undermine confidence in the civil and criminal justice systems.
The bereaved families and survivors of the Hillsborough Disaster, and at least two of the journalists who attended Preston Crown Court for all or much of the proceedings, in the re-trial of ex-Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, are of much the same mind. Whilst the scale of the Bradford trial involving West Yorkshire Police, and what was in issue, is miniscule in comparison to Hillsborough, the principle is the same: The State protects its own.
No written version of the judgment, either in hard copy or electronic form, was provided to either the police lawyers, Miss Perkins’ legal team or the press. An anachronism that has no place in the present court system and smacks of laziness on the part of a judge, whom, given his fine reputation, really should have done better. Particularly, as hearing this claim is a post-retirement sinecure without the huge caseload that besets sitting circuit judges.
Central to the judge’s findings was the proposition that a ‘major criminal investigation’, involving twenty-one officers, many of senior rank, into Miss Perkins was necessary and proportionate, and that justified the covert surveillance and obtaining over a year’s worth of data from the Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system. The suspected offence was claimed to be Misconduct in Public Office, one of the most serious non-violent offences on the statute book with, consequently, a very high evidential threshold. It carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. That proposition, and the evidence heard from the various police witnesses on that topic, notably retired inspector John Rogerson, viewed from the press seats at least, was nothing short of preposterous. The judge failed to note that the concept of the Misconduct in Public Office offence never featured in any of the contemporaneous, substantive, extensive, wide-ranging, police correspondence or notes, or in Rogerson’s witness statement filed and served in January, 2019. The first Miss Perkins’ legal team heard of this allegation was during Rogerson’s live witness evidence last week.
Despite this, one might think, catastrophic flaw and a generally unconvincing witness box performance throughout (he was shaking like a leaf for the last twenty minutes of it), Rogerson was accorded star witness status by the judge. Along with Karen Gayles, a retired superintendent who signed the ANPR authorisation. The latter features elsewhere on this website. The scandal outlined there, and Mrs Gayle’s role in it, lay to waste much of what she expounded from the witness box (read more here) and does not assist her reliability, or credibility. However, emboldened by that evidence she gave in Court 5 at Bradford Law Courts she may now emerge from her shell and renew her pursuit of her former colleague, Mabs Hussain, now an assistant chief constable in Greater Manchester Police, with the same rigour as she applied to Miss Perkins – and assist with establishing the truth of what appears to be a very troubling matter.
Permission to appeal the judgment, submitted orally by Sarah Hemingway on behalf of Miss Perkins, on the grounds that policies and guidance were not followed on surveillance, was refused by the judge. Ms Hemingway represented her client with commendable tenacity and, together with counsel for the police, Olivia Checa-Dover, was warmly commended by the judge for the assistance given to the court throughout the proceedings.
Costs in the sum of £1,000 were awarded against Miss Perkins. West Yorkshire Police had filed a costs budget of around £60,000 with the court. The taxpayer meets the shortfall, on top of the estimated internal costs of £100,000 that the investigation, and all that followed, has cost the police.
Kerry Perkins said after the verdict: “As a medically retired police officer with 16 years service, the judge’s one-sided assessment of the my former colleagues’ live evidence and his interpretation of the applicable law, guidance and policy is seriously troubling. The possibility, and funding, of a permission appeal to the High Court in Leeds is presently under consideration. I will not be making any further statement until that process is exhausted’.
Monday 2nd December, 2019
Court is not sitting today.
Operation Lapmoor has been referred to a number of times in these proceedings, in open court. In response to a freedom of information request made publicly, via the What Do They Know website, in September 2018 (read full correspondence here), West Yorkshire Police, after the usual stalling tactics, said they could neither confirm nor deny the existence of this investigation, relying on exemptions at Sections 30(3), Section 31(3) and Section 40(5) under FOIA.
Disclosure of the following information was sought:
1. Name of Gold Commander, or names of Gold Group.
2. Name of Senior Investigating Officer.
3. Dates upon which they were appointed.
4. Date operational codename requested.
5. Date police operation commenced, concluded.
6. Policy book, or log. Sometimes known as Blue or Gold book.
a. Date of first entry
b. Date of final entry
c. Number of actions
7. Number of officers deployed on the operation.
It is now known that there was no Gold Commander; no nationally accredited Senior Investigating Officer appointed; the investigating officer was acting inspector John Rogerson, a neighbourhood police officer; there was no policy book kept where decision makers recorded their actions and the rationales for them; the investigation appeared to commence in April, 2014 and completed with a successful appeal by Kerry Perkins against a misconduct meeting finding in April 2015; it appears that the number of officers deployed is TWENTY-ONE, the eight who gave live evidence plus Detective Superintendent Simon Bottomley, Superintendent Pat Casserley, Chief Inspector Suzanne Akeroyd, Chief Inspector Jim McNeil, Detective Chief Inspector Elizabeth Belton, Inspector Dave Bugg, Inspector Grant Stead, Inspector Ian Croft, Detective Constable Iain Harper, Reviewing officer Sarah Morris. The latter seven all worked in the Professional Standards Department either at HQ or District. Senior Human Resources officers, Helen Parkinson, Jayne Christopher, Judith Walker all appeared to be closely involved with Sergeant Astill and A/Inspector Rogerson in the investigation. In summary, there were ten senior officers involved and eleven of lesser ranks: four superintendents, three chief inspectors and four inspectors. All ranged against a part-time, female, disabled police constable who was also a single mother with two small children.
Part of the police case in defending this claim is that the Lapmoor investigation, into a fellow officer’s horse riding hobby, and dog walking, both admitted by police to be in her own time, was lawful, necessary and proportionate.
To her credit, the acting chief constable at the time, Dionne Collins, also became personally involved after a heartfelt plea from Miss Perkins. But, to be fair, it cannot be said that the chief was involved in the investigation.
It does not go to the evidence, or the determination of the Kerry Perkins claim by the judge, but one might argue that WYP hid behind three FOIA exemptions and a misconceived public interest test to conceal from view yet another of their investigations that didn’t even meet the basic tenets of approved professional practice. Another recent and glaring example was Operation Thatcham (read more here).
Conversely and perversely, a freedom of information request seeking almost exactly the same information was answered in its entirety (read more here).
Again, it does not go to the evidence in this claim, and the incidents occured well after the material times in the claim, but John Rogerson’s brother, David, who works in the same police staion at Havertop, near Normanton, featured in this widely shared scandal (the YouTube clip has received approaching 1 million views). Many officers at Normanton refused to identify David Rogerson, including his brother and a number of PSD officers, prior to an information being laid at Kirklees Magistrates Court for an alleged assault on a member of the public in the police station precincts in full view of the CCTV cameras. The district judge issued a warrant against Rogerson, he was summonsed and a trial date was fixed. The Crown Prosecution Service, under relentless pressure from both the Police Federation and PSD, took over the case two days before the trial and discontinued it on public interest grounds. The private posecution had met the evidential part of the Full Code Test. The full story can be read here.
Friday 29th November, 2019
Having heard all the evidence in the claim, the last live testimony having concluded on Thursday aftenoon, closing submissions were heard by the judge, HHJ Davey QC, from counsel for both parties. Sarah Hemingway representing the Claimant, Kerry Perkins, and Olivia Checa-Dover appeared for the Defendant, West Yorkshire Police. Judgment will be handed down in open court next week.
During the evidence, HHJ Davey will have formed his own view on the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of the facts as presented on behalf of Miss Perkins and the police. Eight serving or retired officers gave evidence for the Defendent and one retired police officer, who was also a Police Federation representative, gave evidence for the Claimant.
Ms Hemingway submits that it remains a fundamental right in this country to go about one’s business free from state surveillance, unless such action can be lawfully justified. Furthermore, one’s personal data must not be unlawfully processed and private information must not be misused. Safeguards protecting such principles must be effective in any democratic society.
The court is being asked to make findings on two issues in this case: (i) whether there has been a breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 in relation to a police investigation into the private life of Miss Perkins, a part-time police officer, following a horse-riding accident in September 2013; and (ii) whether the police misused her private information.
It is noteworthy, submits Ms Hemingway that it has not, at any time, throughout the investigation into her hobby, or since, been asserted by the police that Miss Perkins was horse riding when she should have been at work. This is an activity that was always done in her own time outside of agreed working hours.
It should be noted that further evidence as to the extent of the police investigation into Kerry Perkins has only come to light at trial this week. Firstly, she was not aware that retired inspector, John Rogerson (who gave evidence on Tuesday and Wednesday), had attended at her children’s school, or telephoned the school, to make enquiries about her children. This was understandably upsetting for the Claimant, given her valid concerns about the impact of this investigation on her children. Secondly, the subject matter of the Public Interest Immunity evidence given by two surveillance officers had a considerable impact on her, given that she thought that the police had been absolutely clear, following an number of data requests and conduct complaints, that there had been no other forms of surveillance done on her. Thirdly, the lead surveillance officer’s evidence (heard on Wednesday) that he had entered onto the private land behind her home, in the early hours of 10 June 2014 and in order to identify her vehicles, while she and her two young children were sleeping in the house, without any lawful authority to do so, has caused further upset.
This case, Ms Hemingway went on to say, appears to be ‘exceptional’ in that no officer giving evidence this week has been able to say with any real certainty that they know of any more than one other misconduct investigation that has involved such methods of surveillance on a serving police officer. James Carter (who gave evidence on Wednesday) of the force’s Central Authorities Bureau went so far as to say that there may have been one case every 4 – 5 years, revised to 3 – 4 years, but was unable to give any specifics. The consequence, therefore, of any finding in favour of the Claimant is unlikely to extend beyond the specific facts of this case, given its highly unusual features.
The police have a duty to maintain an efficient and effective police force, consequent to sections 39 and 39A of the Police Act 1996. Ms Hemingway submitted that suspected breaches of the Code of Ethics must be dealt with by way of an investigation, but only to the extent that any formal investigation is lawful and necessary for a legitimate purpose and is not excessive. The investigation in this case was initiated (by Rogerson) due to concerns that Miss Perkins was suspected of horse riding and driving more than she professed to be able to. In relation to horse riding, Miss Perkins never sought to hide the fact that she had got back in the saddle after her accident and rode, occasionally, in her spare time when she felt up to it. She had posted pictures about it on Facebook (a social media wesite), with some of her Facebook friends, quite naturally, being police colleagues. She stabled her horses at the same place as her friend Inspector Lynne Proctor. And when approached by a local community support officer, Ken Short, she openly told him that she was out on her horse. A statement about this was, eventually, taken from PSCO Short in October 2014. 11. Had Miss Perkins been asked by Sgt Astill (now inspector), Detective Sergeant Bainbridge (now chief inspector), Rogerson, or any other officer, she would have told them that she rode her horse. Yet, each police officer, when cross-examined, admitted they had not sought to take make that obvious, and reasonable, enquiry. Indeed, Ms Hemingway recalls, Rogerson contended in his evidence that he would not have even contemplated doing so, as he ‘would have needed to gather as much information as possible as part of the investigation in order to put all the evidence to Miss Perkins and ask questions under caution’. Other witnesses, including Mr Carter, and retired superintendents Simon Whitehead (who gave evidence on Wednesday) and Karen Gayles (who gave evidence on Thursday), operated on the assumption that she must have been asked, but had not given an answer.
It was further submitted by Ms Hemingway, the police’s own Occupational Health Unit provided a medical opinion (by Dr Williams, Force Medical Advisor) that, “When her symptoms allow, there is no medical reason to debar her from pursuing this activity” and went on to advise “In periods when Kerry is subject to a flare-up of back symptoms I anticipate that horse riding would not be advised, nor indeed possible in the event of a flare-up being severe”. However, that simple request for OHU advice was not made by Rogerson until at least five months after the investigation began. Counsel added to this point by saying that, had these simple initial steps been taken at the outset, it would have negated any reason to conduct an investigation for the purpose of establishing whether Ms Perkins was horse riding, where she kept her horses or whether a back injury would necessarily preclude her from horse riding. Miss Perkins accepts, had those enquiries been made and she had refused to answer, then that would, of course, have been a different matter. But it is submitted that the police cannot reasonably justify such an exceptional Professional Standards Department misconduct investigation, as did take place, in the absence of such attempts to obtain information in a less intrusive manner. In relation to driving, Ms Perkins maintains that she had always explained when questioned that she had good days and bad days as a result of flare-ups of her back condition and that made it difficult for her to commit to commuting to Castleford on every duty day. She explained that she could drive on a longer journey if having a good day but would be limited if having a bad day, which she was unable to predict. Ms Perkins disputes that she ever said that she could not drive any distance, which is how it was presented to other officers involved in the investigation by Mr Rogerson. It is submitted that the UPP process was the most appropriate way to deal with any concerns that the police had about Ms Perkins’ return to her regular part time operational role at Castleford. Nonetheless, even if it was necessary to conduct any formal investigation into her driving abilities, any such investigation, which may well have involved checks on the PNC for DVLA and MID information and reference to ANPR must have been conducted in compliance with the DPA and common law. It is submitted that there were significant contraventions in this case.
Such checks about car details and insurance details were done on both vehicles belonging to Miss Perkins as part of the Rogerson investigation, providing basic data required for Operation Lapmoor (under the Covert Activity Policy) and the ANPR data trawl and analysis.
Ms Hemingway says the answers to the three specific questions is, therefore, contingent upon the learned Judge’s finding in relation to the ANPR and surveillance issues.
(1). In respect of ANPR was processing done lawfully? The written authority was not clear and did not in fact, lawfully, authorise the ANPR data collection, unless the court accepts the evidence of John Rogerson that he was conducting a major investigation into Misconduct in Public Office (which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment). Mrs Gayles’ evidence was that such a major investigation was never mentioned by Rogerson during the briefing and, given that such a purpose was not mentioned in his witness statement or in any other relevant documentation, it is submitted that it is unlikely that was the stated purpose of the application. The fact that PSD felt urged to make enquiries as to whether ANPR searching can be used in a misconduct investigation indicates that the law was not clear. Moreover, the answer to that question was ‘There is no definitive answer which states ‘yes’ or ‘no’ specifically in relation to using recorded ANPR data in a misconduct investigation’. The local WYP policy provides that ANPR can be used in the investigation of crime. It does not refer to investigations into alleged breaches of the code of ethics, or any non-crime related investigations. The Home Office National ANPR Standards states access to data must be solely law enforcement and investigation purposes. Such investigations to fall within three main categories: Major investigations, serious investigations, priority and volume investigations. Mrs Gayles stated that she considered this case to fall within that third category, which includes ‘non-crime issues such as anti-social behavior, vehicle excise offences, road traffic offences and missing persons’. That document does, however, make reference to investigations into alleged breach of the Code of Ethics. It is the only place in the document, or any other relevant policy, that does so and it is unclear how that fits with the three main categories set out above. Nor does it specify the age of the data to be mined as a result of the authority. The Surveillance Camera Code of Practice covers ANPR data. It is submitted that, contrary to Guiding Principles, the rules were not sufficiently clear on who can gain access and for what purpose, when the national standards were considered in conjunction with the local policy and the applicable authorisation form.
(2) Was the processing of data done for a legitimate aim? John Rogerson stated (repeatedly) that the aim of obtaining the ANPR data was in order in investigate Miss Perkins for a major crime, namely Misconduct in Public Office. That was the box that was ticked on the relevant form and, he says, that was the thrust of the briefing he gave to Mrs Gayles, the authorising officer. Mrs Gayles refutes that a major investigation into Misconduct in Public Office was ever discussed in the briefing. Instead, she proceeded on the basis that the investigation was in order to establish whether there had been discreditable conduct/dishonesty on the part of Miss Perkins. However, she accepted undr cross examination that the authorisation form does not reflect that purpose.
(3) Was processing of the data done adequately, relevantly, not excessively? Even if the police can properly rely on the investigation into alleged breaches of Code of Ethics, there is no indication as to how much data (for example, age of data) can be accessed – that box in the table on the (wrong, out of date) form used by Mrs Gayles was left blank. She stated that as authorising officer it would be open to her to determine the age of data to be collected and she would ensure that the scope of the request was proportionate. She authorized the amount of time requested by Rogerson, that is to say, more than one year. It is submitted that, in the circumstances of this case, it was not proportionate to harvest over a years’ worth of data, in any event, but certainly not dating back to a date prior to the injury that occurred on 1st September, 2013. Principle 3 of the Data Protection Act, which is addressed specifically in the WYP local policy on data protection, advises ‘When police computers are designed, consideration is given to information to be held and any forms to be used in collecting it. So long as you stick to information the computer is designed to hold, it would be difficult to argue it is excessive or not relevant’. It is submitted that the relevant form in this instance did not provide for ANPR data collection of over one year in relation to misconduct investigations because it was not considered in developing the local policy and as such the authorisation was not relevant to the data that was collected. It is further submitted that the data, once collected, was then improperly disclosed as part of a misconduct interview on 6th November. 2014.
OPERATION LAPMOOR/ CAP ‘Reconnaissance’ by Rogerson on 29th April, 2014. Whilst Rogerson initially stated that he had ‘driven past PC Perkins’ home address’, when questioned it became clear that he had parked outside Ms Perkins’ home to observe for a unspecified amount of time, he had then driven to her children’s school (though could not recall whether he attended the school to make enquiries about her children or had telephoned the school), and he had also driven around the area in an attempt to locate the riding stables. It is submitted that enquiries made at the school were unlawful as it constituted collateral intrusion upon the private lives of her young children.
Surveillance on 10th June 2014:
(1) Was processing done lawfully? Ms Hemingway submits that, in this case, the CAP did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the police to conduct surveillance and to store data pertaining to Miss Perkins’ private life. According to Mr Carter’s evidence, the CAP has since been amended, by the police, in order to make it clear. It is submitted that Mr Whitehead did not understand the policy, in particular the distinction that has been made by the police in that Directed Surveillance should come under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) regime. This is not clear in the CAP policy and he, unwittingly, made an authorisation under the CAP for ‘Directed Surveillance’. It is submitted on behalf of the Claimant that the domestic legal framework, outside the RIPA framework, falls back on to the DPA 1998. In the specific circumstances of this case, it was entirely unclear in reference to the policy under what circumstances the police could resort to such covert measures, which do on the face of it appear to engage Directed Surveillance. The CAP is neither legally binding, nor directly publicly accessible. It, therefore, follows that the interference in this case was not in accordance with the law and thus an Article 8 violation. In such circumstances, it also follows that the interference was in breach of the DPA principle of being in accordance with the law. Furthermore, it is submitted that the process of applying for authorisation under the CAP was not even done in compliance with the force’s own procedures. Mr Carter’s evidence was that PSD investigations under CAP are ‘Level 2’, along with major investigations. Such a level of authorisation would require an Authorising Officer to make the decision as to whether to grant authority on an objective basis in a quasi-judicial capacity. However, in this case, for reasons specific to this case, it was decided that District Superintendent Whitehead would authorise the CAP.
(2) Was processing done for a legitimate aim? The ostensible aim of the police, in conducting the Lapmoor operation, was in pursuant to the duty to maintain an effective and efficient police force, which is of course a legitimate aim. Steps taken in that regard, such as the Unsatisfactory Performance Process (UPP), would, no doubt, be justifiable under that stated aim. However, there is evidence in this case that the purpose in setting up Operation Lapmoor went beyond that legitimate aim. The purpose in this case was set out to some extent in the email from Detective Inspector Grant Stead (who did not give evidence) to Stuart Bainbridge (who gave evidence on Wednesday), dated 4th October, 2014. It was suggested that it would be an ideal opportunity for observation training to be utilised, for a successful operation to be used as an example to how to get the message across to the wider force, and to illustrate how PSD assist District with such matters. Such objectives fall outside of the ‘legitimate’ aim and illustrate that the investigation was not motivated solely by a desire to address the specific issues arising in Miss Perkin’s case.
(3) Was processing done adequately, relevantly, not excessively? In any event, Ms Hemingway submits that the nature of the covert surveillance operation was disproportionate in the circumstances. In emails sent to and from John Rogerson on 10/6/14 and 12/6/14 respectively [E:21-22], it is clear that a little research on open source material / google search was sufficient to find the information sought and rendered operation Lapmoor unnecessary. Such a reasonable step to ‘investigate’ such a matter was not done. Such information had been available on open sources, yet instead a decision had been made to obtain a broad ranging authorisation for covert surveillance, involving not insignificant policing hours (including the time it would have taken otherwise busy police staff and a senior officer to consider and draft the appropriate paper work, plan the operation, allocate the resources as well as over 9 hours of police hours in conducting the surveillance on 10/6/14). 42. On any reasonable analysis, it is submitted that such a step was disproportionate and excessive in the circumstances. Information obtained from friends and associates 43. Speaking with friends/ associates at the riding club constituted an interference with Ms Perkins’ Article 8 rights private life. Such steps were excessive and unnecessary given that such information could have been obtained from the outset by simply asking Ms Perkins. Information regarding Ms Perkin’s health and disability 44. This information constituted sensitive personal information under the DPA 1998 and as such had to comply with at least one of the conditions in schedule 3. It is accepted that information relating to Ms Perkins’ health and disability were required in order to make an assessment and assist her back to work, part of which would have included providing a suitable workspace (lumbar support chair and riser desk), albeit that took over a year to source. 45. It is contended that the police were not entitled to medical records from the GP in order to make an assessment in relation to a misconduct investigation. Rather, the reports from OHU and the report from the GP received on 10/11/14, attaching the MRI scan report, was sufficient for the purposes of the misconduct proceedings. 46. Such information in relation to Ms Perkin’s condition however was distributed to an excessive amount of personnel within the police force, in particular during the course of the CAP application. If the learned Judge finds that Operation Lapmoor was unnecessary and / or disproportionate in the circumstances, then it follows that the information relating to Ms Perkins’ health and disability that was distributed by way of emails and reports for the purposes of the investigation was equally unnecessary and disproportionate. What is the extent of the private information obtained and was it misused? 47. Ms Perkins accepts that the information she posted on her facebook page and the information about her competing at a horse-riding event on 22/2/14 do not constitute private information.
MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION In relation to the questions the judge needs to answer regarding misuse of private information, Ms Hemingway submits that they are: 1) Whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy? 2) If yes, how should the balance be struck between rights of Miss Perkins and duties of the police? In answering this second question, the judge was invited to take into account the following factors: a) Attributes of Miss Perkins b) Nature of activity c) Place it was happening d) Nature and purpose of intrusion e) Absence of consent f) Effect on Miss Perkins g) Circumstances in which, and purpose for which. info came into hands of the police h) Public interest. The judge was invited to apply the latter test to all categories in the schedule, as agreed between both counsel. In this case, Miss Perkins was horse-riding in her own time, a leisure and sporting activity which can gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, as in the cited authority of Hannover v Germany, wherein Princess Caroline of Monaco brought a claim against the German media that had published photographs of her engaging in leisure activities. On the occasions that Miss Perkins did ride, it was mainly on private farm land near her home. It is accepted that there is no reasonable expectation of activities relating to public events that are likely to be reported in different forms of media. That concluded Ms Hemingway’s submissions
Miss Checa-Dover, on behalf of the police, summarises her client’s position to the effect that the investigation into Miss Perkins was lawful, compliant with the Data Protection Act, 1998 and her reasonable expectation of a right to privacy. The chief constable, through her, also contends that the Claimant’s data was processed lawfully and that the misconduct investigation, into alleged breaches of the Code of Ethics, was lawful, necessary and proportionate in order to maintain public confidence in an efficient and effective police service.
The reader is reminded again that the burden of proof in this claim is for the police to prove the lawfulness and proportionately of their actions.
Thursday 28th November, 2019
First witness was retired sergeant, James Carter, who now works as a civilian in the force’s Central Authorities Bureau. His evidence, under cross-examination by Sarah Hemingway, counsel for Miss Perkins, covered complex and, sometimes, conflicting and confusing areas of law and policy, relating to investigatory powers, directed surveillance and covert policing activity. The court heard that Mr Carter had worked in the Bureau for around 10 years, reporting to an officer called Lynton Patz who manages the bureau, and that he was able to assist with the classification of the seriousness of surveillance between Level 1 (lesser crime) and Level 2 (serious crime and Professional Standards investigations) and the difference between ‘directed surveillance’ and ‘surveillance’, in a policing context, and how both were balanced against data protection and Article 8 Convention rights that lie at the heart of this case. Mr Carter told the court that he had actually filled in the Covert Activity Policy application form relating to the surveillance on Kerry Perkins, the Claimant in this case. The applicant was Inspector John Rogerson from whom the court heard quite extraordinary evidence on Tuesday and Wednesday. He had given Mr Carter a verbal briefing and there were no records of notes or documents that supported the application, the court heard. Mr Patz had reviewed the application form and approved it. Ms Hemingway asked Mr Carter why no written application was made by Rogerson, he stated he was ‘not sure that a written memo, in form of email, wasn’t received from him’. No such document has been disclosed to the Defendant’s legal team. The court also heard that this CAP authorisation is one of only two Mr Carter has dealt with against a police officer in his ten years in the Bureau, whom, to his knowledge of the activities of all the other members of his team, dealt with them once every four or five years. He agreed with Ms Hemingway that such action was ‘exceptional’. It also emerged in evidence that he couldn’t recall a discussion with Rogerson regarding enquiries being made directly of PC Perkins (as she was then) regarding her horse riding. He did recall, however, being told she was ‘unco-operative’ over her medical condition. His own policy, as an experienced police officer and Bureau official, he told Ms Hemingway, was to look for less intrusive means of obtaining data, evidence before authorising a CAP.
Next in the witness box was retired superintendent Karen Gayles, who features prominently elsewhere on this website (read more here). In the light of her evidence to the court that article now assumes higher relevance. The court heard that Mrs Gayles was the officer who authorised Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) surveillance on PC Perkins and the harvesting and processing of data from that computerised system for at least 12 months across three counties. Under cross-examination it emerged that Mrs Gayles had relied only on a verbal briefing from an officer whom had plainly, on his own evidence heard in this court earlier in the week, become obsessed by criminalising Miss Perkins; used the wrong form for the authorisation; did not accept that such use made the authorisation unlawful; ticked the box for ‘major criminal investigation’ despite maintaining repeatedly it was ‘a misconduct matter’; at first relied on the premise that the justification for the surveillance was volume or urgent crime, later resiled to alleged breach of Code of Ethics (misconduct by another name); this was the only authorisation she ever made for ‘misconduct’ in her career; authorised at least 12 months of surveillance and would have been prepared to authorise it for 5 or 6 years as a means of ‘being fair to Kerry’; did not know that the vehicles to be surveilled were insured for multiple drivers and, therefore, the objective of the surveillance could not possibly be achieved; did not ask if less intrusive means of surveillance were available; claimed reasonable adjustments had been made for PC Perkins regarding her disability; did not retain her day book as she was required to do under force policy; could not recall if there was an entry in that day book relating to the authorisation; made no notes or minutes of the briefing with Rogerson; did not accept that there were no safeguarding processes in place to check the validity of her actions (or inactions); asserted that her motivation for a ‘robust’ approach to the authorisation, and the proving of misconduct, or otherwise, was ‘austerity’; wrongly claimed that PC Perkins was earning £25,000 per annum. Throughout the cross-examination, Mrs Gayles forcefully repeated that the authorisation was ‘necessary and proportionate’, was lawful and complied with policy.
The last witness to give evidence in this claim was the second surveillance officer known to have attended at Miss Perkins’ home on 10th June, 2014. He cannot be named, for legal reasons, and is referred to here as Detective Y. Most of his evidence was heard in camera; the only question raised in public session was whether he knew of a third vehicle that may have attended at her home on that morning. He said he ‘couldn’t remember’.
Testimony from the three West Yorkshire Police witnesses today completed the evidence in this trial and the case for the defence.
It does not go to the determination of the issues in this trial, but of far wider public concern and a troubling feature, almost throughout this hearing, has been what appears, at close quarters, to be the general conduct and selective memory of serving and retired officers giving witness box evidence, on oath. This particularly applies to the two surveillance officers: Why would a police force continue to deploy specialist, expensively trained officers where core competencies have to be obeying lawful orders; good, clear recollection of events; and accurate recording and/or note taking.
It was revealed in court that Detective Y had received a ‘de-brief’ from Detective X about the latter’s evidence (given on Wednesday afternoon) before the former appeared in the witness box (on Thursday afternoon). At the time of the briefing, Detective Y said he did not know he was to give live evidence, although he had filed a witness statement and was on the original list of those officers expected to appear at the hearing.
Wednesday 27th November, 2019
Proceedings resumed at 10.45am with retired detective inspector John Rogerson continuing his evidence after a dramatic afternoon in the witness box yesterday afternoon.
He was questioned by counsel for the Claimant, Sarah Hemingway, on a number of matters relating to his characterisation of the alleged misconduct Kerry Perkins as ‘a major criminal investigation’. He confirmed that he had told the authorising officer, Superintendent Karen Gayles, of his view on the scale and type of the operation, but such an assertion did not appear anywhere in his witness statement. When it was put to him, he denied that he had ‘shoehorned’ this into his evidence yesterday to fit the contemporaneous documentation. He had no answer to the point that a major criminal investigation, according to national policing policy, would require a nationally recognised and PIP Level 3 accredited Senior Investigating Officer (read more here). The judge, HHJ Neil Davey QC, crystallised this point: WYP’s Professional Standards Department had assessed the matter as misconduct, Mr Rogerson thought they (PSD) had got that wrong and it was a major criminal investigation.
He also confirmed to the court that he had no experience, or knowledge, of the ACPO Code of Practice in relation to accessing the Police National Computer for information extracted from the DVLA or the Motor Insurance Database. Or, indeed, had he ever seen West Yorkshire Police’s own policy document relating to this issue. His strong view was that all his actions relating to the covert surveillance of a junior colleague on his team, including the harvesting, storage and processing of ANPR data across three counties and for over a year, were necessary, proportionate and fell within the ambit of a proper policing purpose. Even though it is an agreed fact in that case that the subject vehicles were insured for multiple drivers.
John Rogerson signed off his evidence by asserting, with some force, when questioned by counsel, that an intrusive and far-reaching investigation into their mother, a serving police officer, over whether, or not, she was driving a horsebox or walking her dog, that he classified as a major criminal investigation, would have impact on two young children or breach their Article 8 Human Rights: “I didn’t see that then, and I don’t see it now. Why would an investigation into a parent have an impact on children?”
Evidence was then heard from Detective Chief Inspector Stuart Bainbridge. It was drawn out in cross-examination by Ms Hemingway that a written assurance given by Inspector Grant Stead to Kerry Perkins turned out to be untrue. It concerned a request regarding his independence and impartiality in connection with an investigation into complaints raised by Miss Perkins. Stead assured her that he had no previous involvement in any misconduct matters pertaining to her. He was, it was heard, the PSD officer who managed the covert surveillance on her and communicated with Mr Bainbridge, his immediate subordinate, by email, on this particular point.
The court also heard that Mr Stead had told the surveillance team headed by Mr Bainbridge that there was to be no mobile surveillance. That instruction, the court heard, was ignored and the two operatives under Bainbridge’s command carried out mobile surveillance, for which one of the two operatives, who will be referred to in these reports as Detective Y, was even not trained. The objective was to find the location of the stables where Miss Perkins kept her horse. When asked by Ms Hemingway if the officers investigating her, Sergeant Astill (as he was then) and Inspector Rogerson (from both of whom the court has already heard) could simply have asked her where the stables were, rather than an expensive, resource intensive policing operation, he said: ‘Possibly, yes’. The court heard that the information the police required regarding the stables was obtained by a Google search undertaken shortly after the initial surveillance activity, which was, the court heard, carried out at the wrong time of day and when Miss Perkins was on police duty. Mr Bainbridge maintained that the surveillance operation against her was necessary and proportionate. He said that Inspector Rogerson, an experienced Professional Standards detective sergeant before he was promoted to neighbourhood inspector, had tried different ways to obtain the information and failed. He did not elaborate on that but it was heard that they did not include asking Miss Perkins, or an internet search. Mr Bainbridge told counsel that he didn’t ask his former PSD colleague where the riding stables information came from when the authority to carry out surveillance was cancelled by a superior officer. The court heard that Mr Bainbridge made no notes pertaining to this surveillance in his pocket note book, as he is required to do under Police Regulations.
The next witness cannot be named for legal reasons. He is referred to here as Detective X. Part of his evidence was heard in camera. The report on his evidence will be necessarily brief to avoid the possibility of jigsaw identification. Detective X couldn’t explain to Ms Hemingway, when questioned, why mobile surveillance was carried out against specific written orders from Inspector Stead, or why he went at the opposite end of the day to that discussed between senior officers and recommended by Inspector Rogerson. He also couldn’t explain why his surveillance partner was deployed although not trained for what he was asked to do and no notes of the operation were made in his pocket book. He told the court that he did not know that he had been deployed on private land, in a location identified by Inspector Rogerson, for which he did not have authority. He did agree with counsel when asked about the requirement to assess the necessity and proportionality of what he was doing but could not answer when asked about the experience and training of his fellow operative, DC West.
The last witness of the day was retired chief superintendent, Simon Whitehead. The court heard that he was the senior officer who had authorised the Covert Activity Policy (CAP). His career had included a spell in PSD as a chief inspector. When asked by Ms Hemingway if he took CAP authorisations seriously he said, ‘Yes’, but then said he had made no notes of the process in his day book, as required and he had received only a verbal briefing from Inspector Rogerson, whom, the court heard, did not produce a single document in support of his request for authority and, similarly, had no written record of the meeting. Mr Whitehead’s understanding of the central issue was that Miss Perkins couldn’t perform operational policing duties but was horseriding as a hobby. Alleged dishonesty was never raised as an issue with him by Rogerson. However, he described the horseriding as ‘significant allegations (sic)’ that could ‘adversely affect the reputation of West Yorkshire Police’. He told the court that he had considered an authority under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) but it was not a criminal investigation, a point clarified by the judge. He also said that he had performed the balancing act over Article 8 rights and proportionate action and the scales came down on the side of intrusive surveillance. This was shortly after he told the court that he would have expected Sergeant Astill to have asked PC Perkins where her stables were. He had not checked that was the case before signing off the CAP authority. Mr Whitehead could not assist with the question of whether CAP was a policy that applied across the wider police service and he wasn’t familiar with the statutory framework. In answer to Ms Whitehead, he told the court that he didn’t recognise the West Yorkshire Police Data Protection policy to which he had been directed in the bundle. He agreed that unlawful processing of data would reflect badly on West Yorkshire Police and harm their reputation.
Tuesday 26th November, 2019
Proceedings under way at 11.20am. The judge allocated a later start than usual to allow counsel from both parties to continue discussions, carried over from yesterday afternoon, aimed at crystallising the status of the data and information still under consideration in this trial. It is worth repeating that this is a ‘liability only’ trial.
On a point of housekeeping, permission was granted by the court for Matthew Stringer, a witness on behalf of the Claimant, Miss Perkins, to rely on his second witness statement, filed at the beginning of November, 2019. His first witness statement was dated 14th December, 2018.
A retired South Yorkshire Police constable, and former Police Federation representative, Mr Stringer is the first witness to give live testimony in this case. Much of his evidence had fallen away as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) is no longer in issue in this claim. With regard to the alleged helicopter surveillance, denied by the police, that had troubled Miss Perkins so much, he advanced the view that ‘there was no smoke without fire’. Reference was made by Mr Stringer to known misuse of police aircraft by his SYP colleagues and the judge clarified that he was alluding to the infamous case of flying over people sunbathing in their back garden. Counsel for the Defendant characterised that part of his evidence as reckless and made without access to the full facts. Mr Stringer, in response said his evidence was given with an honest perspective. He also told the court that he had never come across covert surveillance of a fellow officer in all his years as a Fed rep.
That completed the case for the Claimant. The court having adopted her witness statement as her evidence in chief and there being no cross-examination required by the police.
The Defendant opened its case with evidence from a serving West Yorkshire Police inspector, Mike Astill, who was the first witness for the Defendant. He was a sergeant working in the Castleford neighbourhood policing team at the time Kerry Perkins suffered her back injury in February, 2013. He confirmed that she had an unblemished police career. Under questioning from her counsel, it emerged that Mr Astill was her line manager, and one of the driving forces behind disciplinary measures that were instituted whilst she was still under the care of both her own doctor and the police force’s occupational health unit. He agreed with counsel that reasonable adjustments for Miss Perkins’ injury, such as a lumbar support chair and a riser desk were not made for over a year. Asked about an email he had sent to colleagues that opened with ‘Kerry is a problem child and top of my hit list’, he denied that was a signal of his intention to make life difficult for Miss Perkins and remove her from his team. When questioned about why he chose to deliver a formal disciplinary notice at 9.30pm to Miss Perkins’ home, where she lived alone with two young children, he couldn’t explain why he chose that hour to complete the task. Mr Astill also said that ‘it was not his finest hour’ when he wrote derogatory comments about Miss Perkins in an email sent to Chief Inspector McNeill. It also emerged in cross-examination that the core allegation that led to those disciplinary proceedings was the fact that she could ride a horse, but not commute to the police station near Castleford, from her home in South Elmsall, on a daily basis. A secondary allegation was that she had been seen walking her dog. Mr Astill could not explain why that process commenced when it ran counter to the findings of two doctors, one of whom was employed by the police.
The second police witness was retired detective inspector, John Rogerson. He was the neighbourhood inspector at Castleford at the time the dispute arose with Miss Perkins and, it soon became evident, the other driving force behind the proceedings being taken against her and the covert, but seriously intrusive, surveillance that formed part of those actions. Under careful and forensic questioning from Sarah Hemingway, it emerged that Mr Rogerson, absent of the medical facts and none too careful about how he went about it, became obsessive about proving that there was serious wrongdoing attached to the horse riding hobby of one of his junior officers, given that, although on duty, her injury meant she was unable to commit to a significant daily journey to a station remote from her home. He variously claimed that it could amount to gross misconduct, potentially leading to dismissal from the force, or the criminal offence of misconduct in public office that carries a maximum prison sentence of life imprisonment. Conversely, it emerged that a Professional Standards Department reviewing officer questioned whether, in fact the horseriding was an issue at all, but Mr Rogerson ploughed on regardless. When seeking formal authorisation from a senior officer for covert surveillance he ticked the box marked ‘Major Investigation’, normally reserved for murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, infanticide, terrorist activities, kidnapping. Asked by counsel if he maintained that position in the case of Miss Perkins, her back injury and horse riding, Mr Rogerson confirmed that he did. The surveillance that was authorised at his request is now known, from the evidence, to include checks on the school of Miss Perkins’ children; undercover officers stationed at the rear of her house; contact with neighbours and riding school colleagues; aerial photographs of her home; monitoring of her social media accounts and ANPR (automatic number plate recognition) across three counties without time limit. He maintained all this was necessary to ‘build up a picture of her lifestyle’ and was necessary and proportionate to aid the disciplinary proceedings. Mr Rogerson flatly rejected the question by Ms Hemingway that there were much easier ways to obtain the information he was seeking, almost all of via open source.
The court adjourned at 4.50pm with Mr Rogerson’s evidence part heard.
Monday 25th November, 2019
The trial opened today in Bradford Combined Court Centre to decide a civil claim brought by a retired police officer against her former employers, West Yorkshire Police. It is expected to take up seven court sitting days with judgment scheduled to be handed down on Tuesday 3rd December, 2019.
The Claimant, Kerry Perkins, who lives in the Pontefract area and served 16 years with her local force as a police constable, before retiring on medical grounds, claims that the Defendants seriously breached her data protection and privacy rights. The police are resisting the claim.
Miss Perkins is represented in court by Sarah Hemingway of counsel, instructed by John Hagan of DPP Law. WYP are represented by Olivia Checa-Dover of counsel, instructed by Prue Crossland of the force’s Legal Services Department.
The claim will be heard by HHJ Neil Davey QC, who has returned to judicial duty having retired in June, 2019 from full time service on the bench.
In the first instance, this is a trial of breach only. The Claimant seeks damages from the Defendant for personal injury, but matters of causation and quantum will be dealt with seperately, if the judge finds in favour of Miss Perkins on liability.
The claim arises out of an investigation conducted by the police into the private life of Miss Perkins after it came to light that she had resumed horse riding, despite the fact that she was on restricted duties at work as a result of a back injury.
As part of that investigation, West Yorkshire Police collected information about Miss Perkins from various sources, including DVLA and Motor Insurance Database, from the Police National Computer (PNC), social media and by directly contacting her friends and associates at various riding stables and clubs.
The police also authorised Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) analysis and a Covert Activity Policy (CAP), in order to assess whether she was falsely claiming that she was injured, or unfit for routine policing duties as an operational officer. It was considered by senior officers in the Professional Standards Department that proof of such alleged deceit may amount to discreditable conduct.
In the light of some of the information obtained by the police, misconduct proceedings were initiated and Miss Perkins was eventually issued with a written warning. A minor sanction that decays after 18 months, if there are no other misconduct findings during that period.
Miss Perkins has always maintained that horse riding was not inconsistent with her inability to return to regular duties. This belief was supported by both the Force Medical Advisor and her own doctor.
Miss Perkins disputes the purpose, proportionality and lawfulness, of the methods used by her colleagues to investigate her private life and, thereafter, retain and process her personal data. She initially believed that, as part of the internal investigation, she had been surveilled by police helicopter, and by undercover officers in cars that she had noticed, in suspicious circumstances, near the stables and in other locations close to her home.
The police vehemently deny the use of covert surveillance, admitting only a single episode, on 10th June 2014, and they have produced a number of officer statements to support this position. In light of that, and following the completion of the pre-trial disclosure process, Miss Perkins has withdrawn those elements of her claim, whilst maintaining that she did genuinely believe that such covert activities had taken place and for which she kept detailed event logs with a large number of entries on each.
Eight witnesses, including some very senior serving and retired officers, are due to give live evidence on behalf of the force. The total legal costs of both sides are expected to be in the order of £150,000.
In the course of a brief court day, the court heard submissions from counsel on three preliminary issues:
Permission to amend particulars by the Claimant’s, concerning sensitive personal information pertaining to Miss Perkins, openly accessible on police computer systems, was refused on the ground that the proposed amendment came too late for the police to properly address the issues raised.
Counsel for the police submits that there are concerns over the two witness statements of Matthew Stringer, a former Police Federation representative, who will give evidence on behalf of Miss Perkins: It is now agreed that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act does not apply to this claim and, as such, there are ‘unhelpful, irrelevant, inadmissible paragraphs’ in Mr Stringer’s evidence. HHJ Davey took the view that the statements should remain in the bundle and the matters raised by Miss Checa-Dover could be dealt with by way of cross-examination or in closing submissions.
During discussions prior to the commencement of the hearing, counsel for both parties were able to narrow the factual disputes in the claim. It is now agreed that Facebook data obtained from the social media account of Miss Perkins, during the internal investigation, did not constitute a privacy breach.
Counsel for the police told the court that, as such, Miss Perkins may no longer have to give live evidence in these proceedings.
Page last updated: Tuesday 3rd December, 2019 at 1900 hours
Photo Credits: Kerry Perkins
Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.
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On 3rd February, 2019, during a pre-trial hearing held in Bradford Combined Court Centre, a barrister, Olivia Checa-Dover, made several quite remarkable submissions to the judge, His Honour Neil Davey QC.
One of those was to the effect that West Yorkshire Police had, incredibly, instructed her to say they did not know where to locate one of their former officers.
More experienced, right-minded counsel might have told the instructing solicitor, Alison Walker, Deputy Head of Legal Services at WYP, not to place her in such a compromising position.
At the final hearing of a controversial, high profile civil claim, seven months later, Miss Checa-Dover denied making such a submission. The transcript of those earlier proceedings will tell a different story, as does the contemporaneous reporting of them, that has stood unchallenged by WYP, and their legal team, since its publication (read in full here).
The man in question, Mark Lunn (pictured above), was the lead investigator, and the only officer working full time, on a police operation codenamed Thatcham: The largest fraud investigation in WYP history, and one that ultimately led to the arrests of 91 men, and convictions for 45 of them, over ‘crash for cash’ insurance claims.
He was the arresting officer of a number of those men. One of which was a Bradford doctor, Abdul Rashid, who ran two general practice surgeries and a private medico-legal practice in the city.
On 7th March, 2012, Lunn turned up at the doctor’s home with fifteen other officers at 6.15am. His wife and three children were asleep when the knock was made.
Dr Rashid was not, subsequently, charged with any offence and he had issued a civil claim against WYP on the grounds that his arrest and detention by the police was unlawful. As such, Lunn was at the very centre of those legal proceedings and the police were doing all they could to justify not producing him as a witness.
The reason the police say they ‘couldn’t locate’ Lunn is because he had, by a catalogue of dishonest actions, tainted Operation Thatcham and placed the entire investigation in jeopardy. If this was revealed by way of cross-examination of Mark Lunn, in open court, the public and the press would come to know that the 45 ‘crash for cash’ convictions are, very arguably, unsafe.
Appropriate disclosure of Lunn’s misdemeanours would have also greatly aided Dr Rashid’s claim for unlawful arrest.
It has only very recently been discovered, by a painstaking journalistic investigation (read more here), that by November, 2012, the police knew about the extent, and effect, of Lunn’s wrongdoing and its devastating impact on Thatcham. They chose to conceal that disclosure from the Crown Prosecution Service, and the suspects’ criminal defence lawyers, and thus began a sustained and far reaching WYP ‘cover-up’ that is now well into its seventh year.
The first stage of that audacious cover-up was to conceal Lunn’s wrongdoing from all except a small group of officers who had been involved in the internal misconduct investigations.
The second stage was not to prosecute him for what appears, arguably, to be at least one criminal matter (a second offence of computer misuse and associated data, licence breaches) and to apply no disciplinary sanctions at the end of that process, so that the misconduct investigation would attract no undue attention amongst the rest of the police force (at that time, misconduct findings against officers were published on police notice boards every Monday). A prosecution of Lunn would have also blown the cover-up.
The third stage was to keep Lunn under the WYP cloak, and out of harm’s way, until Operation Thatcham suspects were charged and the prosecutions of the ‘crash for cash’ perpetrators, and beneficiaries, were in chain. He is regarded as a loose cannon and his record both in the police and, subsequently, bears that out.
The fourth stage was to allow him, in August 2013, to resign from West Yorkshire Police with little, or no, adverse disciplinary record that would be a barrier to future employment. A reasonable hypothesis is that a deal had been cut with Lunn on this basis: Salary paid, and pension preserved, for at least another year; no adverse notes on his Human Resources (HR) file (the court heard during the civil trial that Lunn’s HR file had been ‘weeded’ and that disciplinary records had gone missing).
There is no other reason that WYP could justify overlooking a catalogue of serious misconduct issues, compounded by the fact that there is incontrovertible evidence that he repeatedly lied to two senior officers when confronted by some of the misdemeanours.
Mark Lunn’s lying did not stop when he left West Yorkshire Police. Before he had even left the force his name had already appeared, according to Companies House, on the list of Directors of a firm called Quo Vadis Investigation Services Ltd (QV). His biography on the company website was a fiction and he was forced to resign from QV after less than 3 months service. Lunn’s ‘success’ on Operation Thatcham was, apparently, the leverage for the appointment and the main feature of the bio, which included the claim he had been a detective for 20 years. The truth was he had been a CID officer for less than 5 years before forcibly removed from Thatcham, almost 2 years before the trial at which the men were convicted.
By 2014, Lunn was again attempting again to trade on Thatcham in a private venture. This time the vehicle was to be ‘Pennine Investigations‘. But a company of that name has never been registered and a Google search draws a blank.
In January, 2015 Mark Lunn started work at the Wakefield office of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). But, true to form, that is not what it says on his LinkedIn biography. Enigmatically, he is recorded as working for the Home Office as ‘an investigator’ and is still listed as working there.
This, on any view, was an extraordinary turn of events: An ex-police officer who has a string of misconduct investigations against his name turns up at the policing body charged with maintaining public confidence in the police complaints system. The IPCC purported to do that by oversight of the investigation of complaints made by members of the public against police officers. It is hard to imagine someone less suited to such a role as Mark Lunn.
These are just some of his misdemeanours that have been uncovered so far: He was subject to a large number of misconduct investigations whilst a serving police officer, including what appears to be a major covert operation codenamed Waffleedge; another covert operation codenamed Wademere; seriously compromised WYP’s largest ever fraud investigation; has twice been found to have misused police computers and software (many police officers are sacked after a first offence); appeared to obtain £183,000 from a major motor insurance company using a bogus company as an investment vehicle whilst a serving police officer; discussed details of a sensitive police operation with unconnected third parties; is an obsessive and persistent liar; a fantasist who invents competencies and past vocational experience on his CV’s and biographies: and has confessed, in police interview, to having a very bad memory.
Lunn’s complaints record includes allegations of unlawful arrest (four); assault (four); neglect of duty (three); incivility (two); oppressive conduct and harassment of a female; and false imprisonment.
It is also more likely than not he was part of the conspiracy, along with a number of other police and civilian officers, to conceal his wrongdoing from the Operation Thatcham suspects. The driving force for that conspiracy appears to be the present Head of WYP’s Homicide and Major Enquiry Team (HMET), Chief Superintendent Nick Wallen. He was a detective inspector in the force’s notorious Professional Standards Department at the time.
It is anticipated that, when the full story eventually emerges, the list of Lunn’s misdemeanours may well be longer. Two former high ranking WYP colleagues describe him as “thick as a brick” and, not uncontroversially, lacking in the necessary integrity and intelligence to have ever been selected as a detective. Their actual words were much more direct and colourful.
Examination of documents authored by Lunn, and some of his emails, appear to bear that out. He is also given to inaccuracies, wild exaggeration and disparaging remarks about members of the public, and in one case a criminal defence solicitor, where and whenever it suited.
So the BIG questions are, how did Mark Lunn wangle a job with the IPCC in the first place, and why did he want to conceal that appointment from his LinkedIn connections, first and foremost, and anyone else amongst the wider public, curious enough to know what the miscreant officer was up to?
A subsidiary question is why did he leave the IPCC (now IOPC) fairly recently with, apparently, no other permanent employment to go to? Lunn is currently self-employed as a jobbing builder and free range egg vendor in rural Huddersfield, where he lives. Connexions Property Maintenance, ‘a family run business owned by Mark Lunn’, trades on the fact that he is a former police officer.
In what appears to be a regular ploy, Lunn sought external funding for Golcar Free Range Eggs. He raised £50 out of a crowdfunding target of £3,000. Rather less than the £183,000 he sought from 1st Central Motor Insurance to fund his private investigation business in 2012.
A further question is why did the police tell a circuit judge that they couldn’t locate him when he was working at the IPCC, amongst other former police officers, less than 300 yards from WYP headquarters in Wakefield?
Press enquiries have been made of the Independent Office for Police Conduct, the successor organisation to the IPCC. Contact has also been made with Derrick Campbell, the IPCC Commissioner who controlled the Wakefield office at the material time.
The Home Office and West Yorkshire Police have also been approached for comment. The latter has been asked why a circuit judge was also told by Miss Checa-Dover that Mark Lunn was not the man leading the Operation Thatcham, before he was forcibly removed. Evidence heard, and documents exhibited at the final hearing of the civil claim last month plainly showed that he was (read more here).
The Police Federation press office has also been contacted. The present Chairman of their West Yorkshire branch, Brian Booth, is a friend of Mark Lunn. Mr Booth has been contacted previously but has not replied.
Enquiries have also been made of West Yorkshire Trading Standards regarding Connexions Property Maintenance. The Trading Standards mission is to aim to ensure that the people of West Yorkshire are well informed and empowered consumers who have the confidence to interact with businesses safely and securely. Mark Lunn’s history of misrepresentation and his naked attempt to solicit business by purporting to be an honest, ethical, professional police office is concerning to say the least.
A series of questions has been put to Mark Lunn. He has also been offered right of reply.
Page last updated at 1620hrs on Thursday 3rd October, 2019
Corrections: Please let me know if there is a mistake in this article. I will endeavour to correct it as soon as possible.
Right of reply: If you are mentioned in this article and disagree with it, please let me have your comments. Provided your response is not defamatory it will be added to the article.
In March 2008, an investigation began into two Huddersfield brothers. Concerns about their extravagant lifestyle, following an anonymous tip-off, appeared to be the trigger for the police probe.
At the subsequent trial in Bradford Crown Court in March, 2011, it emerged in evidence that Nadeem and Thazeem Khalid had exaggerated their earnings to obtain £968,000 from three financial institutions; Lombard, Birmingham Midshires and Kensington Finance.
They had used loans, fraudulently obtained, to buy a £75,000 Ferrari car, and two houses in Salendine Nook; a £650,000 detached house and another, valued at £160,000, that was subsequently used as a rental property.
After the trial, the detective constable based with the Kirklees CID response team, Mark Lunn, told a local newspaper:
“They were living a fast and loose lifestyle well beyond their means.
“Throughout our investigation they both showed an air of arrogance and were always of the opinion the case would never be proved. They were wrong.”
DC Lunn added: “They may believe they are untouchable and they may be enjoying a lavish lifestyle when the honest, hard working members of the public are struggling in times of austerity. But they can rest assured the police will catch up with them”.
At the time of their arrest, and conviction, the brothers were said to be running a company called Advanced Claims UK Ltd although their names have never appeared amonst the directors listed at Companies House. In both the evidence used for the fraud trial, and in the unused materials (for the legally minded, the MG6(c)), there were documents relating to the running of that company that aroused suspicion of bogus motor insurance claims.
Mark Lunn, who lives in the Golcar area of Huddersfield, joined West Yorkshire Police as a special constable in 1988. He served in that role for 6 years. He became a warranted officer in 1994 and remained, in relative obscurity, at the rank of police constable until around 2007 when he passed his basic exams and became a detective constable with the CID Response team in Huddersfield. He was a ‘rookie’ when he was given the task of investigating the Khalid brothers. It is said by the police that he was the ‘officer in the case’ for that investigation.
Following the conviction of the Khalid brothers, Lunn was ‘recommended’ to join the specialist Kirklees Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) Unit at their base in Batley Police Station. The sergeant leading the team, Mark Taylor (now an inspector in Bradford CID), says ‘it was a close knit unit’. Unusually for a detective constable, Lunn was allocated an office of his own. He was also tasked with leading an investigation, codenamed Operation Thatcham, to look further into the activities of not only the Khalid brothers but, more particularly, one of their associates, Sahir Mohammed.
But Lunn was harbouring a dark secret of his own, and the fine words he gave to the Huddersfield Examiner would come back to haunt both him and West Yorkshire Police.
Revelling in his new found ‘celebrity’, he was, soon afterwards, planning a very large loan (or investment) of his own whose provenance was questionable. The leverage for that payment was the success of the Khalid investigation and his position as lead investigator on Operation Thatcham, a joint operation that included the private, not-for-profit Insurance Fraud Bureau (read more here) and the Ministry of Justice as partners.
At around the same time, the IFB had been involved in a controversial prosecution at Southwark Crown Court of doctors and solicitors. It concluded in December, 2011, after the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) dropped all charges, with the judge, HHJ David Higgins, describing the conduct of the case as “scandalous”.
That police investigation, codenamed Operation Triassic, had been funded and driven by the insurance industry and Ian Lewis, at the time the fraud partner at Manchester law firm Lewis Hymanson Small, representing BCR Legal Group, a London-based insurance intermediary, said: “Despite repeated requests to be provided with details of the complaints, the CPS and the police failed to do so, raising speculation that this was an investigation led by the insurance industry with a suspicion of an agenda to continue the civil cost wars in the criminal courts”.
IFB, for their part, maintain that they “….provided good evidence to the City of London Police to investigate the matter further and bring charges against the professionals concerned”. An article published by Legal Futures, covering the case, can be read here.
Questions concerning IFB’s role and whether they contributed funding to Operation Thatcham have been put to both them and West Yorkshire Police.
Police documents show that Mark Lunn added to his publicly available LinkedIn profile, sometime in 2011 he says, the fact that he was a director of private investigation business using a bogus company, ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’, as its trading style. It was not registered at Companies House at that time. He was, it seems, looking to ride the tidal wave of money being thrown at tackling insurance fraud by the big players in that industry. ‘Crash for cash’ motor insurance frauds were one of the biggest concerns for underwriters and brokers.
He subsequently approached two senior managers of a large, well established insurance company based in Haywards Heath, Sussex. They were Glenn Marr (Fraud Director) and Clare Burrell (Claims Director) who both worked for 1st Central Insurance. They are part of the much larger, Guernsey based, First Central Insurance and Technology Group.
Lunn says he had been introduced to 1st Central by an, as yet, unidentified contact made through the ‘crash for cash’ investigations. He made three visits to the insurer’s head office, whilst not on West Yorkshire Police business, during the time he spent running Operation Thatcham.
A business plan for the bogus company was produced by Lunn, on police computers, although he told Detective Chief Inspector Paul Jeffrey, in interview, that he had worked on it ‘only in lunch breaks’. He also admitted sending out emails connected to ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’ using his police email account.
The plan was for 1st Central to pay him £183,000, based on that spreadsheet. Apparently, whilst Lunn was leading one of the highest profile fraud investigations in West Yorkshire Police history. A series of questions has been put to the press office of First Central Group concerning the provenance of this arrangement, given they must have known that Mark Lunn was a serving police officer and it directly conflicted with his leader role on Operation Thatcham.
Lunn had already sourced an office and agreed a rental with a well-known local businessman, Ian Pogson, who passed away suddenly in July, 2014. The premises were situated at Brougham Road, Marsden a short drive from the police officer’s home. Police documents reveal that 1st Central rejected that location as they wanted Lunn’s business premises to be situated in Leeds, the recognised regional economic centre.
Mr Pogson is named, by the police, as someone who could give advice on the drawing up of Lunn’s business plan. The link to Mr Pogson was via a former Metropolitan Police detective, Darren Jones.
Lunn says he met Mr Jones through enquiries as part of the Thatcham investigation. The latter is the principal shareholder in Fraud Consultants UK Ltd (read more here). Mr Jones was asked to verify if Mark Lunn’s account of his intermediary role is true. He states that it isn’t: Mr Jones was not a serving officer at the time and he says that Lunn approached him for advice, out of the blue, as someone who had started his own fraud investigation business. He knew Ian Pogson, as he was a client for whom he was doing professional work. Beyond that, he says he has little or no recollection of Lunn. Operation Thatcham was never discussed between them.
According to DCI Jeffrey, based on the account Lunn gave to him, a Leeds solicitor, John James, was also involved in the plans involving the bogus company, ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’. He is a personal injury specialist presently working for a firm called Legal Studio (read more here). He was described by Lunn ‘as a prospective co-director’.
At the time of the alleged association with Lunn he was working for one of the largest law firms in Leeds, Ford and Warren. His CV on the LinkedIn website describes his role there as ‘Specialising in Insurance Fraud litigation, investigating and defending fraudulent motor claims on behalf of insurer clients’. Both Mr Walker, and Weightmans Solicitors, who took over the business of Ford and Warren, have been invited to give an account of any interaction with this ‘company’, a serving police officer and what appears to be a very large sum of money.
This private enterprise, apparently involving variously, and not necessarily limited to, a serving West Yorkshire Police officer, a former Metropolitan Police officer, a solicitor, and one of Huddersfield’s most successful businessmen, was, plainly, a very serious undertaking. The fact it was being organised from Batley Police Station, using police resources (office space, computers, phones at the very least), a police email address, software licenced to the police, and relying almost entirely on a number of professional connections made whilst on one of West Yorkshire Police’s largest ever fraud operations, is concerning.
On Lunn’s own account, he had been working on the satellite project for up to a year.
A series of questions has been put to West Yorkshire Police press office in order to shed more light on how this could have possibly happened and why Detective Constable Mark Lunn was not dismissed from the force. There is also the latent question of whether any of his conduct met the criminal threshold, particularly the deception over the bogus company.
The police’s position, regarding the sanctions Lunn faced over a lengthy list of serious demeanours, is that he was placed on an Unsatisfactory Performance Plan (UPP). A three-stage process that is more aligned to Human Resources than Professional Standards. Routinely used to tackle issues such as lateness or poor attendance record.
The UPP proposition, advanced by West Yorkshire Police, intended to divert attention from the investigation that it is known did take place into Mark Lunn, is, quite simply, preposterous. Those making it, and those maintaining it, should, themselves, face disciplinary or regulatory investigation.
There are also the residual and more serious issues of (i) what happened to the money that the police say was paid to Lunn and (ii) was it legitimately obtained? Public confidence in the police will suffer a serious detriment if answers are not provided to these questions.
On 14th May, 2012 a Bradford firm of criminal defence solicitors, Opus Law, wrote to the Professional Standards Department of West Yorkshire Police and drew the force’s attention to at least some of Lunn’s nefarious activities. Opus, a ‘Legal 500 Leading Firm’, represented one of the persons arrested, two months earlier, as part of Operation Thatcham: Dr Abdul Rashid, a Bradford GP and medico-legal expert.
It appears as though PSD was either slow to act, as the third of Mark Lunn’s three visits to 1st Insurance took place eight days later, on 22nd May, 2012, or, by then, they had him under covert surveillance. He had taken that day off as unplanned leave, telling his supervisor, Detective Sergeant Taylor that he had ‘child care difficulties’. He later told DCI Jeffrey he couldn’t remember saying that and, according to DCI Jeffrey’s notes, Lunn ‘made great play of how bad his memory was these days’.
On Monday 4th June, 2012, Mark Lunn started a planned two week period of leave. At a County Court hearing that concluded recently in Bradford Combined Court Centre, DI Mark Taylor (as he is now) gave evidence about how he came to know of Lunn’s burgeoning private enterprise. It can be paraphrased in this way: ‘On or about the first day of Lunn’s leave, DC Andrew Barrett came to his office and blew the whistle on Lunn, whom had been heard in telephone conversations obviously not to do with his police work’.
In police documents it emerges that, on DI Taylor’s account, DC Barrett was not the only team member to have heard, or seen, Lunn conducting such activities. Others were aware that he had compiled a business plan and had travelled ‘down south’ to make a ‘pitch’ for investment in his business. There was a huge concern as to how this would impact on the integrity of Operation Thatcham’.
DI Taylor’s further evidence in court was that he telephoned DI Andrew Leonard on that day, which he said was ‘at the end of May or beginning of June’ to share the knowledge of DC Barrett’s whistle blowing. There is no contemporaneous document available to support this account by DI Taylor. No emails, entry in pocket note books (PNB’s), or day books, and nothing on the investigation policy log relating to this. A ‘big red flag’ to borrow a phrase the police’s barrister, Olivia Checa-Dover, is fond of using, was not raised anywhere, it seems. Just an internal phone call, of which there is no audit trail.
A remarkable feature of those proceedings was the extent to which DI Taylor’s recollection of events varied from question to question, put to him in his examination-in-chief and, later, his cross-examination.
Another feature was that a significant number of other documents that would have supported DI Taylor’s oral evidence had either gone missing, been inexplicably destroyed or not searched for.
A third feature was how little DI Taylor appeared to know about the day to day running of the Thatcham investigation. For example, on a policy log with a very large number of entries he could not point to a single entry he had made. Almost every single one was made by DC Lunn. He told the court he was involved in thirteen other investigations or prosecutions at the time.
A fourth feature, very obviously of course, was the massive private enterprise, with a dangerous conflict of interest, being organised by the officer leading the investigation, right under DI Taylor’s nose. For up to a year, Lunn must have regarded his supervisor, working in an adjacent office, with scarcely concealed contempt.
Without the letter from Opus Law, it is possible that Lunn would have got away with his plans and scammed both West Yorkshire Police and, possibly, 1st Central Insurance, who were being asked to invest very heavily in a bogus company whilst the principal was a serving police officer.
On 7thJune, 2012, DI Taylor was copied into an email sent by D/Sgt Lockwood. Attached to the email was the letter from Opus Law.
When asked in cross-examination, at the County Court trial, if he had ever seen the Opus letter, before being shown the email in the trial bundle, he answered firmly in the negative.
He didn’t repeat the regular mantra of ‘I don’t recall’ or ‘I can’t remember’. He said: ‘No’
When shown the Lockwood email, he conceded that he must have opened it and seen the letter. The judge, Ben Nolan QC, sitting in this case as a Recorder, characterised this type of evidence as being tendered by a ‘truthful, reliable and extremely professional officer’. The judgment also gratuitously praises DI Taylor’s ‘very good recollection of his role as supervisor of DC Lunn’.
There is, very evidently, a tension between the daily reports of the hearings posted from the press seats and those judicial findings (read here). Not to mention the dangerous enterprise Lunn was perpetrating right under DI Taylor’s nose.
It now transpires, after further investigation, that the Opus letter featured in a meeting with DCI Jeffrey that took place on the day following receipt of the Lockwood email. DI Taylor had actually taken the letter to the meeting for the purpose of bringing it to the attention of ‘the boss’. The letter was not an item on the agenda, this was a routine operational review meeting of POCA team activity, and it seems, from DCI Jeffrey’s own account that this occasion was the first he knew of the Lunn complaint. It was only raised by DI Taylor when the review turned to Operation Thatcham, not as a matter of very considerable importance at the outset. Yet DI Taylor’s best evidence to the court was that he had never seen the Opus letter before being shown it in the witness box.
In DCI Jeffrey’s detailed notes of that meeting there is no mention of the Taylor phone call to DI Leonard. Or, indeed, any contact between Leonard and Jeffrey. It appears that, on all the available evidence, it was the first DCI Jeffrey, the Head of Crime in Kirklees, had heard of the complaints made against Lunn by Opus Law. 25 days after their letter had been sent to West Yorkshire Police.
The apparent delay by the POCA team, and the seeming lack of urgency in managing the complaint up the command chain, over what were, on any independent view, serious allegations, is troubling. Particularly, in the light of knowledge held, by both PSD and those senior officers, over a ‘written warning’ sanction Lunn had received, previously, at the end of a misconduct investigation into misuse of police computers. Given what was alleged, and the fact that the latest complaint came from a leading firm of solicitors well acquainted with policing matters, with documentary evidence supporting it, gives rise to suspicion that other dynamics were in play.
Frequently, police officers are dismissed from the service for computer and data misuse. It is, quite rightly, viewed very seriously and, as such, a curiosity as to why Lunn escaped with such a relatively minor sanction over his previous breach. Nevertheless, in the light of that disciplinary finding, the decision to allocate Detective Constable Lunn an office of his own in Batley Police Station, away from the gaze of the rest of his colleagues, appears highly questionable and smacks of poor supervision and decision making.
There was also one other live PSD complaint running at the time, from a member of the public, over the failure of Lunn to return seized property. The outcome of that complaint is not known. In his written response to PSD, Lunn had declared that he was ‘Team Thatcham‘ and that status, apparently, gave him immunity from any criticism, either internally or from members of the public.
In the same County Court proceedings, featuring the unlawful arrest of Dr Rashid, the court heard at the pre-trial review that there had been three previous complaints made against Lunn, by members of the public, alleging unlawful arrest. None were upheld by PSD. Under force policy at that time, West Yorkshire Police should, however, have placed a ‘red flag’ against Lunn’s name for having three complaints of the same classification made against him, irrespective of whether they were upheld or not.
Dr Rashid’s unlawful arrest claim was also dismissed, after a ten day court hearing, but is presently subject to an appeal to the High Court. He was never charged with any offence, but kept on police bail until June, 2013.
DC Mark Lunn, the officer in charge of the Thatcham investigation was, on the documentary evidence provided by the police to the court, clearly a detective who was prepared to persistently lie; misuse police assets; misrepresent himself using a police email account to further a private enterprise; repeatedly deceive fellow police officers working in the same team; engage in conduct that placed a huge fraud investigation at risk; gratuitously embellish his CV (which he still does to this day); repeatedly breach Police Conduct Regulations and place self-interest well above public service. Added to all that ‘he made great play of how bad his memory was’.
Unsurprisingly, that is not the view Mark Lunn projects about himself.
Incredibly, this was the officer who planned and executed the arrest of Dr Rashid and wrote the operational order that included a massive, pre-dawn police raid at a residential property in an upmarket suburb of Bradford, the home of a well known professional man deeply embedded in the local community, and in which children as young as seven years old were asleep.
The findings of the judge, at the conclusion of the Rashid trial, seek to strongly downplay the impact of Lunn on the lawfulness of the doctor’s arrest and his role in it. Not only in the face of what was known in court about an officer whose very presence, let alone his position as its leader, appears to taint the entire investigation, or at the very least, up to the point he was removed from it, but the fact that almost all the documents, upon which Lunn might reasonably have noted the reasons he relied upon for the arrest, appear to have been ‘sanitised’. This formed part of the closing submissions of Dr Rashid’s barrister at the end of the trial. A point seemingly not addressed in the judgment.
The officer in charge of disclosure, on behalf of the police legal team, was DI Taylor. Warmly praised by the judge as ‘extremely professional’. From the press seats, at least, across three hearings, beginning in December, 2018 and ending in September, 2019 the drip-feed disclosure process had the appearance of an exercise whose principal aim was not to reveal anything that would undermine the principal plank of the police case.
The police’s various and changing explanations for the absence of key documents, including some of those provided by DI Taylor on oath, pose some difficulty when reconciling what is known as Authorised Professional Practice (formerly issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers, more latterly by the College of Policing), and the internal management of police information (MoPI) policies of a well-run police force. Not to mention their lawful obligations, Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and duty of care.
One reasonable hypothesis, given what is now known about his general character and integrity, is that DC Lunn had exaggerated the reasons for the arrest in the contemporaneous documents pertaining to the arrest, for the purpose of enhancing his ‘pitch’ for investment in his private business by 1st Century – and giving the motor claims industry a ‘prized scalp’, as Dr Rashid was described in pre-trial court proceedings.
Significant support for this line of reasoning is that within hours of Dr Rashid’s arrest, Lunn had written to the General Medical Council to tell them that the doctor had been arrested over ‘serious fraud, money laundering and was part of an organised crime gang’. The words ‘on suspicion of’ or ‘alleged’ were notably absent. Lunn had also told the GMC that Dr Rashid was using drugs, but did not specify their nature, or application.
Lunn went on to say that patient records were found scattered in his home and the boot of his car. That was a baseless allegation, unsupported by evidence, photographic or otherwise. The ‘money laundering’ was an invention, as was the allegation that there was a misuse of drugs. None of these matters were ever put to Dr Rashid in interview.
Apart from this grotesque, and arguably libellous, smearing of Dr Rashid, it was a serious breach of West Yorkshire Police’s policy for disclosure to regulated professions. A task, for very obvious reasons, almost always undertaken by a specialist, qualified officer in the Force Disclosure Unit.
The General Medical Council’s Fitness to Practice Panel rejected West Yorkshire Police’s submissions and cleared Dr Rashid of any wrongdoing.
On 18th June, 2012, on the first day back on duty after his holiday leave, Lunn was summoned to Divisional HQ in Huddersfield for a meeting with DCI Jeffrey and DI Leonard, who was Mark Taylor’s line manager at that time.
Perversely, given what was alleged, and Lunn’s past history of police computer misuse, this was arranged as an informal meeting. The public might reasonably have expected that, given the suspicion of at least one criminal offence, Lunn would have been arrested and interviewed under caution.
A countervailing argument might be that admissions could be coaxed from Lunn by informal questioning, rather than when represented by his lawyer and a Police Federation representative at a formal interview under caution, where he might be advised to give a ‘no comment’ interview and provide a statement prepared by the Fed’s own lawyers at its conclusion.
Dr Rashid, for one, might well point out that he was never given such opportunity. Instead, sixteen police officers turned up at his home at 6.15am banging on the door.
It is clear from Paul Jeffrey’s detailed account of the meeting that an internal investigation had been launched against Lunn on 8th June, and a significant amount of information and material seized prior to the interview on the 18th. It is now apparent that the investigation was codenamed Operation Wademere.
At the outset of that meeting with two of his superiors, Lunn was dismissive of the complaint against him and maintained that the Opus Law letter was ‘a bit of a joke’. The bogus company was ‘only an idea’ he said. He was unaware that an investigation into the complaint by PSD, or, more likely, the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) that falls under the PSD umbrella, had started ten days ago, at DCI Jeffrey’s instigation.
Lunn’s approach to the interview was described by fellow police officers as ‘closed’ and ‘evasive’. He was prepared to lie to two senior officers in an attempt to bluff his way out of the Opus complaint. He only made admissions, they said, when he belatedly realised that his superiors already had the answers to the questions they were putting to him.
Eventually, and reluctantly, it was admitted by Lunn that he had misused police computers again; he was running the private investigation business from his home, rather than the office he had agreed to pay £50 per month to rent; he was using contacts gained specifically through the Operation Thatcham investigation to set up his business; he had breached force policy in not disclosing his business interests; most crucially, there was a clear conflict of interest with his duties as the Officer in the Case and the acknowledged lead investigator in Operation Thatcham.
To the extent he had, potentially, placed the entire investigation in jeopardy. Not least, it seems, by procuring the services of a chartered physiotherapist, Lee Robinson, as a director of the bogus company. Robinson was already a retained expert witness on Operation Thatcham.
That conflict, the police admit, would have led to the collapse of the Thatcham trials if the information was disclosed to the Crown Prosecution Service. The decision was made by a group of officers to deliberately conceal that crucial information from the CPS and the legal teams of those on trial.
Lunn denied any other police officers were involved in the plans.
He was removed from Operation Thatcham on the same day, but neither suspended nor placed on restricted duties (normally a non-public facing role and not adjacent to any evidence chains). Instead, Lunn was posted to the Huddersfield South neighbourhood team. Policing the area both where he lived and planned to set up his private investigation office, with the locals unaware that, in their midst, was a ‘bad apple’ police officer. One with a history of complaints of unlawful arrests (at the time, four), one who had twice misused police computers, and one who had repeatedly lied to, and deliberately deceived, other police officers. With a bad memory, to boot.
DCI Jeffrey also noted after the meeting with Lunn on 18th June, 2012 that there was a clear risk of ‘reputational damage’ to West Yorkshire Police if details of Lunn’s activities emerged into the public domain. The risk to the public of rural Huddersfield appeared not to have even been considered, let alone assessed, by DCI Jeffrey or the Professional Standards officers. That, despite the conclusion being drawn by Paul Jeffrey: ‘There are misconduct issues apparent in the information gathering exercise conducted today and I have no doubt that there is significantly more information [about Lunn] that will come out over time’.
Some of that information may have concerned a registration that was made at Companies House, in the name of ‘Insurance Fraud Consultants Ltd’., very shortly after Mark Lunn was removed from Operation Thatcham. It is unclear whether Lunn has any connection with any of the officers named as having control of the company. West Yorkshire Police have been asked to clarify.
Following the report of the Jeffrey/Leonard/Lunn meeting, in correspondence circulated to seven officers, up to the rank of superintendent, and who were, in one form or another, stakeholders in the investigation into Lunn’s activities, it was clear that there were serious concerns about what had been extracted from the police systems, by Lunn, to further his own commercial enterprise. Sgt Jonathan Dunkerley (as he was then) said: ‘It worrys (sic) me what he may have ‘taken’ with him from WYP systems that is clearly for personal gain. It’s obvious the monies and stakes are high’.
It also appears that Lunn was involved in another covert ACU investigation, codenamed Operation Waffleedge. ACU investigations are normally given operational codenames, Professional Standards investigations are given unique reference numbers (URN’s). For example, the Opus complaint had the URN ‘CO/797/11’.
The covert investigation was confirmed in an email between the Intelligence Unit in PSD and Stephen Bywater, following additional concerns raised with PSD on 8th June, 2012 by D/Sgt Lockwood, regarding Lunn. It was obvious that DS Lockwood was not in the ACU loop. The Waffleedge investigation was already under way:
‘We have received this request from Andy Lockwood about Mark Lunn. We are working on Mark LUNN for Op Waffleedge. What do you want to happen. Does someone contact DS Lockwood and let him know of our concerns? Or does the Intelligence Unit just do the work as requested?’
The police, in defending the unlawful arrest claim made by Dr Rashid, have given a variety of explanations for the Waffleedge investigation at pre-trial hearings, at the final hearing and in documents disclosed to the court. Including the proposition, submitted in court, that ‘Waffleedge was not a covert operation’. Taken together, they arouse the reasonable suspicion that the true findings of that investigation are being concealed, to the significant detriment of both Dr Rashid, the integrity of the Operation Thatcham investigation and, most crucially, public confidence in the police force.
There is also a freedom of information request in which West Yorkshire Police have refused to provide any information at all. They will not even confirm or deny Operation Waffleedge exists (read more here).
An appeal against the refusal by the police to disclose uncontroversial details about the investigation is, presently, being considered by the Information Commissioner. It is likely to be, ultimately, determined before an information rights tribunal. That is the only conceivable chance of prising at least part of the truth about Waffleedge from West Yorkshire Police.
Mark Lunn was, remarkably, not called to give evidence at the hearing into the unlawful arrest claimed by Dr Rashid. One of the reasons heard in court was an incredible submission by Miss Checa-Dover, at the pre-trial hearing before HHJ Neil Davey QC, that ‘the police couldn’t locate him’.
Amongst Lunn’s Facebook friends are Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC) investigator, Mohammed Ejaz, and the present Chair of West Yorkshire Police Federation, Brian Booth. Which, apart from laying to waste the proposition that Lunn couldn’t be found, presents an interesting challenge to those organisations, and damages public confidence in both by exhibiting a close association with a ‘bad apple’ police officer. Questions have been put to them both, individually, and to their respective press offices.
Quite apart from which, it took less than 20 minutes, using open source material, for the author of this article to locate Mark Lunn. His home address, the names of the two businesses he now runs (jobbing builder and free range eggs vendor), his mobile telephone number, his Facebook account, and his LinkedIn account.
The trail of destruction he left behind as a police officer has lasted rather longer than 20 minutes – and it may not have ended yet. It appears from the various police correspondence, and reports, forming the rump of this article, that senior officers may have taken the decision to hide Lunn away, in what they believed was a noble cause and until the Thatcham investigation was completed, and not disclose his misdemeanours to those charged with offences arising from it. That may have influenced the defendant’s decision whether to plead guilty, or not, at court.
There has to be considerable doubt as to whether the trials would have proceeded if the fruits of the ACU and PSD investigations into Mark Lunn had been properly served on the CPS and the defendant’s legal team, as part of the police’s strict duty under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996.
Dr Rashid’s barrister, Ian Pennock of Park Lane Plowden Chambers in Leeds, raised this issue in court during his final submissions. He said that if the Lunn disclosures were not made, and it is more likely than not they weren’t, this could amount to a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and required further investigation.
The judge observed that it didn’t matter as the defendants had pleaded guilty and the time for any appeal against conviction had lapsed. He did not address the core point of alleged police wrongdoing, or explore with the police legal team whether the criminal defence teams (or the CPS) of those convicted were, in fact, notified of Mark Lunn’s role in the investigation and his taint upon it. The CPS has been approached for comment.
A complaint is being made to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, by Dr Rashid’s legal team, with a request that another police force is appointed to investigate those allegations of perverting the course of justice.
That, regrettably, is founded more on hope than reality.
Recent history shows that the disgraced police watchdog and their local ‘masters’, West Yorkshire Police, will not want to lift the lid on this stinking Thatcham barrel. Both have steadfastly resisted calls to instigate a proportionate and independent investigation into the alleged serious failings of senior police officers over the industrial scale child sexual abuse, drug dealing, human trafficking in Huddersfield by Asian gangs – described recently by one outspoken media commentator as ‘Grooming Gang Central’.
A common link is that the Divisional Commander of Kirklees from 2009 to 2012 was Chief Superintendent John Robins, now, no less, the chief constable of that same West Yorkshire Police (read WYP biography here).
The child sex scandal and the Operation Thatcham debacle both happened on Robins’ Kirklees watch. As were the seeds of the outrageous lawlessless sown that has now seen ‘Horrible’ Huddersfield grow into the worst place to live in the UK (read more here).
Page last updated at 1100hrs on Wednesday 9th October, 2019
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David Rogerson is an unpleasant, foul-mouthed bully, a view readily formed by most people viewing films of his interaction with Huddersfield businessman, Stephen Bradbury, outside of West Yorkshire Police’s prestigious divisional HQ at Havertop, near Featherstone.
It is also the view of at least two WYP colleagues who worked with him at Havertop and, having now retired, are relieved to be no longer in his orbit. But not, it must be said, Rogerson’s own Professional Standards Department, within WYP, or his staff association, the Police Federation. Or, indeed, the recently retired chief constable, Dee Collins. The latter, incredibly, signed off a promotion for Rogerson in the face of his odious conduct that could, and some argue should, have led to a criminal conviction.
On 18th June, 2015, Mr Bradbury had attended Havertop in order to gather information, including video footage and photographs for a forthcoming documentary with which he was concerned.
A short time after his arrival, he was approached by Sergeant Dale Wooffinden, and then surrounded by six other police officers (with nothing better to do), and asked to explain his presence outside the police station and his intentions. Mr Bradbury gave his explanation and produced a letter from Chief Constable Andy Trotter, of the Association of Chief Police Officers (now renamed the National Police Chiefs Council), as it related directly to members of the public and photography in and around police premises.
Sgt Wooffinden, and his restless posse, having read the letter, was satisfied with the explanation and allowed Mr Bradbury to go about his lawful business.
Soon afterwards, CCTV footage shows the arrival of Acting Inspector Rogerson, as he was then, before his subsequent promotion to substantive inspector, and a short interchange with Mr Bradbury, prior to the officer entering the secure staff car park, ended with Rogerson calling him “an arsehole”.
The police officer, is then captured on footage accompanying Detective Constable Lisa Redfern, emerging from the car park and walking towards Mr Bradbury. A plainly agitated Rogerson tells DC Redfern: “I’m going to arrest him“. He offers no explanation to his female colleague as to the suspicion of any offence. She, in turn, offers no challenge as to the lawfulness of such an action, or the likely consequences.
As Rogerson approached, Mr Bradbury says: “You are going to lock him up are you, is that what you said?”. He took out a hand-held digital camera in order to record what was happening. The police officer then claims that Mr Bradbury is “harassing him” before grabbing his camera, and then the lanyard attached to it, which was draped around his neck. An assault had clearly taken place, the camera had been damaged, and the officer was asked to stop. Rogerson ignored the request and proceeded to drag his victim towards the police station, falsely claiming he had been assaulted by Mr Bradbury.
At this point, Rogerson told Mr Bradbury he was under arrest, but released his grip on the camera and lanyard. He did not caution him, disclose the suspicion of any offence, or give any grounds for doing so. He simply fulfilled the promise he had made to his female accomplice a short while earlier.
At this point, DC Redfern intervenes but only, quite incredibly, to tell Mr Bradbury to “calm down”. She offered no challenge to her police colleague, as she is required to do under Police Regulations, and no protection to a member of the public subject to a pre-meditated, unprovoked verbal and physical attack. As a police officer she also should have known that the arrest was unlawful and there had been manifest breaches of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984. Her later accounts, during the complaints process that followed, suggest she did not. She was entirely supportive of Rogerson’s actions.
Mr Bradbury attempted to explain the prior exchange with Sgt Wooffinden and when the three ‘combatants’ reached the foyer of the police station, Rogerson marched off after refusing to provide details of his name and collar number. It is not clear if he subsequently spoke to Sgt Wooffinden, or not. Mr Bradbury’s camera was damaged and he had suffered abrasions and soft tissue injury to his neck.
DC Redfern failed to respond at all when asked if Mr Bradbury was under arrest. A point she failed to mention in her later account. As a result, he left the police station voluntarily, if not a little shakily, and was never subsequently detained or questioned about the ‘arrest’ by the police. Ms Redfern did not offer any first aid or make any enquiries about his well-being, or fitness to travel home. Another police officer who was sat in a vehicle nearby, and had witnessed the events involving Rogerson, declined to give either his own details, or those of his male colleague. Similarly, he made no enquiries about Mr Bradbury’s welfare.
Shortly after the incident a complaint was submitted to WYP. It set out carefully, and comprehensively, the events that had taken place. The matters therein were not only supported by CCTV film obtained on Mr Bradbury’s Go-Pro camera, there were five cameras in the police station precincts that had captured the attack on Mr Bradbury and the events leading up to it.
After a delay of almost two months, the complaint was allocated to Sergeant Penny Morley of WYP’s notorious Professional Standards Department. This was a clear indication that the police were going to try to fudge the complaint and ensure that the six month limit for a prosecution of Rogerson was going to pass, whilst they prevaricated. Sgt Morley had, some years previously, been called out by a circuit judge, HHJ Peter Benson, following a trial in Bradford Crown Court during which she gave untruthful evidence. Taking the College of Policing‘s Code of Ethics as a guide, she should no longer be part of the police service, let alone sitting in judgment of other officers, after such a condemnatory judicial finding.
A decision was taken by Mr Bradbury, in conjunction with his police complaints advocate, Neil Wilby (the author of this article), to lay an information at Kirkless Magistrates Court. This is more commonly known as a private prosecution. The necessary documents, witness statement and copies of film and photographs, were filed at court on 14th December, 2015, just before the six month statutory limit expired. The allegations concerned assault and criminal damage.
West Yorkshire Police and the Police Federation were livid when they discovered that the Resident District Judge, Michael Fanning, had issued a Summons against Rogerson, in early January 2016, under Section 6 of the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985. They did not believe that the threat to issue court proceedings, privately, against Rogerson would be carried through. It was the first of its kind in living memory of court staff at Huddesfield and Leeds.
A pre-trial review was held the following month in Huddersfield and the Federation sent Nick Terry, a partner with Burton Copeland solicitors in Manchester, to try and have the case dismissed. Even with support, by way of an email from the District Prosecutor of the Crown Prosecution Service, Malcolm Christy, on the morning of the hearing, the judge was unpersuaded by Mr Terry’s increasingly desperate arguments, and those of the CPS rendered by email, and the matter was set down for trial on 16th April, 2016. Mr Bradbury, having represented himself at the first hearing, then appointed a leading local solicitor advocate, Michael Sisson-Pell, to prosecute the case on his behalf.
Three days before the trial the CPS notified the court that they were taking over the prosecution for the sole purpose of discontinuing it. Mr Bradbury was not notified until the day before the hearing. The Deputy Head of CPS Yorkshire and Humber Region, Andrew Penhale, said that whilst the prosecution did not meet the public interest test, the evidential threshold was satisfied and there was a reasonable prospect of a conviction against Rogerson.
Smiles and handshakes all round at the police and Federation HQ in Wakefield, but Mr Bradbury was left with a £600 bill for legal fees (which Mr Sisson-Pell had very kindly reduced to the bare minimum) for which the CPS and the police steadfastly refused to reimburse Mr Bradbury.
The complaint that the CPS were ‘in thrall’ to WYP, and the Federation, did appear to have some merit. A review of the decision not to prosecute Rogerson also failed. As did Mr Bradbury’s entreaties to the CPS regional head, Gerry Wareham. Approached for comment about this article, Mr Wareham said: “Our job is to take over prosecutions like this one [Mr Bradbury’s] that have no merit”. Which flies in the face, completely, of everything the CPS has written and reported about the case previously. Not least that it met the evidential test and that a conviction was likely.
WYP’s PSD then dragged their heels for another two years before finalising the complaints against both Rogerson and Redfern. They, of course, found nothing wrong and both escaped any meaningful sanction. Rogerson was given words of advice after a misconduct hearing and, of course, promoted. Redfern’s alleged misdemeanours were dismissed out of hand. The misconduct hearing was, bizarrely, chaired by Inspector Richard Close, an officer who had acted adversely against Mr Bradbury several times over the past six years, including being a central player in a well-organised ambush and arrest outside police HQ in Wakefield. A malicious prosecution of Mr Bradbury followed, but it didn’t get beyond ‘half-time’ at the nearby Magistrates Court as District Judge Day threw the case out. Gerry Wareham is curiously silent on that CPS debacle.
Vigorous protests to Dee Collins, were, disgracefully, brushed aside in the face of the most compelling evidence against Close. Including the fact that Close had not seized relevant filmed and photographic evidence, including the clip embedded in this article and pictures of his injuries and the damaged camera. Or, obtained witness statements from either Mr Bradbury or Sgt Wooffinden. It was a classic West Yorkshire Police ‘cover-up’.
But the last word went to Mr Bradbury, via his solicitorIain Gould of DPP Law in Bootle. Letters before claim were drawn up regarding this and a number of other incidents in which Mr Bradbury was adversely affected by the unlawful actions of West Yorkshire Police and he was awarded £13,750 in compensation. The out of court settlement that meant the police avoided having to air their dirty washing in public.
Two of the other cases that led to the compensation award are covered in a separate article on this site and can be read here.
The ambush of Mr Bradbury outside of police HQ and the subsequent shambles of an arrest, detention, investigation and prosecution is to be the subject of a further article on this website in the near future.
Page last updated: Thursday 25th April, 2019 at 1810 hours
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Photo credit: West Yorkshire Police In Action YouTube Channel